







## INDEPENDENT EGYPT





AMINE YOUSSEF BEY

# INDEPENDENT EGYPT

By  
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*With a Preface by*  
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*(From caricatures by Saroukhan)*

## PREFACE

“GOOD wine needs no bush,” runs the proverb. As an inveterate water-drinker and, perhaps, as a practical idealist, Amine Youssef Bey ignores its truth. So he has asked me, for what my name may be worth, to serve as “bush” to the good wine of these entertaining and enlightening Memoirs.

In so doing I cannot quite rid my mind of the thought that it may be impertinent on my part to write in praise of a book about Egypt, a country of which I know little at first-hand. Yet, as his introductory chapter shows, Amine Youssef Bey is as sincerely concerned with Great Britain and the British Empire as he is with Egypt and the story of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Not without good reason he sees the British Empire today on its trial. New forms of government, born of new ideals and based on new systems, are challenging the ideals and the systems of government upon which the British Empire stands. He believes—again, in my view, rightly—that the basic unity of the British Empire “is in the ideals of freedom, of democratic government, of the right of each section of it, and of each individual within each section to order their own lives as they will, provided that they do not prevent the rest from enjoying a similar liberty.” And he thinks it the duty of every friend of the British Empire now to come forward with any facts bearing upon its security, be those facts



## Preface

pleasant or unpleasant, and to bring them to the notice of the British people.

Whether Amine Youssef Bey realises it or not he is exercising in this book a fundamental right of every supporter of ordered freedom—the right to criticise. And if he feels the possession of this right to entail a public duty upon those who possess it, he is not far from understanding the twin postulates of democracy. For the right to criticise carries with it a sense of responsible duty. In both respects his book is to be welcomed.

Those Englishmen who, like me, read in their youth Lubbock's *Pleasures of Life*, and *Self-Help* and *Duty* by Dr. Samuel Smiles—"Self-Helpful, wholly strenuous Samuel Smiles," as Kipling calls him—will note with something more than interest the influence of these works upon a young Egyptian Nationalist who was to become the son-in-law and helper of Saad Zaghloul Pasha and the founder of a movement for co-operative self-help among his impoverished fellow townsmen of Damietta. As my old chief and friend, the late Sir Valentine Chirol, wrote of Amine Youssef's work in the difficult years after the War :

"The one bright spot was the capacity for self-help which some of the Egyptians themselves displayed. An organisation started by a young Nationalist lawyer of Damietta, Amine Effendi Youssef, indeed showed a better way to the authorities. The co-operative association which he initiated in his own native town, one of the poorest in Egypt, where 24,000 out of a total population of 32,000 were in sore need of assistance, and which he subsequently extended to Mansourah and other towns, not only in the Delta, but in Upper Egypt, laid itself out at once to discriminate between those

## *Preface*

who clearly deserve relief and those who do not, whereas the Government scheme left many loopholes for the well-to-do and especially for the big traders to reap the benefit of the sale of foodstuffs under cost price. Lord Allenby very wisely did not allow himself to be deterred from giving official support to this promising movement by the prejudice which its Nationalist origin seemed at first to raise against it."

When, in 1923, the "lean years" ended, it was found that the "self-helpful" work of this young lawyer—of whom it can hardly be said that he "knew not Joseph," since he bears Joseph's name—had saved the people of Egypt no less than £7,000,000 in two years. Starting with very meagre funds borrowed from a few friends, he had set up in several parts of the country twenty-six co-operative relief stores which assisted 343,000 poor families and accumulated a capital of £500,000.

It would therefore seem that with an achievement of this magnitude to his credit Amine Youssef can hardly be an idle dreamer, or an Oriental merely toying with Western notions of democracy or using them as counters in a political game. His recognition of the great work done for Egypt by Lord Cromer and by other British administrators would in itself allay suspicion that he may be only a plausible Egyptian Nationalist masquerading as a man of liberal mind. And it is because of the sincerely liberal outlook which he combines with love of his own country that his testimony upon past events and the present position deserves respectful attention.

In his brooding over the future of Egypt Amine Youssef Bey sees the surest safeguard of his country's



## AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

AT the moment when I had completed this book two events, the change of Ministry in Egypt and the outbreak of war in Europe, occurred which make it essential that a few words should now be added.

Before I do so, however, I want to remedy one omission which, on reading the proofs, I realise I have made. I want to express my deep appreciation of the services rendered to the cause of the economic independence of Egypt by Talaat Harb Pasha and his colleagues Midhat Yeken Pasha and Fuad Sultan Bey. I do this particularly for my Egyptian readers, since the work of these pioneers cannot be familiar in England and it is too late for me to give details of it. My English readers will perhaps bear with me in this matter, when I say that these names will in Egypt be handed down to posterity, however much their bearers may be criticised by opponents of their policies, as those of men who inspired the younger generation with a new confidence and with a spirit of self-reliance previously unknown. They have been the leaders for twenty years in our great commercial, industrial and financial progress. If in the future we are destined to enter on a life of prosperity and economic security, it will be in great measure due to them, and I am convinced that in days to come the name of Talaat Harb will be engraved with that of Zaghloul in the hearts of all Egyptians.

Now for the situation created by recent events.

### *Author's Foreword*

In the last two years Egypt has seen great changes in her political life. It has been a surprise to many, both here and in Great Britain, that these have apparently aroused so little enthusiasm among the Egyptian people. The fact may be due to a feeling of disappointment. Their own leaders, whether in or out of office, do not appear to them to have laid aside their personal interests and quarrels after the Treaty and to have united, as it had been hoped they would, in constructive policies of reform. Some of those leaders have gone so far as to risk the sacrifice of the constitutional rights they had fought so hard to acquire, in order that they might be revenged on others who had used their popularity to persecute them. Perhaps, too, the man in the street has been disappointed in the attitude of the British. He has noted a certain lack of sympathy for the Egyptians and a tendency to nullify the effects of the Treaty by supporting reactionary and repressive measures destructive of the political rights and liberties of the people. He fears that the ideals and promises voiced by the English have been forgotten and that they have traded upon the disunity of the Egyptian leaders to enhance their own influence.

There need be no fear that this disappointment, however real, in any way weakens Egyptian support of Great Britain in the war. Egypt knows that her real interests are bound up with the victory of Great Britain.

Every member of a young or small nation is today analysing the world-situation and considering how the war is going to affect him, his family and his country. He sees Britain now, if ever, defending justice against oppression, the weak against the strong. He sees her risking all in the cause of humanity. For, if Germany

is victorious in this war, it will mean the destruction of civilisation for five hundred years.

Speaking as an Egyptian, I ask my friends and my countrymen to be loyal to the Treaty of Alliance we made with Great Britain and thereby to be loyal to themselves, to their families and to the great inheritance which God has given them. Great Britain is prepared to sacrifice her wealth and her manhood in this just cause. She needs the help of all who understand the principles of humanity. They must come forward ; they must organise themselves ; they must teach others ; they must render every assistance and support to her, whether she asks for it or not.

The American, the South African, the Canadian, the Australian, the Iraquian—all those peoples which, after a struggle or without it, have in the end obtained their independence with the recognition of the British Commonwealth of Nations, see the issue as I see it. There are other nations dependent on Great Britain whose aspirations have not yet been fulfilled. Let them read the recent history of Egypt, of South Africa, of Iraq and they will realise that their hope lies in her victory.

There was a time when Britain stood for a form of imperialism which did not recognise the rights of small and undeveloped nations. Today that is gone and she stands for brotherhood among all the peoples of the world. In witness of that policy she has taken up arms for the independence of a country far removed from her and not linked to her by ties of race or political association. In the near future, if I am not mistaken, there will be a movement among the nations of the world, in Egypt as well elsewhere, towards the formation of closer social ties uniting them, towards the organised instruction and

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inspiration of those whom the written word cannot reach, in order that they may realise that not only is their worldly well-being at stake, but also their spiritual salvation.

Great Britain will not, I am confident, in this war commit those errors, which she committed in the last, towards countries which are indebted to her ideals and to her co-operation for their liberty and independence. She will in conjunction with them mobilise, not armies alone, but also brains. We shall then repay her, since we shall not need to struggle for our salvation when war is upon us, by the free offer of material assistance and of sacrifice in its conduct.

We must give of our money and of our time. We must also give of our brains. This we must do, not so much that Britain may be victorious—for that we know she will be at any cost and in face of any difficulties—but rather that her victory may slay for her and for her allies the dragon of destruction which from time to time comes to demand its toll of human happiness. Let us neither forget nor forgive any man, whatever be his position, who through ignorance or malice stands in the way of that victory.

Our differences and our party politics must be laid aside in face of the greater dangers of tyranny and humiliation. In the great cause of humanity and justice for which Britain is fighting and in which she will be victorious, she will have the wholehearted support of all Oriental countries, of all Mohammedans and especially of all Egyptians.

And now I want to dispel any misconception that may arise in regard to my motives in writing this book. I have in the course of it at times been critical both of

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the British and of Egyptians. I have no wish to withdraw one word of my criticism. For it has not been prompted by any of that malice which so often sharpens the literary axe. I have, I admit, had an ulterior motive in telling the story of my life. Who has not? It has been the welfare of my country, which I believe to be bound up with the welfare of Great Britain. My criticism has been uninfluenced by personal considerations. If public men feel resentment at anything I have written, they must remember that their position invites criticism. But I will go further. For those whom I have attacked I will make the plea that no country has a monopoly of political folly. Politicians the world over have committed and will commit blunders, through self-interest, vanity, desire for revenge and, worst of all, stupidity. It is right that attention should be called to such blunders and that those who commit them should stand or fall by the verdict of public opinion.

Egypt today has to work out her democratic solution in the face of many difficulties. Her younger generation sees a world of dwindling hope for democracy in the face of the rising tide of militarism. Those who are middle-aged, who were the student leaders when Egyptian Nationalism was born, are called upon to complete the work of our great leader Zaghoul. But will they? Only, I think, by unity of effort and by the adoption of higher standards of political honesty.

In this context I should like to make it abundantly clear that, whatever I have said of some members of the Wafd, I have no doubts whatsoever of their honesty of purpose. They are a group of leaders distinguished above all others for their courage. They have stood and they still stand for democracy and parliamentary



rule. They are the staunch opponents of those reactionary influences which are the bane of Egypt. El Nahas Pasha and his colleagues have been entirely loyal to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty from the moment of its signature, fully realising that the best interests of their country would be served by the complete fulfilment of its terms. At the same time I cannot overlook the fact that in the pursuit of this object they have not always acted wisely. So far in Egyptian parliamentary life there is still present a canker. It is the canker of self-seeking and of the revenge and other evils that self-seeking engenders. Sometimes the evil has gone so far as to endanger the parliamentary system itself and those very democratic and constitutional aims to which their great qualities were devoted. Let my friends who left Zaghloul and Nahas, before irreparable harm is done, realise that they are in danger of defeating their own objects and even of rendering insecure the foundations of their country's future prosperity. Let them, in a word, be true to themselves and to the cause they have so splendidly led.

To the younger generation too I would make an appeal. Egypt, as an independent nation, is herself still young. Her armies cannot compare with those of the despotic countries of Europe which today threaten democracy. It rests with our young men to adhere to the principles for which we have stood in the past, regardless of self-interest, favour, fame and all the enemies of our democracy. Those of you, those of all of us, who are more enlightened, have a duty towards those of our fellow-countrymen who are less fortunate. We must win their support for a democratic system. By that system alone shall we enjoy the blessings of

### *Author's Foreword*

peace and of civilisation. That system is endangered by the subversive influences of reaction. It is for our young men to defend it. If they do so, it is my firm belief that they can establish real parliamentary government together with free speech, the liberty of the press, free elections and independent justice and can ensure, not only the faithful execution of the Treaty, but the security of the Throne itself.

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Before laying down my pen I want to thank my secretary, Miss Florence Taberner, for her able assistance in the compilation of this book. Further, since it is an autobiography, I feel that I must record my indebtedness to those who, more than any, have inspired and sustained me at various stages of my life. There have been three such influences. The first of these was Baheideen Barakat, who, as my schoolfellow at the Khedivia School in 1903, set me so high an example of loyal friendship, courage and character ; the second is my wife, through whose loving kindness I have been able to smile at misfortunes and calamities and to obtain fresh inspiration ; and, thirdly, there is Amin Osman Pasha, a more recent friend, who for the last two years has stood by me, helping me in my adversity with his sincere friendship, his courage, his moral support and his practical sympathy. He it was who, together with my wife, convinced me, when those whom I had helped deserted me, that I had still someone whose friendship made life worth living.

AMINE YOUSSEF.

*Cairo, January, 1940.*



## A TRIBUTE

DEAR AMINE YOUSSEF BEY,

We are glad to take the opportunity of the writing of your memoirs to convey to you and through you, we hope, to your many readers, our impressions of your activities on the occasion of our visit to Egypt in the year 1929 when the Labour Government, of which we were members, was in power in England.

On our arrival in your country one of our difficulties was to know to whom we should go for reliable and unbiassed information. We were at first doubtful of you. Were we to rely on the information you gave us or would you be speaking as a partisan or as one of those Oriental intriguers of whom we had heard so much?

We can only say that at the termination of our visit all our doubts were resolved. Your energy in your country's cause was so dynamic as to lead you to arouse us at four o'clock in the morning for the discussion of business. It was not only the hospitable courtesy and unfailing kindness with which you treated us. It was far more than these, the fact that we found your information as to the policies and characters of your political opponents as fair and appreciative as those you gave us respecting the policies you yourself upheld, and the fact that you were always as willing to introduce us to your opponents as to your friends.

We came to Egypt as the friends of the late Saad

## *A Tribute*

Zaghloul Pasha. But it was mainly you and the fair-mindedness you displayed which caused us, as we told Madame Zaghloul, to retain that friendship. On leaving Egypt we wished to make you some return for all that you had done for us and we asked you whether there was any service which we could render you personally. Your reply was characteristic: "I want nothing for myself, but I should be very happy if you could use any influence you may have to secure justice for the two Egyptian Members of the Wafd, Nokrash and Dr. Maher" (who were at that time under British official suspicion, completely unfounded as subsequently appeared, of complicity in the assassination of British subjects in Egypt).

We heard on our return, from the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and many others in England, of your efforts to secure efficient co-operation in trade between your country and our own. We heard too of your untiring and selfless toil in an endeavour to improve the political relationships between the two countries. We are of the opinion that no single man in your country and to a large extent in our own, has done more than you to dispel any mutual mistrust, to solve the problems that face us and to build up a firm and lasting friendship between Great Britain and Egypt.

We are,

Yours faithfully,

BEN SMITH.

JACK HAYES.

## INTRODUCTORY

THE British Empire today is, in a sense, on its trial. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the establishment of its power and the very wide acceptance of its systems and ideals. The twentieth century has seen the birth of new forms of government which challenge many of those systems and ideals. We have, on the one hand, nationalism claiming that unity of race is a necessary condition of unity of government. We have, on the other, a system which declares that race and national feeling are immaterial and that economic principles alone should determine unity of government. Both of these systems, with their regimentation of the lives of the people, with their persecution of those sometimes of alien race, sometimes of different economic conceptions, stand in open and almost violent opposition to the ideals of the British Empire.

For the British Empire is a congeries of nations, widely differing in race, religion, customs and economic systems and as widely differing in the manner in which they became parts of the Empire. Its basic unity is in the ideals of freedom, of democratic government, of the right of each section of it, and of each individual within each section, to order their own lives as they will, provided that they do not prevent the rest from enjoying

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a similar liberty. These ideals are not imposed by Great Britain, though in many cases they are evoked by her example. Their application to the various races they unite differs widely. In the building and maintenance of such an Empire there can be no rigidity. Great Britain has always to learn, as well as to teach, she has always to be ready to adapt her methods to the particular people with whom she is dealing at the particular period of its development.

It is for this reason, when these ideals are openly challenged by great Powers, that it becomes the duty of every friend of the British Empire to come forward with any facts bearing upon its security—whether they be palatable or not—and to bring them to the attention of the British authorities and of the British people.

It is essential above all that the British authorities should understand the psychology of Orientals in general and of Egyptians in particular. The events of the last twenty years and the support of national movements in the different Oriental countries have been accompanied, on the part of Britain, by changes of policy from time to time. This often leads people to think that the British say one thing and mean another.

In particular, where there has been discontent, little or nothing has been done to cure it except as a result of violence and disorder. The general impression in the minds of the masses and many leaders of public opinion in Egypt and the East, with which I am not entirely in agreement, is that when things have quietened down again and treaties or alliances have been concluded and the British authorities think that the public support of national ideas is weakening, they often revert to their former methods and execute the various alliances or

treaties in a manner which is not always in accordance with the spirit which dictated them.

In Egypt the Nationalist Movement has become more extreme through faults in the British administration. I believe this to be the case in other Oriental countries also. What is above all needed is to win the adherence of the ordinary man in the street at the moment when he is in need of moral support and assistance. If Egyptians and Orientals become convinced that the British are not using their weaknesses or mistakes to justify breaches of the spirit of the treaties made with them, they will be found loyal, friendly and ready to co-operate in securing peace and prosperity for both countries.

The idea of the Commonwealth of Nations, for which Britain has been working during the last few years and which is especially present in British minds at the present time, is bound to be adopted in the independent Oriental states whose friendship is essential for the safety of the British Empire. In every young nation governments in power are liable to make mistakes. It is for British leaders and their representatives everywhere to teach, advise and help their friends, with tact and goodwill and never to be frightened by the mere word ‘ independence.’ After all, the best co-operation and even counsel in time of need is given by free and independent people.

The word ‘ independence ’ all over the world has largely lost its old meaning. It is now vital for nations, large and small, to co-operate closely, realising that if one nation, whether weak or strong, is allowed to suffer, even through its own faults, the great fabric of civilisation may be shaken and collapse and that nothing can



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contribute more to the well-being of nations than sympathy with the people, understanding of their mentality and assistance in their difficulties. The drafting and signature of a treaty is of little importance compared with the manner of its execution and this depends not only on loyalty to the agreed terms but also on loyalty and friendliness to the man in the street ; for he may be asked in time of need to sacrifice himself, his family and all that he holds most precious.

Governments all over the world may be friendly ; but the support of public opinion is also necessary to make that friendship of any value and by public opinion I mean the opinion of the masses. The policy of exploiting the difficulties of others is doomed, and the secret of success with Oriental nations is to stand by them, to help them, to understand them and to like them.

My purpose, then, in writing my memoirs of the last twenty-five years and my impressions of British policy during a period in which I have tried to play my part in the building up of friendly relations between Great Britain and Egypt, is to show on the one hand where British policy has been wise and successful and, on the other, where mistakes have been and are being made. Such frank criticism ought not to be and, I am confident, will not be resented. My hope is that it may help in cementing the friendship not only between Great Britain and my own country, but also perhaps between her and other countries where she may have made or be making similar mistakes.

Since the last war there has been a great change in the mentality and aspirations of many small countries. The propaganda employed for political purposes, by acclaiming liberty, independence and a higher standard

## *Small Nations*

of living for the different small nations, strengthened their aspirations and hopes. They set to work to accomplish their own salvation with courage and conviction, relying on those ideals which Britain and the Allies had proclaimed to the world during the war. Some of them have succeeded in persuading Britain to meet them half-way ; others have so far failed, but are persisting in their efforts to attain the desired ends. This state of affairs has naturally caused an unsettled situation everywhere and has led in some cases to disorder.

It is essential today, if we are to establish the peace of the world on a stable basis, to investigate and analyse present conditions and to redress wrongs by probing to the roots of the evils engendered by the last war in large and small countries alike. To do this successfully, responsible people in this and other important countries must face the situation with restraint, tact and good faith and, above all, with impartial minds not deflected from the truth by personal likes and dislikes.

In the olden days it was sufficient for the representatives of the powerful states to meet and to divide between them the small fish they wanted to swallow. Today things are quite different. The existence of the smaller nations is necessary to ensure that of their bigger neighbours and their relationships must be determined by mutual compacts.

But treaties have lost their sanctity, not only because some countries ignore them for their political ends, but also because their success depends on the possibility of convincing the ordinary man in the street, by concrete facts, that they are in the best interests of the community, and that prosperity and happiness will be gained by loyalty, not only to their phrases, but also—and this is

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of even greater importance—to the spirit which underlies them.

The man in the street does not understand the value of a treaty unless he and the members of his family can see that the standard of life is improved, that their liberty is respected and their future is secure. If a treaty is followed, for any reason whatever, by the loss of any of these essentials to individuals, it loses its value in the eyes of the people and the friendship of governments is of no avail in a time of strain. The man in the street must be educated to meet the exigencies of critical times and, if necessary, of war ; but this can only be done if he himself believes that it is for his ultimate good to make sacrifices today in order that he may benefit tomorrow.

It is due to humanity, which suffered much during the last war, that leaders of public opinion should have open minds, should pause before it is too late and some act of rashness is committed, and should use every possible endeavour to solve problems in a peaceful way at any cost short of the betrayal of honour.

If there has been a change in the mentality of the small nations, there has also been a change in that of the British people since the last war. There is evidence of an appreciation that world affairs are in an unhappy and chaotic state and of a courageous effort on the part of those in power to introduce or bring back some element of sanity into them.

In writing my memoirs it is my desire to assist in this process. I have always been a staunch friend of British ideals ; but I am an Oriental and can, therefore, perhaps help the British to understand why the Egyptians, despite the injustices which they consider have been

inflicted on them as a result of British policy, have always rallied to the British cause in times of danger, holding that Britain, with all her faults, is a more stable friend than other countries.

At the present moment affairs in Egypt are critical. This situation is the result of a series of mistakes, often in what may appear in England to be small matters, made by responsible persons, both inside and outside the Government, due to their failure to understand the sentiments and aspirations of an Oriental people.

Such mistakes have their repercussions in other Mohammedan countries and, if I can help to allay suspicions engendered elsewhere, I shall have further cause for satisfaction.

In order to make clear to British readers the attitude of Egyptians today towards the British it is necessary to know something of the history of their relationships not only during the period with which I am to deal, but also from the time of the British Occupation and the period of Lord Cromer. The earlier history of the country has been written many times and from many points of view. It may be studied in a brief, but extremely lucid and largely unbiassed form, in the first three chapters of Sir Valentine Chirol's book *The Egyptian Problem*.

It was during the first period of the Occupation, when Lord Cromer was in power, that the present generation of Egyptians were either students or had completed their studies and were beginning their careers. Their political outlook was determined, their sympathies and antipathies engendered by the events of those days. It is important therefore to get a clear view of what those events were.

Lord Cromer was highly respected by every Egyptian

## Introductory

who has taken or is likely to take any part in public affairs. Once he had accomplished the difficult task of obtaining the full confidence of his own Government, he embarked with great devotion and infinite patience on a series of reforms which have won him the undying gratitude of all Egyptians. He succeeded in putting the finances of the country on a sound basis and in rescuing it from the morass into which it had been plunged by the wild extravagances of the ruler. He abolished the *corvée*, that system of compulsory labour which had pressed so hardly on the *fellaheen*. Under him the irrigation schemes which had languished before he came into power were largely brought to fulfilment and the country was saved from those periodic droughts and floods which had for so long been its ruin. He ensured to the *fellaheen* their fair share of the benefits of these schemes and relieved them from the burdens of unfair taxation and rapacious tax-gatherers. No doubt he was assisted in these policies, which resulted in an enormously increased prosperity for the country, not only by an able band of British engineers and administrators, but also by the loyal co-operation of many Egyptians. But this great period of economic advance is for all time associated with his name in the minds of Egyptians.

Another less spectacular, but perhaps more difficult, sphere in which he effected great reforms was in the administration of justice. Instead of adopting the advice pressed upon him from all sides of abolishing the existing and very complicated judicial system, his colleague, Sir John Scott, devoted himself to the careful amendment of the system, particularly on the side of procedure, with the primary object of diminishing delays and simplifying the system without too crudely



THE EARL OF CROMER, G.C.B., O.M.



## *The Cromer Reforms*

imposing Western ideas of justice. In reforming the courts which administered Mohammedan sacred law he was wise and fortunate enough to secure the co-operation of Sheikh Mohamed Abdu and his followers who became the fathers of the Nationalist Movement ; for he, as a former supporter of Orabi Pasha<sup>1</sup>, could not be regarded as anything but a patriotic Egyptian.

In all these respects, as also in sanitation, the hospitals and many minor matters, he and his colleagues did great things for Egypt. There was and indeed has always been, in the opinion of most Egyptians, one field in which he did not seem to be very much interested or in which at all events he was not very successful. There were no great advances made in his time in the sphere of education. That spirit of self-reliance, which is the outcome of a liberal education, did not seem to interest him and it was not till late in his administration that he selected for the post of Minister of Education a man destined to play a great part in the drama of modern Egyptian history, Saad Pasha Zaghloul. This lack of interest in education during most of his life in Egypt has caused many Egyptians to criticise him right up to the present day for having devoted his attention too exclusively to the material side of Egyptian well-being and too little to the moral and spiritual side. What must be and is remembered, however, is that in his cautious but real reform of the judicial system, in his high-minded discountenancing of corruption in Government and in his determined maintenance, in the face of much advice to the contrary and even of opposition, of the freedom of the Press, he prepared the way for that higher moral tone which educationists, if not British administrators, have suc-

<sup>1</sup> Usually, though incorrectly, spelt 'Arabi' in English.



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ceeded in inculcating into the youth of Egypt. For, in spite of the criticism of Egyptian education, most of the liberal-minded Egyptians of today were educated in Egypt by British schoolmasters and professors who instilled into them those ideals of fairness, of justice, of liberty, of self-restraint, even of humour which indicates a sense of proportion, which are at once the highest ideals of British education and the elements of true Egyptian patriotism.

Another defect in administration to which reference is often made was due not to Lord Cromer himself but to many members of the British community in Egypt. He selected as officials representatives of the best elements in the British nation who in their turn co-operated, as he did, with the best elements in the Egyptian nation. But there was a tendency on the part of many others to stand aloof and to refuse to mix with Egyptians. Apart from the very natural resentment this caused, it left the British sometimes dependent for their information on sources which, though Oriental, were not Egyptian. From this have arisen many misunderstandings which have on occasion proved obstacles to effective co-operation between the two countries.

But, while these defects have had an effect on the minds of Egyptians, they have not impaired the appreciation of the services rendered to the country by this great administrator. The Oriental mind is idealistic and keenly appreciative of integrity and in Lord Cromer they saw not only an idealist, but also a man of high personal character in his private as well as in his public life. Unfortunately the end of his career in Egypt was indelibly stained by one blot, for which he was not in reality personally responsible, but for which he took the

### *The Denshawī Incident*

responsibility on his shoulders. This was the Denshawī incident, the story of which has often been told and the memory of which will unfortunately never die in Egypt. A group of British officers out shooting near a village in the Province of Menufiah killed some pigeons belonging to the peasants. The officers were trespassing and had no permission or licence from the Egyptian authorities. This led to an affray in which there were casualties on both sides. Lord Cromer was absent on holiday and his subordinates went beyond their authority and beyond the ordinary limits of their jurisdiction to uphold in a short-sighted and vindictive manner the authority of the British Army in Egypt. Some of the peasants were flogged, others executed with degrading accompaniments and the action has been since almost universally condemned in Great Britain. But in Egypt its effect was lamentable. It was regarded, and with some reason, as persecution rather than as an act of even high-handed justice. It was in flat contradiction to all those ideals of impartial justice which the British administration under Lord Cromer preached and in general practised. The Egyptians are admittedly pacific and patient, but such a repudiation of their own and also of the alleged British code of justice was almost incomprehensible to them and did infinite harm to the cause of Anglo-Egyptian friendship. In this case it was among the *fellaheen* that the resentment against the British was engendered and it is only by long years of tact and care that the memory of the incident will ever cease to poison their feelings.

Since Lord Cromer took, as has been said, the responsibility upon his shoulders, the British Government, recognising the seriousness of the incident, sacrificed

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him despite all the great things he had done for Egypt and consequently for Great Britain. His place was taken by Sir Eldon Gorst who, though a man of high character and a very real friend of the Egyptian people, had neither the personality nor the strength of his predecessor. He pursued what was known as the policy of full accord between the Khedive <sup>1</sup> and Great Britain. It is true that he carried on much of the work of Lord Cromer, especially in regard to irrigation, land-drainage and the like. But in his desire to conciliate the Khedive he sacrificed many of the principles which Lord Cromer had inculcated and allowed him to gratify his personal feelings at the expense of justice and the public interest. It was a big price to pay for the friendship of the nominal ruler of the State, for there is no doubt that it endangered the good name of the British in Egypt and undermined the friendliness and respect of the man in the street and, in particular, the peasantry, for the British character and government.

When Sir Eldon Gorst, who was a sick man at the time of his accession, retired in 1911, he was succeeded by Lord Kitchener who did not, despite his great reputation both as a soldier and as an administrator, succeed much better. He too carried on the material reforms of Lord Cromer, made great improvements in the roads of the country and by the strength of his personality increased British prestige in Egypt. Nor did he leave to the Khedive so free a hand as Sir Eldon Gorst had left. But he was apt to be influenced by men who did not represent the best characteristics of the Egyptian people.

<sup>1</sup> A Persian word meaning "the small God" sold as a title to Ismail Pasha by the Sultan of Turkey and indicating a higher rank than that of "Wali," a Governor of a Province.

## *The National Movement*

It was in the time of Lord Kitchener that the movement for a parliamentary regime, which had been in existence long before his appointment, began to make real progress. Public opinion was brought to bear upon both the British authorities and the Khedive to obtain a larger share for Egyptians in the government of their country. A Legislative Assembly was created, of which two-thirds of the members were elected and one-third appointed and certain powers of control, especially in regard to fiscal and financial matters, were given to it. The election was by indirect suffrage and the nomination was by the Government. Moreover, its powers were almost entirely consultative and deliberative. But it was the inauguration of a democratic system and, through it, popular opinion began very soon to make itself heard.


In 1913 the first general election was held and it is in that year that the seed of the modern National Movement was sown. Zaghloul Pasha had been a Minister, first of Education and then of Justice, for seven years in the time of Lord Cromer, Sir Eldon Gorst and Lord Kitchener. He was opposed to the influence of the Khedive and, though an admirer of Great Britain and of the work of Lord Cromer and other British administrators, he was an advocate of greater independence and more popular government in Egypt. Just at this time I was drawn more closely into the circle of Zaghloul Pasha by my marriage to his niece and adopted daughter. He had been advised by his father-in-law, Moustapha Fahmi Pasha, who had twice been Prime Minister, his term of office amounting to no less than eighteen years, and who had been one of the strongest supporters of Lord Cromer, not to stand at the elections. He was

## *Introductory*

anxious to stand for election but also very much inclined to rely on the experience of his father-in-law, who pointed out that the influence of the Khedive, as well as that of Lord Kitchener, would be used against him and that in these circumstances he could not hope to be successful. Many others of his friends were of the same opinion ; but with a few of his relatives and friends I urged him to ignore these opponents and to enter the fight.

At this time the old National Party, though it was weakened after the death of its leader Moustapha Kamel Pasha in 1908, was the only party that could claim the respect of patriotic Egyptians. Some of its members supported the election of Zaghloul Pasha although he was a member of the new and as yet not firmly established advanced wing of the party. It was appreciated that he was a straightforward, honest and able man, that he had won distinction as a lawyer, as a judge and as a Minister and that he had that subtle quality of magnetism which goes to the making of great leaders. He had as his supporters all the students and the younger generation. But the older and more wealthy sections of the community were not with him. The elections proved that he had a very much larger body of support than these experienced friends thought, for, in spite of the strong influences against him and the by no means unanimous or enthusiastic support of the influential members of the old National Party, he was elected in two constituencies by sweeping majorities. In this and in the ensuing National Movement for Egyptian independence the voice of the people was heard more clearly than in any utterances of the Government.

This success encouraged Zaghloul to stand for the



SAAD ZAGHLOUL PASHA



Vice-Presidency of the Assembly, the highest position attainable by the votes of the Members. Again, in spite of the most vigorous opposition on the part of the Khedive and Lord Kitchener, he was successful. These victories gave a tremendous impulse to the Nationalist cause in the country and rallied to his support a large number of the Members of the Assembly. This was the group which, after the war, formed the Wafd or National Delegation and led the policy of independence for Egypt.

I have said so much of events prior to the war although they do not actually come within the period of my memoirs. It was only now that I began in my own way to exercise an influence on politics and on the economic life of my country. So far my knowledge of events is mainly derivative, for my own energies were, as will be seen, absorbed in studies and in the early struggles of a penniless young lawyer. From this point on I shall show that for twenty-five years I have been to some extent officially at the centre of affairs. The fact that a great many of my activities have been more or less unofficial and have even at times been regarded with suspicion by those very Egyptians for whom I was working, as well as by a certain number of official Englishmen, was due to two things. I have always been an ardent, but not a blind, admirer of the ideals and characteristics of Great Britain. This very appreciation has caused me to have a keener eye for any actions in which the British Government or British officials fell below those ideals or betrayed those characteristics. Further, I have never been in the ordinary sense a party man. A certain restless energy has made me impatient of the deliberations of committees and still



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more impatient of the political and personal intrigues which, in my opinion, are often seen in Oriental politics. I have usually, I make bold to claim, been in advance of my political friends and my tendency to rapid and individual action has on occasions aroused suspicions and jealousies even when I had accomplished the objects towards which they were slowly working. When I have been definitely opposed to any particular line of policy which was adopted, I have always tried to remain silent and to give a fair trial to views which I did not hold. As will appear in these memoirs, my work has been carried on largely single-handed. From time to time it has been recognised and I have been placed in responsible temporary positions, usually for the purpose of carrying out a particular task. But, while the publicity accorded to my activities both in Egypt and in England as well as in several continental countries makes it impossible for me to say that I have worked behind the scenes, it is nevertheless true to say that they have never been heralded in advance and rarely acclaimed on their success by official approval or even encouragement. Of this I do not complain. One must accept the penalties consequent upon one's character.

I have tried to benefit my country because I am a patriotic Egyptian and the record of my actions will show how far I have been successful. As a major part of that policy I have supported the influence of Great Britain as beneficial and necessary to Egypt. I am now embarking on the task of showing to Great Britain that the support of Egypt—and by that I mean the support of the Egyptian people—is of importance to her in the world of today and that, despite treaties and measures

of formal justice and equity, the spirit of friendship which translates legal phrases into human realities is sometimes obscured and even destroyed.

There is just one more point on which I should like to touch before I embark on the details of my life and work. For many years now my chief energies have been devoted to a policy which is not, except indirectly, political at all. It is the improvement of trade relations, especially in regard to the cotton industry, between Great Britain and Egypt. My actual proposals and the extent to which they have won acceptance in England will appear in later chapters. What I want to emphasise here is that these proposals are constructive (and we Egyptians are often accused of producing no constructive suggestions), they are for the benefit of British as much as for that of Egyptian trade (and we are sometimes accused of asking for more than we are prepared to give) ; and to them I personally have devoted for many years my leisure, my money and my strength (and we are even accused of only devoting ourselves to a public object when we have an axe to grind). In this I have no axe to grind. I am seeking only the welfare of the toilers in my country and I am seeking it on lines which will contribute very materially to the prosperity of the Lancashire cotton trade and of many minor industries in Great Britain. This fact has, I am glad to be able to record, been recognised not only by the British Department of Overseas Trade, but also by great organisations of business men and to an amazing extent by the Press. To all of these I am grateful, but my gratitude will not prevent me from asking more of them. If I can devote half my life to policies of common advantage to the two peoples, I am surely entitled to

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ask for co-operation from Great Britain. I want these policies to be translated into actualities. I know that a certain conservatism is one of the factors in the solidity and security of British commerce. But to be too conservative in this modern world is to court disaster. If I can see some of these proposals adopted I can say that my task is at least to some extent accomplished and can perhaps take a little of that rest which I have denied myself for so many years. For I know that, once the first steps have been taken, the practical good sense of the British industrialist will lead him to go further on the same lines ; and I know that then will dawn an era of co-operation for the common interests of the two peoples which will have its repercussion on co-operation and friendship in the wider field of politics.

## EARLY YEARS

I BEGAN to write these memoirs on the 6th December, 1938, which was my birthday fifty years ago and according to the Mohammedan Calendar was the 12th Rabii el Awal, the birthday of Mohammed the Prophet.

My parents came from the town of Damietta, with which I was later to have many associations. My father was a well-known lawyer in the Province of Dakahlia. He was one of the leaders of the Nationalist Movement in the days of Orabi Pasha before the British Occupation when the independence sought was from the control of the Turkish influence. He was deported with other Nationalist leaders to Syria where they lived for three years on the best of terms with their Syrian hosts. The accusation against him was that he was an agitator who had been instrumental in collecting 40,000 signatures of notables in Egypt in favour of a plot to dethrone the Khedive Tewfik. These incidents occurred prior to my birth, so that I may be said to have been born into the atmosphere of Egyptian Nationalism. Even before his expulsion my father was brought into contact with Saad Zaghloul, who like my father was a disciple of Sheikh Mohammed Abdu and with whom my own ties were destined in later years to be so close. The story of how, through these friends,

## *Early Years*

he first met Sir Eldon Gorst, was often told in the family circle during my childhood and may perhaps be repeated here. My father had a cottage at Ras el Bar where he used to stay in the summer and where he used to entertain his friends, among whom was Sheikh Mohammed Abdu, the ex-Mufti of Egypt. On one occasion Saad Zaghloul came there in a Government boat with Sir Eldon Gorst, who was at the time Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, and with other friends, and the boat anchored opposite the cottage. The Egyptians in the party used to visit the cottage and take their meals there, and on one occasion my father asked one of them, Saad Zaghloul's brother, who was a Judge, to introduce him to Sir Eldon Gorst and to act as interpreter for him. On this visit my father invited Sir Eldon Gorst to dine with them in the cottage and to try Egyptian cooking. Sir Eldon, who was already an invalid unable to cope with the rich foods of a formal Egyptian dinner party, accepted on condition that there should be only a single dish at the dinner apart from salad and dessert. My father at once agreed, though the interpreter, his feelings for Egyptian hospitality outraged by the idea of a single dish being offered to twenty guests, protested that the thing was impossible. When the guests were assembled they found that my father had been faithful to his promise without, however, betraying any of the principles of hospitality. Sir Eldon Gorst and his fellow-guests were presented with but a single dish. It consisted of a large lamb roasted whole in a very big dish. When it was carved it was found to contain several large fowls. These in their turn were found to contain quails, which again proved to be receptacles for a number of smaller birds

## *A Prophecy*

known as bagapike. Whether Sir Eldon Gorst enjoyed the joke as much next day as he did the evening before is not recorded in our family history. But the story may serve to indicate the terms on which these men, destined to be sometimes bitter political opponents, sometimes workers in common for the good of Egypt, met in social life from their earliest days of contact.

Two incidents from my own early childhood I may perhaps be permitted also to recall, since they help to paint the self-portrait which the writing of memoirs necessitates.

Certain circumstances surrounding my birth, added to the fact that I was an only son with four sisters, caused my parents to regard me as a being of more than ordinary importance. This view was confirmed in their minds and no doubt was handed on to me and has had its influence upon me in my later life by a prophecy made when I was seven years old. We were then living at Zagazig and at our house was staying Sheikh el Kawakibi, a great authority on philosophy and religion who came originally from Afghanistan and had been expelled from Turkey on account of his liberal sympathies. He was credited, incidentally, with great skill in palmistry and on studying my childish hand he said to my father: "Take care of your son and give him as much education as you can, for he has a brilliant future. His name will not only be known in his own country, but will also be known abroad where he will be hospitably received." My father was inclined to regard this as nonsense, for in those days very little was heard of Egypt in other countries, the name of the Khedive himself being practically unknown outside Egypt and Turkey. He impressed upon me that I

## *Early Years*

must not take this seriously or entertain false hopes from it. But I know that I did in fact take the prophecy very seriously and every day of his visit used to ask the Sheikh el Kawakibi to repeat it. I cannot, of course, take it quite so seriously today, but it seems to me very likely that a certain self-confidence and quickness of action that have stood me in good stead were planted in me on that occasion.

The same prophet also warned me, in the presence of my father, to beware of the year 1907, since in that year I was to have the greatest shock of my life, but was to be saved by the mercy of God. When in 1907 my father died and unexpectedly left me penniless I recalled the second prophecy and perhaps took courage at the same time from the first.

The second incident occurred also when I was seven years old. On the feast of Bairam, the day after the end of Ramadan, my father took me with him to pay the customary round of visits to his friends. In the course of the morning we called at ten houses and at every one I noticed that my father drank a full cup of coffee. I asked him why on this day he consumed this enormous quantity of coffee and enquired whether it was not very bad for him. He explained that it was not really good for him and that he did not want it, but that it was customary on such occasions to accept this form of hospitality and that it would give offence merely to taste it. My reaction was then and there to make a solemn vow that I would never in my life take coffee, for in this way I could avoid becoming the victim of so foolish and harmful a custom. To this day I have kept that vow and, since similar arguments seemed to me to apply to tobacco, I have never smoked.

## *School Days*

Since the taking of alcohol is forbidden by the Moham-medan religion and my views have never tempted me to break the rule, I may be said to have freed myself from my early years from reliance on these drugs and to have been quit once for all of at least these minor vices.

My school career was not at first very successful. In the Primary Schools at that time I was taught in French and I could never acquire any facility in that language. I was in consequence dismissed from my school at Zagazig, though the action of the teacher was not legal. It did not, however, prove of disadvantage to me, since my father went to Cairo and visited Sheikh Mohammed Abdu, Sir Eldon Gorst, whom he had in that very year met in the manner I have described, and Mr. Dunlop, who was in control of the Ministry of Education, on the subject of my future education. My father was advised to allow me to take English courses of study instead of French, and it was pointed out to him by Mr. Dunlop that English was the language of the future in Egypt. No doubt any prejudice my father may have had was mitigated by the fact that Mr. Dunlop himself conducted the conversation in Arabic. In any case he agreed to that course and I studied English in both the Primary and Secondary schools, as well as in the private lessons with which my father generously supplemented the classes of the Government schools.

It was in these years that, under such teachers as Mr. Karman and Mr. Foster Smith, I learned to appreciate the great literature of England and, through it, the character and ideals of the British people. The influence that this has exercised on my whole attitude towards the relationship of Great Britain and Egypt is



## *Early Years*

incalculable. Whatever education in school and college can effect in the formation of character and mentality I owe to British teachers and to English literature and history, and I have never forgotten that debt.

I would like to mention another incident which helped to form my character—the manner in which I became acquainted with my young school fellow Baheideen Barakat, whom I was lucky enough to know when we were together in the second year at the Khedivia School and whose association helped me very much in my career. I was one of his great admirers, for he impressed me very much by his personality, his courage and his character. There was an English teacher of algebra called Mr. Base. During class time he used to ask us to solve as many problems as possible from the algebra text-book and gave us marks according to the number of problems we solved. One day I did my best and solved twelve problems. When my exercise book was returned to me, I found it marked “Very good +” while I had been expecting “Excellent.” Baheideen Barakat was sitting on the second bench behind me. He noticed that I was not satisfied with the mark I had obtained. He took my book and discovered that I had solved twelve problems while he had only solved ten, and the teacher had given him the mark “Excellent.”

At that time the pupils observed the greatest respect and deference towards their teachers. Baheideen Barakat took the two exercise books, went to the teacher and pointed out to him that there appeared to have been a mistake in the marking and that he had intended to give Amine Youssef “Excellent” because he had completed twelve problems while he himself, having

only finished ten, was the person who should have "Very good +." The teacher was astonished at his audacity in daring to criticise the marks and told him that this did not concern him. Very politely Barakat said to him : " It is not for me to question your judgment, but I submit that it is not fair that I should be given more marks while I solved fewer problems than he did. I hope in the future to do better than he, but, if the other pupils think that I am treated with favouritism, they will not credit the marks I obtain."

The teacher was displeased with these remarks and punished him by giving him three days' drill (which meant that he had to go to school early and do drill as a punishment). Barakat said : " I accept the punishment with pleasure, but would respectfully ask you to reconsider this matter in order to see if it is not possible to correct the marks." The teacher admired the character of this young boy of fourteen and took the exercise book, but instead of changing Barakat's mark, he changed mine to " Excellent." He said to Barakat : " My young fellow, the reason why I gave you ' Excellent ' and Amine Youssef only ' Very good + ' was because, although he solved more problems than you did, his writing was very untidy, while yours was very neat."

This incident impressed me very much and I thought at the time, " This is a young boy whom I ought to have as a friend," and since that time we often used to meet and I derived great pleasure from his companionship and conversation. He was a model in respect of morals and strength of character, in spite of his youth. I am sure that he inspired me with his personality and had an influence on my future through

## *Early Years*

his kindness and friendship. He used to invite me with some of our fellow-pupils to his house, for he came of a very rich and distinguished family and his father was the nephew of Zaghoul Pasha, of great parliamentary ability, very intelligent and very popular. Barakat Bey, the father, used to talk to us in the most friendly way and encourage us to come often to their house. I was greatly impressed by his intelligence and in spite of the difference in our ages, I always liked to hear him talk and to talk with him.

I used to be invited to his country house and see how kindly his family treated the village folk, as though they were members of the same family. This treatment, which I noticed when I was their guest, inspired and encouraged me in later years to help the poor classes, when I had finished my studies and was practising as a lawyer in Damietta.

There is no doubt that in life many of the great achievements are the result of inspiration and influence either of a friend, father, mother, sister, brother, wife or teacher, and if many of the achievements of great men were analysed, it would be found that the glory they attained belonged mainly to the unknown soldier who inspired them.

I used to prophesy to Barakat when we were boys that he was going to achieve great things and would reach the highest positions in the country and he was greatly impressed by my appreciation of him. He is now the President of the House of Representatives and has distinguished himself as a pupil, as a student, as a teacher, as a judge and as a minister. His father, who did not take a degree in the schools, was a very able man and was a member of the first Zaghoulouist Govern-

## *My First Job*

ment in 1924. He had many of the qualities of the late Zaghloul Pasha and acted as his right-hand during the National Movement. He was deported with him to Seychelles in 1922. I shall never forget how his encouragement, friendship and fatherly sentiment helped me in many of my achievements.

In 1907, as I have said, my father died. He had been of a generous and open-handed temperament, lavishing his large earnings as a lawyer on his family and friends and often losing large sums as a result of guarantees to the latter in times of difficulty. For me it meant a great and, as it appeared at the time, unhappy change. Accustomed to a generous allowance I was, in a boyish way, as open-handed with my friends as was my father. Excursions, visits to the theatre, entertainments of all kinds were largely paid out of my pocket. Practically all this had to stop. But one thing, I was determined, should not stop, and that was my education. My mother was as poor as I was myself and I felt it was due to my father's memory not to appeal to those Egyptian friends whom he had helped during his life. But I had the confidence of youth and I decided that the leisure formerly devoted to spending money should now be devoted to earning it. I went to an English petroleum company and was fortunate enough to find an English manager willing to see me and, which was even more helpful, sympathetic and ready to assist me in my difficult position. He understood and expressed his admiration for my desire not to tarnish my father's memory by going for assistance to his Egyptian friends. He offered me £6 a month for four hours' work every afternoon, when my studies did not claim me, and in three months' time he raised

## *Early Years*

this to £12. This, with a small loan from my brother-in-law, enabled me to remain at school for two years after my father's death.

Though life was difficult at this time, I often think that, apart from the more obvious lessons of hard work and simple living, I have been enabled by my circumstances in this period to understand the man in the street far better than if I had continued to live as a comparatively wealthy young man. In much of my work during later years as regards food prices, travelling facilities, social and educational facilities for the working classes and the like, I have been impelled by my firsthand knowledge of what poverty and a life of continuous and generally unrelieved toil really meant. My meals at this time consisted generally of bread and cheese and eggs. My clothes were old and shabby. I had to provide for my mother and to save up my school fees. At the same time I felt the necessity, rightly or wrongly, of honouring my father by keeping up appearances before my school-fellows and by inviting them out as before and I pinched and saved further in order to be able to do this. I do not find that these years have left me any feelings of bitterness. Indeed I have a certain feeling of gratitude to them for their gifts of self-reliance and of sympathy with the poor.

Of my actual studies at school I need not say much. My favourite reading was philosophy and biography. One incident, at the risk of being accused of egotism, I cannot refrain from quoting. A certain history teacher, Mr. Fox, found one term that it was quite impossible for him to complete the programme required for the examinations unless he could obtain help from some of the students in copying out his notes on the Roneo.

He asked for volunteers, but none were forthcoming except myself. I was at the time a boarder and could manage to devote three hours a day to duplicating these notes for my fellow-students. This I did and was rewarded by the gratitude both of the teachers and of the students.

I was still at school when I wrote my first letter to the Press. I was already a Nationalist and a great admirer of Moustafa Kamel, the young Nationalist leader. At the same time I was also an admirer of Saad Zaghloul, Sheikh Mohammed Abdu and Kassem Amine, the advocate of the enfranchisement of women. At this period the Nationalist party was attacking this group, and, when Saad Zaghloul was appointed Minister of Education in 1906, Sheikh Shaweesh, the editor of the organ of the Nationalist party, *el Lewa*, made a very bitter attack upon him. Although I did not yet know Saad Zaghloul personally I was fired to write a letter to all newspapers hotly defending him against the attackers.

In 1909 I became a lawyer. I had been ill in bed for six out of the nine months previous to the examination. I had, therefore, little hope of success in it and was inclined not to enter for it at all. But Baheideen Barakat strongly encouraged me to enter and to my surprise I was placed twentieth out of nearly eighty successful candidates.

I chose the town of Damietta to commence my practice and my reason was in line with my attitude in respect of coffee and tobacco. There were no cafés or theatres or cinemas in Damietta and I felt that I should not be tempted from my reading of law. The town was small and quiet, containing only 32,000 inhabitants.

## *Early Years*

My only distraction from my legal work, of which I soon had plenty to do, was in the social life of the town. In conjunction with a few friends and under the leadership of the pioneer of this movement, Abdel Halim Alaii Bey, I assisted the working men to form labour clubs of their own for the purposes of recreation and education.

We succeeded in founding three such clubs in the town and were kept busy attending them to give lectures, conduct classes and take part in the social life of the members. My own lectures were largely based on Lubbock's *Pleasures of Life* and *Uses of Life*. I was anxious to broaden the outlook of these uneducated men and it was in this respect a virgin field that I was cultivating. The principal industries represented among them were shoe-making, silk-weaving and furniture-making. Though the workers in those trades were uneducated and illiterate, they proved intelligent and as hard working at these studies as they were in their trades. This was for me the beginning of the social work which I have been able in later life to carry on into wider spheres. It was also, as were my early struggles when my father died, of the greatest use in making me familiar and consequently sympathetic with the outlook and aspirations of the poorer and less sophisticated classes in my country.

I began in these years to develop my conviction that, whatever Governments might do, it depended on the common people whether friendship between countries in the position of Great Britain and Egypt was firmly based and able to withstand the strain of difficult days or no. Deeper and deeper through my life has this conviction grown and, with it, the appreciation that the



AHMED ORABI PASHA





manners and behaviour of ordinary life, the considerate approach to problems of administration and legislation, the tactful handling of delicate situations, even when they might not seem to be of great moment, counted more than all the phrases of laws, the compacts and the treaties worked out in an atmosphere remote from the lives of the millions affected by them.

Politically I was and have always been a supporter of the Nationalist Party and this is perhaps the place to give some account of the early days of the Movement.

The Nationalist Movement started in the days when Orabi Pasha led the revolt against the Turkish ascendancy, which in the Army and elsewhere had pressed so hardly and for so long on the Egyptian people. In his fear of intervention from Constantinople Orabi, appreciating that England and France were both interested in the situation and might well take the Turkish side in the quarrel, gave to the Movement a general anti-European rather than a specifically anti-Turkish complexion. The conflict, however, between him and the Turkish ruling class under the Khedive grew so acute and provoked so dangerous a situation that Great Britain was led to intervene, the British Fleet bombarded Alexandria, an army was landed and the British Occupation began. The wise administration of Lord Cromer prevented the Nationalist Movement from becoming a powerful opponent of the Occupation, though from time to time, as in the case of the conquest and government of the Sudan, of Denshawi and of numberless smaller incidents, it became the rallying point not merely of disaffection, but also of a very real ambition for Egypt to be governed, whatever guarantees her government might have to give and whatever

## *Early Years*

assistance she might have to seek, by Egyptians. The fact that some of the Egyptians of Turkish origin had notoriously misgoverned the country while the British under Lord Cromer were using every effort to set it upon its feet and were being largely successful in that effort, made a very great difference. At the same time there were many links with Turkey which were absent from the association with Great Britain. There was above all the link of the Mohammedan religion, of Islam, which is at once a religious and a political factor. There were also the numberless associations in society, in business, in family life which the years of Turkish ascendancy had formed. It seemed sometimes, with the Khedive still ruling as the representative of the Turkish Empire and with Great Britain actually so advising at every point as to constitute her the *de facto* ruler of the country, that the Egyptians had acquired two masters in place of one.

We in Egypt, however, always regarded the British Occupation as temporary and on that understanding, based on reiterated pledges, we were prepared to co-operate without relinquishing our claim to be finally an independent people. For the time being, therefore, the Nationalist Party really meant, among responsible people, the advocates of speeding up the transference of power to Egyptians, of the rapid training of the younger men in the art of government, of the development of institutions on democratic and therefore native lines rather than on the lines of the old Turkish tyranny or even the modern control by British administrators.

I have already shown how deeply most of us were impressed by the wisdom and justice of Lord Cromer's policies. We were eager to advance on those lines.



MADAME AMINE YOUSSEF BEY



## *Marriage*

*But, after all, it was our country and in common with every people in the world we desired to govern it ourselves.*

So it was that, when Lord Cromer passed from the scene and his successors inclined first to the support of the Khedive and then to the more British and military methods of Lord Kitchener, the Nationalist Movement grew in power and offered in effect the only possible party for a self respecting Egyptian to belong to. The very word party is largely a misnomer borrowed, as it is, from the Parliamentary democracy of Great Britain. There was not really any other party to which a patriotic Egyptian could belong. He could be an individual working in some department with the British and not concerning himself with public affairs outside his own department. He could be caught up in the intrigues which emanated from the palace of the Khedive who at times utilised for his own purposes such sections as he could influence. But, if he looked broadly and in the light of history at the political situation in his country, he was bound to be a Nationalist.

For myself, I had not been active in the general movement until my marriage brought me into close personal relations with by far the greatest of its leaders.

In the year 1913 I married the niece of Saad Zaghloul Pasha. This marriage was in effect the beginning of my close association with the Nationalist Movement and coincided with the period in which it assumed its modern form. I was now no longer a distant admirer of its leader. I was a close member of his family and as such was inevitably drawn into the arena of politics on the course of which I was often able to exert a considerable, if usually indirect, influence.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EGYPTIAN  
PEOPLE BEFORE THE LAST WAR

TO sum up the characteristics of a people is one of the most difficult of tasks. It often happens that an observer goes to a country, spends a few weeks or months there and then returns and tells the world all about the character of its people. Yet that same observer, if asked to sum up the characteristics of his own people, among whom he has spent his entire life, will admit that he cannot do so. They differ so much in different parts of the country, in the different classes, at different periods, under the influence of different moods. It is, of course, true that an onlooker sees most of the game, that a more objective and dispassionate view is possible for a detached spectator than for a probably biassed participant. Yet the characteristics noted without long experience, without deep sympathy and community of sentiment and interests and without, at the same time, a certain intellectual detachment, are likely to be merely superficial examples of behaviour apt to be infinitely misleading. It is easy to say that Germans are subservient to authority, that Frenchmen are volatile, that Russians are vague, that Englishmen are practical, that Italians are emotional and so on. But none of these descriptions, even if a few more adjectives are added to each, con-

stitutes a satisfactory analysis of the character of the peoples or provides a reliable solution to the problems of its history.

As an Egyptian who happens to have seen much of the world outside Egypt, who has known what it is to be poor and who has come to mix with the wealthier and more influential classes, I can on reflection generalise about my people to some extent. I have a knowledge of them rather wider than those who have spent all their lives in one section of society and one pursuit, I have a sympathy with them deeper than any foreigner or self-interested Egyptian can have, and I have tried to attain that intellectual detachment which a liberal education and wide experience of mankind in different lands and circumstances alone can give. Even so, or perhaps for that very reason, I find it difficult to generalise with such facility as the tourist or foreign trader will display. Moreover, where a gifted observer such as Lord Cromer or Sir Valentine Chirol will describe faults of character with fairness and a large measure of truth, my own community of feeling with my people leads me to understand, perhaps because to some extent I share, those faults and to probe beneath the surface. Are such faults inherent in us or are they merely the superficial results of circumstances? Can we cure them or transmute the qualities that have produced them into something of value, even into virtues? Are they indeed faults at all or simply the distortion under outside influences of qualities which in themselves are of value? A hundred such speculations arise. It may be that the impractical, dilatory character of the Russians is an outward manifestation, a distortion of great imaginative powers that have led to a more revolutionary and in a sense practical



## *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

planning of society than has appeared in any other country. It may be that the subservience and insensitive hardness of the German character is only the form taken in certain circumstances of powers of self-sacrifice, determination and co-operation which might be of immense value to the world. And so on.

The first two facts about the Egyptian people that must be borne in mind are that they have been for more than 2,000 years under foreign domination and that 90 per cent. of them are peasants.

Their geographical position has been regarded as making the control of them necessary successively to the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Turks, the French and, finally, the English. The fact that they have submitted to such control is not to be taken as evidence of lack of courage or of military qualities. From the mere list of names given it will be appreciated that Egypt has been the objective of each power or empire when it was at the height of its strength.

The result of so long a period of subjection has not been servility. The Egyptians are conscious of a great history in the ancient world, of the exercise of military qualities in more modern times and of all those traditions of and characteristics due to an ancient civilisation which have been at times suppressed and distorted, but never destroyed, under the rule of races in those respects inferior to themselves. While they may have learned to bow to superior force, they have never respected it. They have always retained the claim, even when it could not be expressed, of being a people, not set apart, but with its own right to stand high among the peoples of the world.

On the other hand they have for so long been pre-

## *Egyptian Characteristics*

vented from controlling their own destinies and from ordering their own society constructively that they have in great measure lost the habit of doing so. The problems of government are largely outside their consideration. Who is to order and who is to obey in public affairs, that is all they are inclined to ask. Thus, when democratic institutions gradually, under the influence of Western ideas, begin to grow up, the mass of the people does not enquire into policies and projects so much as into who is to hold office and what orders they will have to obey. Among those in power, in modern times the King and his entourage and the Ministers, this leads to a far greater preoccupation with who is to be in power than with what he or they will do when they are in power. More than once it will appear in these pages that only some simple question of who is to rule them has really been able to interest the people at large, though naturally they are apt to revolt after the introduction of a new policy which has turned out to their disadvantage. Future policies of reform or administration have left the public mind unmoved and uninterested.

One after another those who have written about the Egyptian people have commented on their sensitiveness, on their readiness to take offence even when none is intended. This is due to the nervousness consequent on alien domination. It must never be forgotten that Egyptians are at all times profoundly suspicious of foreigners. However much they may realise that the direction of Lord Cromer was more beneficial to them than the rulership of Ismail and infinitely more so than the tyranny of the Mamelukes, the fact remains that all of these people, the British with the rest, are foreigners and, as such, even when they confer blessings upon the

## *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

people, are only doing so for the ultimate purpose of exploitation. It has been well said that foreigners' relationships to Egypt have always been like those of a band of suitors towards a beautiful woman ; they will shower favours on her, they will caress her, but only so long as they can still hope to possess her.

Since they are suspicious of him, they are never frank with a foreigner. Their long subjection, their experience of the sufferings consequent on giving utterance to their real feelings, have robbed them of the courage to give utterance to their convictions. This suspicion produces a certain restraint, not in superficial behaviour, but in the feeling that there is something behind, something held back, an absence of frank truthfulness.

Sir Valentine Chirol, whose fair-mindedness is in general remarkable, speaks of the " gross intolerance and unfairness towards all who disagreed with them " which they had developed in the course of the British Occupation. There is a large measure of truth in this accusation and the fact is due to their inherited and well-founded suspicion of the motives of all foreigners. If I am myself in any way representative of my countrymen, I do not find that I am intolerant and unfair towards those of my fellow-countrymen with whom I disagree. The letter from Mr. Ben Smith and Mr. Jack Hayes printed in the Preface will indicate how others have judged me in this respect. I could point to a hundred instances of conspicuous fairness to opponents and tolerance of their opinions in the lives of such leaders as Zaghoul Pasha, the friend and supporter of Lord Cromer and the great champion of Egyptian independence, as Sheikh Mohammed Abdu, the friend of Orabi, the Grand Mufti, and yet the ally of the British administra-

### *Suspicion of Foreigners*

tion in many of its modernising reforms, as Moustafa Pasha Fehmi, the accomplished Egyptian diplomat and loyal colleague of Lord Cromer. These men and I myself have resolutely set ourselves to conquer this ingrained suspicion of foreigners towards whom alone Sir Valentine Chirol can with any justice accuse Egyptians of intolerance and unfairness. But it is not surprising that the great majority of Egyptians should "fear the Greeks even when they bring gifts," should suspect ulterior motives in their foreign controllers and should therefore seem to the best of those controllers to be unfair towards them.

It must be remembered too that the Capitulations were for very many years a constant source of irritation apart from general political factors. In business and social life the Egyptian in his own country saw foreigners in an unjustifiably privileged position. Free from taxation, often able to evade penalties for crime, judged in their business relationships by alien tribunals, they constituted yet another reason for that dislike and mistrust of the foreigner which for so long influenced the minds of Egyptians.

If they were generally suspicious and resentful, the Egyptians have always shown themselves ready to forgive an injury, particularly if the wrongdoer admits his fault. He does not forget, it is true, for that would be merely stupidity ; but he is willing to forgive. To quote the most extreme case, the Egyptian has never forgotten the Denshawi incident ; yet he has long since forgiven Lord Cromer who took upon his shoulders the full responsibility for it. So also the Egyptian is generous and hospitable to foreigners, though he mistrusts them all the time.

## *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

It has surprised many that a people generally so gentle and averse from violence should have been liable on such occasions as the riots of 1919 to acts of incredible brutality. But it must be remembered that the feeling of injustice was extreme at that time and it must also be remembered that repression is everywhere likely to cause outbursts of violence. It may be that the brutality on those occasions was the measure of the injustices and repressions, not merely of the moment, but even of the two thousand years preceding it.

I now come to the second main factor in the formation of the character of the Egyptian people, that 90 per cent. of them are peasants or, at all events, so little removed by wealth or education from the peasants as to be practically indistinguishable from them.

It was no less a person than Mohammed Ali, the Albanian who is generally called the creator of modern Egypt, who said of the peasantry that it was "taillable et corvéable à merci." There is no sort of doubt that they have been taxed unmercifully and their labour has been forced from them, from the time when under the Pharaohs they laboured in chains at the building of the Pyramids right down to the period before the British Occupation when, as Sir Valentine Chirol says, "I witnessed whole gangs of wretched peasants being dragged away in chains from their own fields to cultivate the vast estates which the Khedive and his favoured Pashas had systematically filched from the people." The same author speaks of the *corvée*, "under which the well-nigh annual task of averting the alternate menace of a dangerously high or a dangerously low Nile was carried out by forced labour cruelly recruited and still more cruelly handled." Under the foreign yoke the 'Omdah'

## *The Egyptian Peasant*

or village ' Sheikh ' (Mayor) and tax-gatherer had wrung from the wretched *fellaheen* their last piece of silver by the use of the *kurbash* which blistered the soles of their feet. It is true that these *Omdehs* and the usurers who caught the simple *fellah* in a network of debt were sometimes of their own class and country. But a system designed to produce slaves will certainly produce tyrants in the same way as I have already pointed out that repression is largely responsible for violence. Such tyrannies combined with the evils of foreign political domination are not calculated to advance a population far along the road of culture, prosperity and humanity.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian peasant is in general easy-going and good tempered. He is industrious and, perforce frugal ; but on the rare occasions when he has any money he is generous to a fault. The man does the heavier work of the fields while the woman, in addition to doing the lighter tasks there, looks after the household and, as in France, keeps all the accounts. From the nature of the case she is not secluded as are the women of the town, so that with 90 per cent. of the women living and working with the men and with today a considerable proportion of the remainder adopting Western ideas and education and emerging from *purdah* into active social life, Sir Valentine Chirol's reference to the " seclusion in which ancient traditions and superstitions thrive " applies only to a very small, if socially influential, section of society.

The villages in Egypt, as in many other countries with such features of local life as vendettas and feuds, are constantly rent by factions bitterly hostile to one another. Yet in face of authoritarian and consequently largely foreign inquisition, the factions, on the trial of

## *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

crimes of violence, will join in a conspiracy of silence which will preserve the criminal, only to be punished at a later date by those injured parties who have helped to ensure his safety.

The *fellaheen* may be said even today to be largely illiterate and to have very little appreciation of the advantages of sanitation and similar marks of Western civilisation, mainly because they do not find that their own personal well-being has benefited thereby ; yet they are undoubtedly conscious of the disadvantages of their own lives, for the moment they make by industry or by usury a little money, their first aim is to become petty landlords and, if they can in this way prosper further, to escape to the amenities and higher civilisation of the towns. This is the cause of much ill-feeling, based no doubt upon jealousy, for, simple as he is, the peasant appreciates that it is the fruit of his toil upon which his mortgagee or landlord is living there in idleness and comparative luxury.

While, therefore, the *fellaheen* have many of the characteristics common to all peasant populations and certain distinctive and not very advantageous qualities due to foreign despotism, they are free from some of the faults found elsewhere. They are not parsimonious and mean, as are the peasants elsewhere ; the very oppressions they have suffered give them some appreciation of the meaning of such words as freedom and independence ; their eagerness to escape from the hardness of their lives makes them alive to the advantages of modern systems of irrigation and drainage and even of education and culture. They have a remarkable measure of shrewd common sense and intelligence when faced with new and unaccustomed problems and, as has been said,

though they are slow to forget, they are ready to forgive, if better things are to come.

In the towns things are very different.

The worker in the cities and towns before the war was much better off than the peasant in the villages. Owing to the stability of work and the adequate wages paid to him, his life was more stable. He was industrious and, as a result, we had a group of workers and artisans who afterwards, during the war, when many things we needed in the country could not be imported from abroad, contributed to make Egypt to a certain extent self-sufficing as regards most of the necessities of life. Though the Egyptian worker is a good craftsman, the finish of his products was not at first perfect, which meant that they did not fetch so high a price as those of foreign competitors. In spite of this, however, they improved tremendously in their work during the war and to this day Egypt benefits from their better work and buys much less from abroad.

It was during the war that labour social clubs were initiated in some of the different industrial towns in Egypt and led movements for education and social benefits for the workers. At that time the Egyptian labourer was not very ambitious. He was fond of his home ; he would sometimes during his leisure time play dominoes in the cafés, but most of the time he went on with his work conscientiously and never complained. There was not in Egypt during these years any real discontent or unrest.

Egypt is not and is never likely to become a manufacturing nation. Except for such industries as transport, the railways, the dockyards and to a certain extent other industries such as cotton, silk and boot-making, labour,



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as it is understood in Great Britain, capable of being organised into trade unions and of forming units of the industrial and social life of the communities, does not exist. There are traders, craftsmen and petty officials who share many of the characteristics of the peasantry. The organisation of the commercial life of the nation was until recently and to a certain extent is now largely in the hands of foreigners, of whom the majority are Greeks, with next in numbers Italians and then the English, French and other nations. Flourishing under the unfair privileges of the Capitulations these foreigners have not only reaped a golden harvest from the wealth of Egypt, but have robbed the Egyptian middle-classes of the facilities and, consequently, of the desire to conduct their own commercial and industrial enterprises. This has largely militated against the interests of Lancashire and England generally. Instead, the middle-class Egyptian turns to the professions : to law, to medicine and, above all, to employment as government officials. Facile and quick to learn, qualities partly no doubt due to necessity under foreign rule, he has a certain tendency to superficiality because he is unaccustomed to wide responsibility and to the call for initiative. He clothes himself eagerly in Western ideas and pursuits and becomes a lawyer, a doctor or an administrator. Unfortunately the educational ideals and systems inculcated by Lord Cromer and more recent British administrators have done little until recently to check this tendency to adopt the less creative and dynamic pursuits. Until recent years the road to wealth and position for an Egyptian did not lie through invention or even the exploiting of inventions, through the organisation of industry or through the fulfilment of wide social needs,

but through the attainment by personal or family influence, by initial wealth acquired as an absentee landlord or by a certain quickness of brain and tongue, of an official position which might serve as a jumping off place to higher things.

There were, before the war, two movements—one for general social reform and the other for the emancipation of women—which call for some mention here and which will give some indication of the activities of a section of the urban population whose influence is far greater in Egypt than in other countries. Egyptian students in the schools and universities are very hard workers at their studies, but they were at this period, owing to the absorption of the notables and wealthy Egyptians in material things, the pioneers in social reforms which they considered essential for the prosperity of Egypt.

They supported and carried on the work of Sheikh Mohammed Abdu and Saad Zaghloul's school, who had taken the lead in introducing social reforms in Egypt. This was accompanied by a very efficient move by one of the friends of Zaghloul—Kassem Amine—a Judge in the High Court of Appeal, who worked for the emancipation of women in Egypt, in spite of the great obstacles put in his way by the conservative priests of great influence in the Azhar University and by the Khedive and his conservative entourage. He persisted against much opposition and had a small but very influential and enthusiastic following and, although he did not succeed during his life time, his schemes were brought to fruition during the Nationalist Movement started by Zaghloul.

The first great achievement of the student movement was the formation of an Egyptian Club in Cairo under

## *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

Omar Lufti Bey, the father of the co-operative movement in Egypt, and Mohammed Ali Delawar Bey, a distinguished official in the Court of Appeal. These two Egyptians, supported by the students, initiated the first social club for students and graduates from the University and a series of lectures inspired Egyptian public opinion with the importance of the social reforms undertaken.

This club attained such importance that it may be said without exaggeration that its voice was heard all over the country and its ideas were fully supported by public opinion. For the first time a group of the younger generation had united to teach the country citizenship and to lead it to very important social reforms. The student at the time acquired confidence in himself and as a result of the successes of his social efforts he became a real citizen before he had finished his studies.

At this period students had no reason to worry about their future. They were sure of either getting a position in the Government or embarking on a successful career as a lawyer, a doctor or an engineer, for the competition of today did not exist then.

I was a member of this club and I believe that its leaders and pioneers helped me to develop some of the schemes which I have brought to fulfilment in later life. Naturally most of the members of the club were Nationalists supporting Moustapha Kamel Pasha, the leader of the old Nationalist Party who was a great orator and a young man full of energy and activity. His only weakness in the eyes of the young generation at the time was that he sometimes had certain connections with the Khedive of which the young Nationalists did not approve. The Khedive Abbas, in spite of his faults, was undoubt-

edly a patriot and had the interests of his country at heart, even if he did not always follow the right course to attain this end and if the pursuit of his personal aims militated against the general appreciation of his patriotic ideas.

As I mentioned in the second chapter, the students, who were educated by English teachers and professors, were great idealists and set themselves high standards of character, of justice, straightforwardness and honesty. Some of them afterwards became officials in the Egyptian Government, some lawyers, doctors and engineers, who took the lead with Zaghloul when he started the Movement of Independence in 1919. In spite of their youth, their moral standard was high and the patriotic ideals which they cherished saved them from many of the temptations which young people have to face.

This Egyptian Club stands out in history as an example of the good results which can be achieved by co-operation and unity.

It has been pointed out by British critics that Egyptians, even though they have seemed anxious for higher education and other of the advantages of Western civilisation, have not been to the fore in the endowment or support of educational institutions, hospitals and the like. The truth of this cannot be denied, but the reason of it is not that their enthusiasm is not genuine or that they are selfish and mean in respect of their money. It is that they have not been accustomed to do these things individually and as a matter of personal generosity as is the case in Great Britain and America. It might be retorted to Western critics that at least a large proportion of such endowments and gifts among them have not been entirely disinterested. Those with a surplus of wealth

## *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

do quite often utilise it in this way to acquire distinctions and powers which are not susceptible of direct purchase. In Egypt we have been accustomed to look to our rulers for our public institutions, well knowing that in one way or another we should be compelled to pay for them. There are whole peoples and there are in all countries many not unenlightened individuals who consider that this, and not individual gifts, is the right system. So long, moreover, as the direction of policy in our country was under the control of foreigners, we were disinclined to devote our private fortunes to institutions which might well be used for policies of which we disapproved. Also, it must never be forgotten that in respect of the relationship of the individual to the community we are still at an early or, in any case, a transitional stage. It is only two or three years since the institutions have been those of a country which we could in a full sense call 'ours.' In the first thirty-six years of the century we were still struggling to reach that position and in the year 1914, which is the particular moment with which I am now dealing, the position did not seem to be either quickly or easily attainable.

In the period immediately before the war, however, the trail had been blazed for the development of those characteristics which are required for the successful and happy life of a modern, democratic community. The British Occupation was, in the intention of the best minds in Great Britain, meant to be temporary. It was certainly so considered by Egyptians, though the considerations advanced in the foregoing pages will make their fears and suspicions of it readily comprehensible. The memory of Lord Cromer with his policies of irrigation, of honest collection of taxes, of steady development

of democratic institutions and the like was very much alive. It is true that the memory of the Denshawji incident was also alive and ready to be used whenever there was a clash between British and Egyptian ideas or methods. It is true also that the administrations of Sir Eldon Gorst and Lord Kitchener had not produced such benefits or indicated such hopes as had that of Lord Cromer. But, on the whole, the feeling of Egyptians for Great Britain was not hostile and in many respects was actively friendly. Slowly it had come to be appreciated that, despite set-backs, misunderstandings and mistakes, the intentions of the British were sound and their word could be trusted. The date of the conclusion of the Occupation seemed still remote, but it could be brought nearer by Egyptians absorbing the best of Western thought and exerting themselves in the construction and operation of democratic institutions.

In this the Nationalist party, now under the leadership of Zaghloul Pasha, was naturally to the fore. They had seen recently Sir Eldon Gorst's policy of full accord with the Khedive and the more arbitrary and militaristic methods of Lord Kitchener. Neither of them were to their taste and neither were in accordance with the professed theories and practices of Great Britain. Zaghloul Pasha was at the head of a formidable band of followers demanding the abolition of the Capitulations, democratic reforms of the constitution, agricultural development, educational advance and, above all, some more definite date for the withdrawal of Great Britain and independence for Egypt. All of these things must come. Most of them have since come. But in 1914 they did not seem likely to be postponed for another twenty years and, though there was tension, there was a

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great deal of mutual respect, confidence and good feeling between the leading Egyptians and their British advisers with the British Government behind them.

So far I have been speaking of the political relationship between the Egyptians and the British. I want now to touch on the social and personal aspects and to make an attempt to delineate the character of the British in Egypt before the war as it appeared to the Egyptians.

In the time of Lord Cromer the character of the British official, the British business man and the British citizen in Egypt had come to be estimated so highly that the English ranked in Egyptian minds far above any other Europeans. The Egyptians naturally resented a certain aloofness, which marred the British attitude towards Egyptians, even towards those who were their superiors in official or social rank. But, in spite of this, the integrity, the honesty, the straightforwardness of the English was never questioned. At that period the English maintained such high standards, even in social matters, as to constitute them a model in the eyes of Egyptians, for the Egyptian man in the street, as well as the educated classes, considered that a nation composed of men and women of so high a type must be the greatest nation in the world.

The British people in Egypt, both officials and business men, have always shown great sympathy and friendship towards the Egyptian people, sometimes to the extent of rendering assistance to the poor or to any who were unjustly treated, even when the injustice was attributed to high Egyptian officials or, indeed, to the Khedive himself.

Lord Cromer set an example in this respect. He opened the Residency (the British official residence) to

## *Officials under Lord Cromer*

every Egyptian, whatever his position in life, so that anyone could come and complain of a grievance. The officials under Lord Cromer always listened to such grievances with kindness and sympathy. Such an attitude was the best possible check on any irregularities committed by the Pashas and those in power because they were really afraid that they would be severely punished through the interference of Lord Cromer.

I have in mind a case which shows for what a high ideal of justice Lord Cromer stood in the government of Egypt. A very rich Egyptian—perhaps the most wealthy man in Gharbiah Province—who had great influence and was an intimate friend of the Khedive, when some of the cattle were stolen from the property of the Khedive near him, endeavoured to discover the truth by illegally flogging the accused. This incident was brought to the attention of Lord Cromer, who advised the Government to investigate the case and to take very severe measures against the culprits, whatever their position was. Although the Khedive Abbas Hilmi resented it, the case was thoroughly investigated and brought before the Egyptian courts, which punished Menshawi Pasha and the officials in the Egyptian Government who had ill-treated the accused. They were imprisoned. A similar instance occurred later when Mohammed Mahmoud Bey (Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha), who was until recently our Prime Minister, was Behera Governor. The Governor's assistants were found guilty of similar maltreatment and were imprisoned, while Mohammed Mahmoud Bey lost his office, although he was not personally responsible and in spite of the high esteem in which he was held. This example was very effective in putting a stop to



## *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

any persecution or illegal treatment inherited from the times before Lord Cromer.

Wherever British officials in Egypt performed their duties under the British flag, there was always exhibited a sense of justice and fair play. They helped the Egyptians to redress their grievances and showed the greatest interest in their welfare, in spite of the fact that they themselves did not hold strictly legally responsible positions.

The British business man was honest in his dealings—a characteristic which is sometimes not very apparent in business. The Egyptian was, as has been said, very sensitive to injustice and persecution and welcomed the British ideals as evidence of how Egyptians under British guidance would obtain real justice. The small man was not allowed to be persecuted by the big for refusal to submit to illegal orders.

In only one case during Lord Cromer's career, apart from the Denshaw incident, had the British interfered in the normal course of justice. This was really a political case, that of Sheikh Ali Youssef, the owner and Editor of a famous Egyptian newspaper, the *Moaayad*, which was accused by the British of publishing secret telegrams stolen from the Telegraph Office by their agent. The Egyptian courts acquitted Sheikh Ali Youssef and Lord Cromer submitted to the judgment, although he and some of his English assistants suspected the Khedive of using his influence in the court, considering that this attitude would prove to Egyptian public opinion how fair treatment and a sense of justice were respected in Egypt.

So high had this policy raised British prestige in Egypt that Lord Cromer was often referred to by the



SHEIKH AMINE YOUSSEF



### *After Lord Cromer*

masses as "The Friend of the Wearers of Blue Robes" (the usual attire of the peasant in Egypt). The British officials in Egypt in general followed his example and a sense of security was felt everywhere by the Egyptian official, the Egyptian peasant and the Egyptian labourer.

In their private lives the British were obliged to observe, under Lord Cromer's orders, so strict a moral code that they never even mixed with foreigners in cafés or ordinary theatres or places of amusement. Any infringement of this moral code by a British subject or official always led Lord Cromer to send them away. By means of such strict discipline he tried to preserve the high moral tone of the British character. We who were students at the time were very much impressed by the high standard of the teachers and professors who came to our country, and by the uprightness and high ideals of British subjects in Egypt. To this I owe my own deep admiration for British ideals.

Unfortunately, after Lord Cromer's departure from Egypt his successor, although a very good man, did not pursue the same policy. He was anxious to conciliate the Khedive and those in power and this resulted in loss of prestige for Great Britain in the minds of the Egyptian masses. Lord Kitchener, in spite of his efforts to raise British prestige to what it had been in Lord Cromer's time, also failed: for he was inclined to rely on a certain type of Egyptian which is not distinguished either for a fine sense of justice and honour or for lofty moral character.

When the war came, the Egyptians called a halt to their claim for immediate recognition of independence. There was a truce in this comparatively friendly battle in view of the more dangerous and internecine struggle

### *Psychology of Egyptian People before last War*

between the European nations. There was, I venture to claim, a spirit of generosity in the Egyptian attitude at the outbreak of the war. However little success Egypt might have been able to attain by constituting herself a thorn in the flesh in those dangerous years for Great Britain, she decided that she would not so constitute herself and that was much. Her leaders might have bargained, they might have exacted penalties for old grievances. They refrained from doing so. They relied on what they knew to be the best in the British character and that reliance called out what was best in the Egyptian character. No old scores were to be paid off, no new demands made. It was a truce and Egypt stood as an ally beside the Power with which she still had so many points of dispute.

How the exigencies of war led Great Britain to requite this attitude and the effect her action had on Egyptian psychology by the autumn of 1918 will be told in the next chapter.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EGYPTIAN  
PEOPLE AFTER THE LAST WAR

THE hatchet, as has been shown, was buried. Egypt threw in her lot with the Allies and her leaders and the people as a whole were ready to accept the full implications of that policy. There might be, indeed there were, a few here and there who were influenced by their hostility to the British Occupation, by their susceptibility to the wooing of the Mohammedan world by Germany, by ties of loyalty to the Khalifate, by their adherence to the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, who at the outbreak of the war was actually absent in Constantinople. But those few were in no sense representative and their voices were unheard. The absence of the Khedive was fortunate. Turkey was at this stage neutral, but the Regent of Egypt, Hussein Rushdi Pasha, who was Prime Minister, immediately took a step which it was not at all likely that Abbas Hilmi himself would have taken. He definitely threw over the neutrality of the Turkish suzerain state and declared that German ships in Egyptian ports were enemy ships. This action on the 6th August, two days after the outbreak of war, was not only an overt declaration of the alliance between Egypt and Great Britain, in effect the participation of Egypt in the war on the side of the

## *Psychology of Egyptian People after last War*

Allies, it was also a declaration that the Turkish suzerainty was at an end and that, whatever religious and social ties might link Egyptians with the Turks, politically Egypt was no longer a part of the Ottoman Empire.

Having buried the hatchet, but by no means failing to mark the spot where it might be found after the war, the official rulers of the Egyptian people with the concurrence of the Nationalist leaders were ready to accept the consequences and to implement their pledges in the fullest possible manner.

I may, perhaps, be allowed to pause here and call attention to one or two points in regard to this move. No comparison can be made with the action of British political parties in sinking their differences and uniting in the face of danger. No comparison can really be made with the action of those European countries who saw their interest in union with the Allies. It might be said that Egypt was not strong enough to utilise the moment of danger by pressing on her differences with the British Government. Even if there be some measure of truth in this argument, it should be remembered that in 1914 and still more in the later years of the war it was by no means certain that the Allies would be victorious. There were times when the Turks were near and when disaffection in Egypt might well have involved the cause of the Allies in serious danger. Yet Egypt never wavered in her allegiance to that cause. I wonder whether it is always realised in Great Britain what in this matter she owes to the life and policy of Lord Cromer and those who supported him. For it was that and the memory of it, enforced by good sense and ability to forgive on the side of

## *The Protectorate*

the Egyptians, which caused their rapid decision and their loyal co-operation in the face of all that was to come.

The imposition of martial law and a strict censorship in November was no more welcome to us than it is to any people. It must be remembered too that with others the martial law and the censorship were in the hands of their fellow-countrymen, whereas with us they were in the hands of foreigners and not, except formally, in those of our fellow-countrymen. Nevertheless they were accepted.

Then in December came the Proclamation of the Protectorate, the deposition of the Khedive, since Turkey was now definitely on the side of the Central Powers, and the appointment of Hussein, a prince of the House of Mehemet Ali, as Sultan. The last two of these steps were not unacceptable to us, for Hussein was respected though not at first popular as he afterwards became. It was unfortunate that in setting the seal on the break with Turkey, the title of Sultan should be adopted, which recalled the most unpopular features of former Turkish rule. But this was a small matter as compared with the establishment of a Protectorate.

To begin with the word for it in Arabic was even more unfortunate than the title of Sultan. *Himaya* is the very word used to describe the position of protected foreign subjects in Egypt. It aroused at once the thought of the hated Capitulations and of the long history of foreign injustices and tyrannies. But the essence of it went very much deeper. Egypt had never at any time regarded herself as a part of the British Empire. In her view, fortified by the constantly reiterated assurances and pledges of British adminis-



## *Psychology of Egyptian People after last War*

trators and Governments, the Occupation was a purely temporary measure. Now, taking advantage of the generous feelings of the Egyptian people, of their acceptance of the breach with Turkey, of the imposition of martial law, of the self-imposed truce in the Nationalist campaign, the British Government had stolen a march on them, had declared, not that the Turkish rule was at an end, but that it was "forfeit to His Majesty," that Great Britain would henceforth take charge of Egypt's relations with foreign Powers, and that, with a few vague assurances as to social and constitutional reforms in some distant future, Egypt was a part of the British Empire.

If the feelings of many did not show themselves in intrigue and open hostility, we who were in touch with Egyptian opinion at this time, know well that this was the first cause of that real hostility which was stored up in the hearts of Egyptians to break out into the furious campaigns and disorders of 1919 and 1920. The feeling of reliance, of trust in British justice and honour was terribly weakened and there were many who marked anew the spot where the hatchet was buried.

The declaration of the Protectorate was accompanied by an undertaking, possibly intended to be friendly, but actually not too flattering, that Great Britain accepted full responsibility for the conduct of the war and would not ask the Egyptian people for aid other than the negative service of not hampering the military operations and not assisting the enemy. Since we had offered the active co-operation of our army to the Allied cause, this was a concession that to us seemed more like a snub than a friendly gesture.

Meanwhile we noted that for the time being all vestiges of democracy were being swept away. Our Legislative Assembly and minor legislative bodies were not allowed even to meet, the incidence of martial law became more oppressive as the thousands of soldiers from all parts of the British Empire were brought to our country and billeted upon us and generally treated the Egyptians with disrespect and impudence and sometimes even with brutality.

Then came the call to us to provide labour for the purposes of the war. New railway lines had to be built, all sorts of services were required for the support of the expeditionary forces. The Egyptian Labour Corps was formed. At first the call for volunteers was a success. The pay was, in the eyes of the farmers, good, the conditions satisfactory. But again and again came the call for more men. There were casualties ; the villages were depleted of their workers. The orders went out to the Omdehs that volunteering must be speeded up ; the methods by which this was accomplished were put down to the British. On the top of all this came the levies and forced contributions. The peasants, deprived of their best workers, seeing often Greek contractors making fortunes out of supplying the needs of the British forces, were compelled to hand over their crops and even, at last, their beasts of burden. There is a saying, not Egyptian it is true, that a peasant rates his cow at the value of his wife or son. These cows and donkeys he had to give up at a nominal price to the British officers, who by now were often young men of a very different type and character from those of old days.

As the war dragged on, sections of the Egyptian

## *Psychology of Egyptian People after last War*

Labour Corps were shipped to Europe. The casualties became more numerous, the discontent greater.

It is true that the country was prosperous and that this prosperity did extend to many of the farmers. But it was inevitable that the hardships should be put down to the British Protectorate and to the townsmen who were largely foreigners and who with the assistance of the British Protectorate were reaping a golden harvest ; while the soaring price of cotton should be ascribed to general world conditions and not to any policy of their British rulers.

Another grievance, amounting to Egyptians almost to an outrage, must be put down to the unimaginative mentality of the military rulers in Egypt at this time. In a Mohammedan country the practically forced levies were collected for the purposes of the Red Cross. If anything could be calculated to implant a conviction of almost malign despotism, especially in the eyes of a simple and devout peasantry, that was it.

Meanwhile to the more educated and thoughtful Egyptians, among whom I as a lawyer and now a member of the family of Zaghloul moved, there were other and wider considerations evoked by the atmosphere of the war. I think I have already said enough to indicate my respect and admiration, which I share with very many other Egyptians of my class and type, for the ideals and character of the British people. The respect for truth, the appreciation of justice, the absence of chicanery and intrigue, the good temper, the tolerance, which in the long last seem always to emerge, were some of those characteristics. Both in regard to ourselves and in regard to others, the British people, in common with other European peoples, seemed to have lost their

best qualities. Everywhere we saw falsehood, self-seeking, despotism, injustice, violence, not only practised but even preached. What had become of Great Britain's ideals of peace and justice? What right had these Europeans to accuse us Orientals of so many of the faults and sins they were themselves openly and unrestrainedly committing? The pedestal on which, in respect of many of their qualities, we had placed the British people was sensibly lowered and our confidence in the good qualities of our own people correspondingly raised. This too was to have its effect in the years immediately succeeding the war, though I am glad to say that today I can recognise many of these evils as the temporary concomitants of the great evil of war. Although traces of them remain and reappear today in Europe in various forms and under many disguises, the higher qualities are, I believe, the more fundamental and the more permanent and these have gradually come once again to predominate. Like the peasants of my country I can forgive, but I do not forget, the injustices, the oppressions and the sins of the war period.

To the period just before the conclusion of the Armistice belongs the formation of the Wafd, that Nationalist Delegation which superseded the old Nationalist Party and has to a large extent dominated Egyptian political life ever since.

At this time, it must be remembered, martial law was in full operation and anything like public propaganda was impossible. It was therefore to a strictly private meeting that Zaghloul Pasha invited a group of his friends and colleagues to his country house for a discussion on the coming situation in Egypt and the

## *Psychology of Egyptian People after last War*

steps which it would be necessary to take. These friends had all been members of the Legislative Assembly and had, in 1913, supported him in his campaign for the increase of the authority of Parliamentary institutions. Their names, and they are of importance in Egypt as being the names of the founders of the Wafd, were: Ali Shaarawi Pasha, Abdel Aziz Fahmi Bey, Ahmed Lutfi Elsayed Bey, Abdellatif Elmekabatti Bey, Mohammed Ali Bey, Hamed el Bassil Pasha, and Sinnot Hanna Bey.

As a result of this meeting, two days after the signature of the Armistice the hatchet was unburied, though its edge was not sharpened, and Zaghloul Pasha with two of his colleagues, Ali Shaarawi Pasha and Abdel Aziz Fahmi Bey, called at the Residency and requested permission to go to Europe and to England to plead the cause of Egyptian independence. Their conversation on this occasion was of the first importance and was consequently at a later date duplicated on the Roneo and distributed in the country.

The British authorities refused the request. On this Mohammed Said Pasha, a former Prime Minister of Egypt, tried to form another Wafd under the patronage of Prince Omar Tousson Pasha and to include in it the members of the old Nationalist Party. Zaghloul Pasha did not approve of this course because he rightly considered that the existence of two Wafds would lead to the failure of both and to the possible failure of the Egyptian cause. Moreover, public opinion was strongly against the formation of the new delegation. Said Pasha, under pressure of this public opinion, relinquished his attempt and Zaghloul Pasha came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of the National cause to include



MOUSTAFA EL NAHIA PASHA



in the Wafd representatives of the old Nationalist Party. Some negotiations took place with the Committee of the old Nationalist Party, but there was a difference of opinion with regard to the choice of their representatives. Zaghloul insisted that he should choose the people to work with him, while the Committee insisted that they should choose their own representatives. Moreover, in regard to their number, Zaghloul insisted on having not more than three while they asked for five.

Knowing that I was a member of the old Nationalist Party, Zaghloul asked me to use my personal influence with my colleague and partner Abdel Rahman Elrafeei Bey, a lawyer who was a member of the Executive of the Party, and his brother, Amine Elrafeei, the editor of a Nationalist paper, to suggest to them, without using his name and on my own personal responsibility, that it was in the interests of the country that they should agree to become members of the Wafd. They were both very friendly with Zaghloul and had helped him in his election campaign in 1913 for membership of the Legislative Assembly. I had a talk with my colleague, but, after a few days' consideration, while he expressed his appreciation of my recommendation of him, he found himself unable to accept membership. On hearing this, Zaghloul Pasha expressed his disappointment, but asked me whether I was personally acquainted with any of the original members of the old Nationalist Party, even if they were not members of the Executive Committee. I mentioned the name of Moustafa el Nahas Bey, who was a Judge and a friend of mine and whom I often used to meet in Cairo. I mentioned also the name of Dr. Hafez Afifi Bey, who was very popular



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for the services he had rendered in Tripoli with the Mohammedan Crescent (which performed the same functions as the Red Cross) but him I did not know nearly so well. Zaghloul asked me to see Nahas Bey and find out, without using his name, what his views were. I had a talk with him in Groppi's, the well-known tea-room in Cairo, and I found that he was a great admirer of Zaghloul and was very critical of the attitude of the Executive Committee of the old Nationalist Party. When I suggested to him that it was in the best interests of the country that the young Nationalist members should co-operate inside the Committee of the Wafd and said that I should be very pleased if he and those who agreed with him would become members, he said that he would be delighted to do so but that, owing to certain private financial difficulties, he could not afford to leave his job. He was in fact the sole support of his sister and his nieces. I did not myself go any further, but reported these facts to Zaghloul. Zaghloul said that he was prepared to solve this difficulty and asked me to see Nahas and invite him in his name to the House of the Nation. Nahas called on the following day and arrangements were made which enabled him to be co-opted as a member of the Wafd.

With regard to Dr. Hafez Afifi Bey, Zaghloul Pasha was able to get into contact with him through another source.

The Wafd then, after the interview with Sir Reginald Wingate, sought a mandate from the people which would give them the full support of the nation. The English authorities, when they heard of this, became apprehensive and used every effort to put a stop to it,

out they were unsuccessful. There was great enthusiasm in the country everywhere. Lord Curzon, who was Foreign Minister at the time, tried in Parliament to decry the power of Zaghloul by saying that the Judges, the Army and the Government officials and police had not signed a mandate for Zaghloul. This, he maintained, proved that Zaghloul did not represent all sections of Egyptian life. As a result of this statement, which was reproduced in Egypt, the officers and government officials all over the country signed a mandate. Had it not been for this statement of Lord Curzon's, Zaghloul would not have secured the immense number of signatures that he did from nearly the whole of the civil service.

I was one of those who organised the collection of signatures to this mandate, especially after the arrest of Zaghloul, when the British authorities ordered him to stop the agitation and the movement for the mandate and he refused. I was able to obtain a mandate from three capitals of Provinces, especially from the government officials—Tantah, Mansourah and Zagazig—and also from Port Said and Damietta.

Before Zaghloul Pasha and his colleagues were arrested, the Wafd Executive had chosen certain of its supporters to replace any members who might be arrested. The support in the country at this time was so enthusiastic that I could unhesitatingly say in the Press that the Egyptians welcomed any sacrifices they had to make in order to attain the objects—that going to prison was like going to the theatre. The Nationalist Movement, as I have shown in another chapter, gained power and strength, not only through their own good organisation but even through the repression and severe

treatment they encountered at the hands of the British military authorities. If before the war the Nationalist leaders could claim to represent the vast majority of the Egyptian people, the events of the war period and the steps taken by Zaghloul on the signature of the Armistice caused that representation to be even more complete. He and with him his colleagues and the people demanded the abolition of the Protectorate and the complete independence of Egypt.

The personality of my relative and, in general, my leader Zaghloul, merits a volume to itself. But at this stage it is necessary to say that his great power in his own country and his great influence upon other countries were due largely to the fact that he understood and knew his own people and that in consequence his voice was indeed the voice of the nation. To Sir Reginald Wingate and, indeed, to the British Government at home, the boldness of this demand was surprising. For four years they had regarded Egypt as a comparatively simple problem. Her co-operation they had taken to be submissiveness. The British Protectorate was to them a *fait accompli* and their only doubt was whether to proceed to the more complete absorption of Egypt into the British Empire or, keeping the Protectorate as a substitute for the Turkish suzerainty, to revert to the pre-war order of things with the assurance that the withdrawal of Great Britain could now be relegated to the Greek Kalends.

But Zaghloul and his colleagues of the Nationalist Party, truly representing the feelings of a people regarding itself as cheated, rebuffed and exploited, demanded not only the abolition of the war-time measures, but the immediate fulfilment of the original

pledges of Great Britain. Their reliance on the British word and, to a large extent, on the advantages of British administration, was gone. The belief that they were as well able as the British to ensure the well-being of the people had grown, although I am sure that Zaghloul and most of his colleagues still held the view, which I hold myself, that Egypt had reaped many advantages from the Occupation. But the war period had balanced the disadvantages more evenly with the advantages.

In addition to this, certain principles had been professed towards the end of the war and had crystallised since into the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the cynical attitude of a Clemenceau towards those principles or the merely surface acceptance of them by a Lloyd George did not represent the way in which they were regarded in Egypt. We were, perhaps, younger pupils in the school of democracy and we believed that self-determination and the respect for the rights of small or subject nations were genuine aims. In this belief we were fortified by the consideration shown to India, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, to the Hedjaz and to various small European countries whose capacities for self-government and, indeed, whose level of civilisation we could not in most cases regard as equal to our own.

Zaghloul followed up his general demand with a specific request through the High Commissioner to the military authorities for permission to proceed with his colleagues to England to state his case. He was refused and the refusal was conveyed in a peremptory communication from a secretary. It may, of course, be argued that Zaghloul was not the representative of the

Egyptian Government. He was the leader of a Delegation representative of the vast majority of the Egyptian people, but the official forms and ceremonies required a request from a *de jure* government. That request came when the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, with the Minister of Justice, Adly Pasha, applied for passports to go to England for the purpose of conferring with the British Government. They were refused.

A few months earlier Rushdi Pasha had succeeded in obtaining the appointment of an Anglo-Egyptian Commission to consider the government of Egypt after the war. The only result of this had been a note drawn up by Sir William Brunyate, the Judicial adviser, which by English as well as Egyptian critics has been stigmatised as "ignoring the existence of the national sentiment which the war and the democratic ideals of the war had stimulated in Egypt as elsewhere." Apparently this note was based on the official British policy at the time of the establishment of the Protectorate. Not unnaturally it provoked a storm and the request of the Prime Minister was his attempt to allay it.

Neither the Government nor the Delegation were allowed to send representatives to England or were invited to Versailles. What were Egyptians bound to conclude? So far from their country being regarded as a loyal member of the Alliance in the war, it was now not allowed to have any voice at all in the settlement, even as a constituent nation of the British Empire and, though but temporarily within the Empire, was not allowed to confer with the British Government on the future relationship between them. There was only one interpretation that could be put upon these occurrences: Great Britain meant to be false to her pledges, to force

*March 6, 1919*

Egypt permanently into the British Empire and not even to allow her a voice in the terms on which this surrender should be concluded.

At this date I am willing to assume that this was not the considered attitude of the British Government. With the settlement of world problems on their hands no doubt they thought that the problem of Egypt could wait as it had waited for so long. They were probably sublimely unconscious of the furious resentment which now, fed with the smouldering tinder of all that they had seen and endured during the war, was ready to burst into a flame. That they must have been so unconscious is obvious from the fact that they themselves applied the match which brought about the conflagration. On March 6th, 1919, the General Officer Commanding the British Forces in Egypt sent for Zaghloul Pasha and his colleagues and gave them a stern lecture concluding with a threat of severe measures if they continued their activities.

It was enough. The Nationalists, so far from ceasing their activities, immediately printed and circulated an account of the interview with a protest and two days after the interview the four principal leaders were arrested and imprisoned in the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks. They were deported to Malta and the whole country burst into revolt.

The history of that revolt and of how a month later the deportees were released and allowed to proceed to Paris, of how this policy was carried out by General Allenby, whose conciliatory administration had superseded that of Sir Reginald Wingate, has frequently been written and need not be told here. I am content with the accounts given by such an author as Sir

## *Psychology of Egyptian People after last War*

Valentine Chirol and even with that of Lord Lloyd, though I disagree with both of them on points of detail and interpretation. My sole object in recounting as much as I have of the history of Egypt during and immediately after the war is to show how and why the Egyptian psychology had changed so profoundly.

Through all this period I was living and working as a lawyer in Damietta. I was in close touch with Zaghloul and, through him and from my own personal contacts, with the currents of feeling in all grades of Egyptian society. I have tried to interpret honestly the feelings I saw and in large measure shared. We Egyptians were turned from a nation of which the major part was acquiescent to the *status quo* and hopeful of the future in respect of Great Britain into a nation which was hurt in its feelings, mistrustful, antagonistic and united. We were, as a nation, greatly enriched, but our riches were not due to the British but to the rise of prices all over the world and would not be diminished in the happy event of their withdrawal. From Great Britain in its war-time and post-war mood we had nothing to hope and little to fear. So long as we had exhibited to her the virtues she was always urging us to possess and professing that she possessed herself, the virtues of friendship, loyalty, trust, co-operation, reasonableness, peacefulness, so long we had been made to suffer and she had traded upon our patient endurance of our sufferings. The moment that we discarded the mask that covered our feelings and, goaded into active expression of them, revolted, the moment the more lawless elements among our people found an opportunity in the bitter resentment of the more law-abiding to proceed to acts of violence and



FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT ALLENBY, G.C.B.





## *Great Britain's Problem*

crime, the British realised that we were in earnest and retreated from their position. For my own part I could appreciate that these changes were really the result of one or the other opinion gaining the upper hand for the time being in the councils of Great Britain. I could even understand that to yield after violence is often more honourable and braver than to resist with greater violence. In any case it is not always the same as yielding to violence. But the mass of the people only saw that, if they were united and firm and that if then they resisted oppression with disorder, rioting and even brutality they were successful.

It was a new problem that Great Britain had to solve in Egypt after the war, not because the war had materially altered the international implications of the situation, but because it had materially altered the psychology of the Egyptian people. Their basic characteristics were unchanged. In these happier days nearly twenty years later they have again become the easygoing, forgiving, sensitive but peaceful people that they were before the war. But in 1919 and the succeeding years they had acquired experiences which gave them a sternness of purpose, a unity, a concentration and a mercilessness which were not, as is so often stated by British critics, created by Zaghloul and marshalled by his organisation, but of which he was the mouth-piece and the instrument and, in face of the enemy, the leader.

There are two or three further points on which I should like to touch before I turn to my personal activities in the less turbulent days which succeeded this period. One is the fact, often overlooked by British writers, that there was little rioting and violence when Zaghloul was

## *Psychology of Egyptian People after last War*

in Egypt, freely conducting his campaign. It was when he was exiled and when his influence for order was removed that the anger of his followers flamed high.

Another is the fact that violence was never offered to a woman, however fiercely the flame of anger was burning. The worst cases were almost invariably where the victim could be regarded as the symbol of those things which had aroused the deepest resentment.

A third is the fact that wherever there is revolution and disorder, private scores are settled and even the responsibility for crime is ascribed to those who suffer most from their commission. More than once it was those who did not wish well to our cause who committed or instigated the crimes for which we were held responsible.

But all this is past now and we may hope that in Great Britain there is as much forgiveness as there is in Egypt. There is little chance of a recurrence of such events. But the whole history needs to be recalled and the effects of actions estimated from the Egyptian point of view because it may happen in the future that Egypt is again called upon to choose between Great Britain and her enemies. There is already enough that is not forgotten, however much it may be forgiven, to make unanimity in that choice somewhat hard of attainment. I shall have occasion to point out in the concluding pages of this book several things which may militate against such unanimity if they are not set right. Slowly the Egyptian is again recalling Lord Cromer and the memory of the good is obscuring the memory of the intervening evil. My desire is that that process shall not be subject to postponements or interruptions.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CO-OPERATIVE  
MOVEMENT AND THE MILNER MISSION

I HAVE tried so far to give a general view of the political situation in Egypt in its broader aspects and to introduce to British readers, for the first time from the point of view of an Egyptian, the psychology of my countrymen and the effect of the Great War upon it. I have also traced the lines of my own comparatively unimportant life up to this time.

I now propose to take up the tale of my life and to devote myself to the immediate objects of this book. For I venture to think that from this time on my activities have exercised more than a little influence on the history of my own and to some extent other countries. At least I know that in the first campaign I waged they contributed to the relief of suffering and to the advancement of good feeling between classes and even peoples to a considerable degree.

In the year 1919, when the political situation was what I have indicated in the last chapter, I was still living in Damietta. I had gone on with my legal work and, as far as war conditions would permit, with my social work in our three Labour Clubs during the last two years of the war. I had, as I have said, married

the niece and adopted daughter of Zaghoul Pasha in 1913, five years before the National Movement. My marriage had brought me into close contact with the leaders of the Nationalist Movement. I was twenty-four years of age and had, as yet, been more of a close observer of the great movements outside my own country town than a participant in the stirring history of the time. My marriage had, however, done more for me than give me happiness in my private life and introduce me to the leaders of the public movements. It had given me in a financial sense a certain amount of freedom and leisure which I could, when the time came, devote to public objects. I was not and am not to this day a wealthy man. The accumulation of riches has never in itself been of interest to me. I have not indeed waited to think whether any of the courses I have pursued would produce me money or power or distinction. I have always been summoned by a call to action in some cause that seemed to me fraught with consequences of importance for the well-being of the people and especially of the poorer sections of it. I am essentially the man of action and quick action at that, the man whom the easygoing, the self-seekers and those who are routine minded are apt to consider a busybody. As such I find myself more at home in the American than in the English atmosphere. I am not, I hope, without my share of intellectual power, but I am not an 'intellectual' in the sense that the thinking, the theory, is my chief interest. That for me is a rapid process to be followed by equally rapid action. I do not know that I had ever given close attention to the science of economics. Economists are rarely men of action. In the activities I am about to describe I proceeded, I expect, empirically,

though there were underlying principles which dictated how I should proceed.

I have described already our Labour Clubs in Damietta and have said that my own lectures in them were largely based on the books of Sir John Lubbock and Samuel Smiles with their doctrines of active self-help and the grappling with the problems of life vigorously and with confidence.

One of these problems faced me every day in the later years of the war and immediately after it in my own town. Damietta contained 32,000 inhabitants of whom 26,000 belonged to the working class. I saw that, though the country as a whole had become very much more wealthy in recent years, this large majority of my fellow-citizens, however hard-working they might be, had become no better off. As fast as the price of cotton rose, so fast rose the cost of living. With the wealthier middle and upper classes such a rise of prices might cut into the margin left over when the necessities of life were paid for. But in a period of national prosperity those margins themselves were larger and, indeed, many of the members of the middle classes were making fortunes out of the very rise in prices which oppressed the poor so hardly. The working classes on the other hand had no margin and the rise in prices ate up any increase in wages they might gain and indeed, owing to the activities of the profiteers, made them a great deal worse off than before.

It may convey some idea of what was happening to give the increases in price of a few of the main necessities of the people. Maize, which is the principal food of the working classes, rose in price by over 100 per cent. in three months ; barley by as much ; wheat by 60 per

cent. Animal fodder rose in the same period by nearly 40 per cent. bringing it to no less than 300 per cent. above what it had been a year before. Sir Valentine Chirol remarks that "In many parts of the country prices soared locally to even greater heights, and the landless poor, who derived no benefit from the rise since they had no produce to sell, could not possibly buy sufficient food for themselves and their families out of their inadequately increased earnings, and in many cases the food was not there to be bought even if they had the money."

It may easily be imagined what distress I witnessed among the weavers and other artisans who were my friends in the Labour Clubs and among the general population of Damietta. We had already had to face problems peculiar to us during the war. The trade of our town was mainly with Syria and various towns in Asiatic Turkey. The failure of this trade during the war had already caused unemployment and considerable distress. The savings of the people had then been spent and nothing, as the war went on, came to increase our prosperity. In these days, with my friend the late Abdel Halim Alaili Bey and others, I had started a philanthropic society proceeding on the simple plan of collecting money from the rich and distributing it to the poor. But now the distress was very greatly and very rapidly intensified.

The main cause was the phenomenal rise in the price of cotton which, while it increased the wealth of the country and improved the position of many of the farmers, had caused the production of foodstuffs to be abandoned in favour of the production of cotton and great scarcity to follow. This tendency would, no

## *War on the Profiteers*

doubt, right itself as years went on, for the acquisition of money at the price of starvation does not finally appeal to any man. But starvation cannot wait for the slow operation of economic laws and the consequent changes in the policy of peasants and farmers in respect of the planting of crops. Something must be done and done immediately.

The Government was making some attempt to relieve acute distress by selling commodities bought largely from abroad at less than cost price. But such a policy was obviously unsound. It was bound to be impeded at every point by the operations of the profiteers ; it was, in a sense, bound to reimpose, in the form of taxes, the burden which it lifted ; similar factors in other countries were causing similar rises in the prices at which the commodities could be bought from them. There was little hope from such a policy as this.

I set to work to tackle this problem, proceeding on two main principles of action.

The first was that gratuities, besides spoiling the character of working people, were in fact no cure at all and the distress had become so great and so widespread that they were not even successful as a palliative. This principle applied both to the Government policy of buying dear and selling cheap and to our own plan of collecting money from the rich to give to the poor. Whatever policy we adopted must be economically sound and, to be so, must be based on those very principles of self-help which I had been preaching in our Clubs.

The second principle was that war must be declared on the profiteers and that these enemies of the people must be defeated at all costs. The direct attack by



## *Co-operative Movement and Milner Mission*

legislation with penalties could always be met and evaded. Our plan must cut the ground from under their feet and must do so in a way which they could not prevent and which would be immediately popular with the vast majority of the people. Food at a cheap rate must be immediately available for the people and the underlying principle must be, not charity, but co-operation.

With some of my friends, I went round to all the richer men in the town. It was not difficult to convince them of the need for action, for although the Government, having a monopoly of these commodities, fixed a price at which sugar and flour were to be sold by the merchants, which allowed a margin of 8 per cent. profit, the merchants used to charge double the stipulated price, which was resented even by the rich people.

If Orientals are unaccustomed to such rapid action and to the idea of co-operative business in normal times, they have sufficient intelligence and common sense in critical times to benefit from co-operative plans when they are convinced of their soundness. Although generally the Mohammedan business man in Egypt does not follow strictly in trading the Mohammedan law which forbids charging interest on loans, yet in Damietta the Mohammedans are more religious and in general forbid interest in their transactions. This therefore gave my scheme the security of not being hampered from the start by the burden of interest. I raised £E 10,000 in shares of £E 100 each. I had now the capital necessary to make a start.

The next step was to obtain supplies. This could only be done through the British and Egyptian authorities, who had a monopoly of sugar and flour. I suc-

## *Distribution of Food*

ceeded in diverting supplies from the profiteering merchants who were making 100 per cent. on the sales. The Government allowed the distributor to sell the supplies to the consumer at a gross profit of 8 per cent. on the price paid by him to the Government, and I reckoned that this would be sufficient to make our scheme a success. We took a census of the population of the town and rationed all classes for flour and sugar and the poor for rice, lentils and oil in addition. We found that out of the flour and sugar alone we could make a profit of £E 900 per month. We therefore sold the other commodities at 30 per cent. below cost, which was 50 per cent. or 60 per cent. below market price. This cost us £E 600 per month, so that we had a gross profit of £E 300 and a net profit of £E 250.

As might be expected the merchants did all they could to impede the scheme. I was offered bribes and my life was threatened. Political intrigues were conducted against me and I was reported to the British military authorities as using this scheme to cover my propaganda against England. But I went straight on and succeeded. I succeeded in enlisting the help on the one side of the working men, through the Labour Clubs and the ideas of self-help which had spread in and through them, and on the other of my rich friends who not only lent the money for capital but also came and helped in the supervision of the distribution of food in the shops.

Of course I was not alone in this work. In Damietta and afterwards in many other towns there were many who threw themselves into the work with unselfish devotion. In particular, of the many Egyptians who helped, I should like to mention my old colleague the late Abdel Halim Alaili Bey. I also owe a debt of gratitude

### *Co-operative Movement and Milner Mission*

to Lord Allenby, Sir Gilbert Clayton, Mr. Ross Taylor and Colonel Elgood who gave me and my scheme every assistance, especially in regard to purchasing facilities and protection from the opposition of the private merchants.

We extended the scheme in different towns until 1923, adapting it as time went on to changing conditions. It was possible in general not only to supply the poor with necessities at a low price but at the same time to pay back the initial loans, or to use the profits to found special working-class schools giving free education under the supervision of the Ministry of Education.

I was officially thanked, through Lord Allenby, by the British Government as well as by the Egyptian Government, and I received an unofficial tribute from Sir Valentine Chirol in the following passage, which I venture to quote in full :

“ Thus, whilst Egypt as a whole had grown extraordinarily prosperous, and huge fortunes had been made and the *fellaheen* taken in the aggregate had waxed fat, there was widespread and acute misery amongst numerous classes, and with misery went the growth of discontent, especially when there were political agitators only too keen to fan the embers of discontent into flame. Even if there was no deliberate attempt to increase the food shortage by inducing native traders to hold up their supplies or only to offer them for sale at preposterous prices, the Extremists went about the country whispering that the shortage was due to the enormous requirements of the British Army, and the expansion of the cotton area to the selfish demands of Lancashire. Both from the political and from the economic point of view, not to speak of mere humanity, there was a

dangerous situation which called for prompt and generous action. But Ministers who can barely carry on, and officials, British and Egyptian, handicapped by the increasing uncertainty of the political situation as well as by an outworn system of hopelessly divided powers and responsibilities, do not readily appreciate the necessity for prompt and bold decisions and are not easily accessible to outside pressure. Some effective measures were at last taken, and with the assistance of the British Government considerable imports were rushed into Egypt, with the promise of more to follow, and stores were opened for the sale of flour to the public under cost price. More forethought and more energy might have brought much earlier relief, but in such matters they are hardly to be looked for in Egypt under existing conditions of government. The one bright spot was the capacity for self-help which some of the Egyptians themselves displayed. An organisation started by a young Nationalist lawyer of Damietta, Amine Effendi Youssef, indeed showed a better way to the authorities. The co-operative association which he initiated in his own native town, one of the poorest in Egypt, where 24,000 out of a total population of 52,000 were in sore need of assistance, and which he subsequently extended to Mansourah and other towns, not only in the Delta, but in Upper Egypt, laid itself out at once to discriminate between those who clearly deserve relief and those who do not, whereas the Government scheme left many loopholes for the well-to-do and especially for the big traders to reap the benefit of the sale of foodstuffs under cost price. Lord Allenby very wisely did not allow himself to be deterred from giving official support to this promising movement by the prejudice which its

Nationalist origin seemed at first to raise against it.”<sup>1</sup>

It was estimated, when by 1923 the abnormal period was at an end, that no less than £7,000,000 had been saved to the people in Egypt in two years. I had founded 26 co-operative relief stores with a capital of £500,000 which, according to Government statistics, had assisted 343,000 poor families.

This was my first public work and one effect of it was an invitation to go to England in 1922 in order to visit British co-operative societies, as I shall describe later.

Though, as may be imagined, most of my time and attention was absorbed in these activities and in my practice as a lawyer, I was more than an interested spectator of the stirring events in the political field during these years. I have traced the main lines up to that date in March 1919 when Zaghoul was arrested and deported with his colleagues to Malta. The story of the strikes, the riots and finally, in effect, the revolution which followed has often been told. The sternest measures of repression were used by the British Military Authorities. I have already endeavoured to make clear why these unfortunate events occurred. That they were unfortunate is obvious, as outbreaks of violence are always unfortunate. I might even admit that under martial law stern measures had to be taken to repress them. But between the lines and sometimes even in the very words of those British authors who have dealt with this period, one can see that we are in reality agreed that the responsibility really rested with the British Administration during and after the war.

This was certainly evidenced by the policy of Lord

<sup>1</sup> *The Egyptian Problem*, published 1920.

Allenby who succeeded in persuading his Government to release Zaghloul and his colleagues and to remove all restrictions on travel for them and for anyone else.

The effect in Egypt was immediate. In place of riots and bloodshed there were tumultuous, but quite orderly, demonstrations of joy and once again an Egyptian Ministry took office under Rushdi Pasha. But, alas, this happy state of affairs was only to last a few days.

On his arrival in Paris Zaghloul Pasha was to find that that very day President Wilson, in contravention of all the principles enunciated in his Fourteen Points, had publicly recognised the British Protectorate in Egypt and had thus left Egypt apparently alone in the world to fight her own battle.

In the absence of Zaghloul, who seemed through this occurrence to be almost as much silenced in Paris as in Malta, disorder again broke out. There were strikes of all kinds, even of Government officials, the Ministry resigned and chaos again reigned. The British authorities, once again with the assistance of martial law, adopted stern measures to check the disorders and for the moment these were successful. Zaghloul was able in some measure to control the situation and, after all, he was free. The issue had by now been clarified in the eyes of the British and they were at long last convinced that they must deal with the Nationalist demand as voiced by Zaghloul. As Lord Lloyd expresses it :—

“On the one side stood the British control, armed with sufficient power and backed by sufficient force to enable it to carry on the government of Egypt, should it so decide. On the other side stood the Party of Independence, which had profited by years of preoccupied inattention on the part of the British to establish a secure hold

### *Co-operative Movement and Milner Mission*

over the majority of the Egyptian people. One or other of these two combatants must win outright before the situation could settle down again and allow Egypt to return to the development of her true interests.

“These were the true facts of the situation in which the British Government had now perforce to intervene ; and in regard to which it was essential that it should now frame some definite policy.”

In order to frame this policy the British Government decided to send to Egypt that Commission which has gone down to history as the Milner Mission. Throughout the rest of the year 1919 riots and repression had continued in Egypt and Lord Allenby had been imploring the British Government to permit him to announce the policy of the Mission. The announcement was made on November 19th with the following preamble :—

“The policy of Great Britain in Egypt is to preserve autonomy in that country under British protection, and to develop a system of self-government under an Egyptian ruler.”

The announcement went on to indicate in advance the kind of constitution and delimitation of powers which was contemplated, but for the Egyptian people the preamble was sufficient. It was intended to perpetuate the Protectorate and that was a direct refusal of that independence which was now the unanimous and unequivocal demand.

Riot, disorder and crime again broke out everywhere and the Wafd, on the direction of Zaghloul from Paris, decided on the famous policy of the boycott.

It seemed that only in this way could the real feelings of Egypt in regard to the Protectorate be brought home to the British Government. With this policy I was in



LORD LLOYD, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.





### *The Boycott of the Milner Mission*

general agreement. But I did not feel that a mere negation was enough. After all, here was a special Mission of intelligent and experienced men, certainly not themselves antagonists to Egyptian aspirations and not themselves alien to the Egyptian people. The policy of the nation evolved by the Nationalists and more or less forced by the unanimity of the people on the Government was to leave them to make their report with little more evidence than they could have obtained from their newspapers at home. I could not let slip the opportunity of at least trying to convince them of the facts. Acting in a purely private capacity, I had done my best to bring the Wafd, the National Delegation, as the leaders of the party were now called, and the Milner Mission together. I had failed. But in one quality at least my character resembles the traditional character of the British. I do not know when I am beaten. If the Wafd would not meet the Milner Mission, might not representatives of both meet a third body at the same time? With the assistance of my friend Mr. Delaney, who is the head of Reuter's Agency in Egypt, I arranged a reception to the correspondents of the British Press who had come with Lord Milner and to this reception I also invited all the members of the Wafd and other Egyptian leaders. After tea I was able to arrange a meeting between Mr. Spender, Dr. Hafez Afifi Bey, a member of the Wafd, and myself, at the office of Mr. Delaney. After two private talks we agreed that the Mission must invite Zaghloul to go from Paris to London, and actually after the arrival in London of Mr. Spender, who was at the time of these conversations the only member of the Commission present in Cairo, the Milner Mission sent its Judicial Adviser, Mr. Hurst,

### *Co-operative Movement and Milner Mission*

personally to Paris to invite Zaghoul Pasha to come to London. This he did, and a conversation followed between the Mission and Zaghoul Pasha resulting in the Report of the Milner Mission and the proposals, which Zaghoul Pasha did not accept or refuse, but sent to Egypt by representatives of the Wafd in order that they could be examined there. As a result of this, certain amendments were made to the proposals and submitted by Zaghoul Pasha to the Milner Mission, but unfortunately they were not agreed to.

The fact that these things were not at that time done and that the Wafd and the Mission were not in complete agreement as to the terms of a future treaty, does not show that these negotiations were useless. They were, in fact, the first steps in the slow process of convincing the British Government that it was necessary to end the existing regime and to regard Egypt as an independent nation.

Early in 1921 the Report of the Milner Mission was released. Despite the fact that the British Government had been unable to agree with Zaghoul the terms of the treaty that was to follow it, they imagined that it was still possible to come to some agreement upon its propositions. For this purpose Adli Yeken Pasha accepted the Prime Ministership.

From the point of view of the Egyptian people it was useless to negotiate further in this way. They had already selected their delegation and this delegation had already indicated the final terms upon which a treaty would be accepted. They might have stood firm in this position and refused to take part in any further negotiations at all. But Zaghoul, who had returned to Egypt in April, succeeded in obtaining approval of more

### *Zaghloul's Position*

moderate counsels. If the Protectorate were abolished, the reservations of the Wafdist delegates accepted, the censorship and martial law ended and the Wafd were given a majority of the seats on a delegation presided over by Zaghloul, he was willing to co-operate with other powers in Egypt for the conclusion of the Treaty.

To one, like myself, in close touch with and sympathetic towards Egyptian opinion it is clear that he could not go further than this. The conditions precedent to a treaty had already been determined. To accept a position on the delegation without himself leading it and having a majority in support of his views meant a relinquishment of his position of representative of the Egyptian people and his surrender to the Palace of the democratic idea. Any division of opinion in the masses behind the Wafd meant a surrender to the British. Without him the negotiations were bound to fail, for they would not have the support of the Egyptian people. Such a failure might at length convince the British Government that the Egyptian people knew what it wanted, had conveyed through him what that was, and was determined to attain it.

I myself at this time did everything I could to convince the British Government that a delegation without Zaghloul as leader could not possibly succeed. Adli was willing to accept all Zaghloul's conditions except the one that determined the leadership of the delegation. He was not prepared to stand down in favour of the undoubted representative of the people. In Egypt the whole question turned on this point and not, as Lord Lloyd indicates, on the general conditions laid down by Zaghloul.

I visited the Chamber of Commerce and convinced the

members that the delegation must fail unless Zaghloul led it. Mr. Kingsford, who was its President and also the President of the social organisation which represented the British community in Egypt, gave me an interview for publication in the Press in which he expressed the view that, if the delegation was to succeed, it must be under the chairmanship of Zaghloul.

In addition to this I saw Reuter's agent at Alexandria and, as a result, he sent a telegram to the British Press stating that both the British and the other foreign communities were of this opinion. This telegram caused great anxiety to Adli and his friends since they imagined that it was inspired by the Residency and that their position was therefore likely to be endangered.

The event proved that we were right. The delegation was chosen by the Prime Minister, Adli Pasha, against the desires of Zaghloul and proceeded to England in July 1921. Its departure was preceded by hostile demonstrations in Egypt. Its months of negotiation in London were conducted to an accompaniment of protest from the people of the country it was supposed to represent. Negotiations broke down. It was impossible to regard a treaty as constituting an independent State which provided for the maintenance of a British garrison in Egypt and took all control of Foreign Affairs out of the hands of the Egyptian Government. Adli Pasha knew perfectly well what would happen in Egypt if he brought back such a treaty as that. He returned to Egypt and resigned his office. So far the policy of Zaghloul was justified by a negative event. But something more positive was to follow. It was essential that there should be a Ministry in Egypt and at present the British authorities had the chief voice in its formation. It was

### *Zaghloul deported to the Seychelles*

becoming more and more difficult, especially since Lord Curzon had written a hectoring letter to the Sultan the sole object of which seemed to be to vent his annoyance at the breakdown of the treaty negotiations.

Sarwat Pasha had been acting as deputy Prime Minister during the absence of Adli Pasha and it was to him that the British authorities turned in their search for a Prime Minister. Sarwat seized the opportunity, which had in fact been created by the firmness of Zaghloul, and made conditions. Let the Protectorate be abolished, the sovereign independence of Egypt be recognised and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs be reinstated and he would accept. In despair of any other solution and in the effort to escape the direct concession of these claims to Zaghloul, the British Government on the advice of the High Commissioner accepted and, prior to the making of any treaty at all, the main planks of the Nationalist programme were conceded. Once again, however, the British Government made the mistake of underestimating the intelligence and the determination of the Egyptian people. Thinking that now at last all would go smoothly if the man whom they persisted in regarding as an irresponsible agitator was out of the way, they proceeded, on the excuse of his refusal to cease political activity, to arrest Zaghloul with his principal colleagues and to deport them to the Seychelles.

I have no desire to stress once again the outbreaks which always accompanied the absence of Zaghloul from the control of the Nationalist Movement. This time it took the British Government more than a year to come to the conclusion that government in Egypt was impossible without Zaghloul.

## MY FIRST VISIT TO ENGLAND

THE outlook in Egypt at the time of my first visit to England was black indeed both for the British and for the Egyptians.

The deportation of Zaghoul Pasha and his colleagues to the Seychelles was followed by a boycott of everything British on the Indian model. For their leadership in this policy the acting leaders of the Wafd were arrested and brought before a British court-martial. It was apparently the plan of the British authorities to destroy Nationalism by eliminating its leaders. I advised my British friends at the time that the severe treatment of Egyptians would produce the directly contrary effect and would simply strengthen the Nationalist Movement and, in particular, the more extreme elements in it. My advice was, unfortunately, unheeded, the proceedings before the Military Court went on and the members of the Wafd were pronounced guilty.

As an Egyptian I was opposed to the policy of militarism which dictated such proceedings. I considered it to be against the interests of both countries. Together with a few English friends who shared my view, I endeavoured to convince Lord Allenby and the British Government of the wisdom of not inflicting a severe penalty on the leaders of the Nationalist Movement.

## *Zaghloul in Prison*

The riots and the attempts on British lives were not the actions of the present leaders or of the deportees. They were, indeed, in great measure the results of the stern measures taken. The verdict of the Military Court was followed by an attempt on the life of Mr. Brown of the Ministry of Education. Instead of convincing the British authorities of the truth of our argument, this unfortunate occurrence led to the continuation of the policy of severity. It had been hoped that Lord Allenby would reverse the judgment of the Military Court, but instead of this a sentence of seven years' penal servitude was pronounced against the leaders and a fine of £5,000 each. Moreover, instead of being treated as political prisoners, they were treated with great harshness and were put in solitary confinement in small cells for sixteen hours daily. I obtained admission to the prison where I saw Morcos Hanna Bey, the Batonnier of the lawyers and one of the prisoners so treated. I succeeded in obtaining from the British prison authorities an amelioration of their treatment for three days, during which I succeeded also in obtaining definite instructions from Lord Allenby that the amelioration should be permanent.

This success caused the leaders to come to the conclusion that I could help by going to England to defend the cause of Zaghloul Pasha and the Wafd generally. I at once expressed myself as very willing to go subject to the approval of Madame Zaghloul Pasha, who was practically the acting leader of the Nationalist Movement now that all the others were deported or arrested.

Madame Morcos Hanna Bey and Madame Wacyf Ghali Bey on behalf of the prisoners went to Madame Zaghloul and asked her to allow me to go to England to defend the cause. Madame Zaghloul at first refused



## *My First Visit to England*

categorically, saying I was the only one left to help her during the trouble and they must choose someone else, as she had already sacrificed Zaghloul Pasha and was not prepared to allow me to be sacrificed, especially as I was the father of two children and the husband of her niece, and if I went to England I might not be allowed to return. But the members of the Wafd in prison, again through the same source, insisted, saying that their only hope was in myself and that I was at the same time invited unofficially on account of my success with the co-operative relief movement to visit England. Madame Zaghloul continued to refuse and had it not been for my wife, who said to her, "If you sacrificed my uncle for the good of the country, I am ready to sacrifice my husband and God will be with us," I should never have made this, my first visit to Europe.

Before I went to England, I had been on the best terms with English friends in Egypt, both inside and outside the Government, and it was due to them and to their assistance that I succeeded in my co-operative relief scheme, which I began in 1920. The series of articles which had been written in the *Egyptian Gazette* and the *Egyptian Mail* under my name on Co-operation and Politics brought my views before the British public. I shall never forget the friendship and sympathy of Mr. O'Farrell, who was then Editor of the *Egyptian Mail*. During that period 90 per cent. of the articles written in the *Egyptian Mail* by Egyptians were by myself.

I had made the acquaintance of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald when he was on his way back from India where he spent his holidays in 1922. At that time he had lost his seat in Parliament because the people had not forgiven him for his anti-war policy prior to 1914. He

came to the house of Zaghloul Pasha with a highly commendatory letter of introduction from Dr. Hamed Mahmoud. I was at that time living in Zaghloul Pasha's house with my family and I had a series of talks with Mr. MacDonald about the political situation in Egypt. On one of his visits, as he was drinking a cup of Egyptian coffee, he remarked in the presence of some of the members of the Wafd who were not yet prisoners, that, after his study of the Egyptian demands, he believed that if he were in power he could solve the Egyptian problem quicker than he could finish his cup of coffee. He did not believe in demonstrations as a means of obtaining any end and, in spite of being Labour, he was very moderate and more inclined to Conservative methods in the solution of political difficulties.

When I went to England that year, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Spender and Sir Valentine Chirol were the four men who paved the way for my success. I arrived in London on the 9th September, 1922. I had never been out of Egypt before in my life. I stayed at the Piccadilly Hotel. Two days after my arrival I invited the Foreign Editors of the *Daily News* and the *Westminster Gazette* to my hotel and I convinced them that the policy which was being followed in Egypt was not in the best interests of both countries. The *Daily News* published a leader supporting my views and also an interview with me on another page. I succeeded also with a number of other Labour and Liberal papers, and in less than two weeks more than thirty articles had been written about my co-operative movement and the political situation in Egypt. The only paper which did not show any interest in my visit was *The Times* and, in spite of all my efforts to find a way

## *My First Visit to England*

to reach that paper, I failed. I made some enquiries and found that it would be very helpful if I could get into touch with Mr. Wickham Steed who was a power with *The Times*, and had also great influence at the time in the political world. It may interest my readers to know that I enlisted the services of an enquiry agency in order to obtain the ear of Mr. Wickham Steed. I happened to have a letter of introduction from Mr. Parker, the Editor of the *Egyptian Gazette*, to a Member of Parliament whom my agency mentioned as an acquaintance of a certain Mrs. Cohen, who was indirectly a friend of Mr. Steed. By this means I was fortunate enough to obtain an invitation to Mrs. Cohen's house at Byfleet and subsequently to be introduced to a friend of Mr. Steed. As a result, on my return to London from Byfleet I found a letter from him inviting me to tea at the office of *The Times*. I need hardly say that I accepted this invitation.

Armed with the letter I proceeded to 6 Tavistock Square, the London office of the Wafd. Mr. B. N. Langdon-Davies, with the help of Dr. Hamed Mahmoud as Egyptian representative, was at that time acting for the Wafd in England. When he saw the letter of invitation from Mr. Wickham Steed, he was delighted, for he considered that this letter would pave the way in *The Times* for the expression of our views. We at once prepared an article together on the Egyptian situation. Next day I went as invited to the office of *The Times* in Printing House Square. I saw that they were expecting me and, when I entered Mr. Wickham Steed's office, he greeted me with a smile and said, "Isn't it enough, you Egyptian egoist, to attempt the lives of British subjects in Egypt, that you come here today and try to persuade our ladies



BRIG.-GENERAL SIR GILBERT CLAYTON, K.C.M.G., K.B.E.



to support your ideas against us?" I replied, "Mr. Wickham Steed, we Egyptians, who have been taught by English teachers and admire the English character, knowing that our cause is just, believe that if we can get the women in England to plead for us, we are sure of success, for they are your better half. They understand humanity and justice better than men do and that is the reason why I arranged to meet you through one of your friends." He then began the conversation by criticising Zaghoul Pasha and his party and said that they showed by their attitude that Egypt was ungrateful to Britain, who had saved Egypt from anarchy, poverty and injustice, and that Zaghoul Pasha, through his agitation, had incited the public to kill the English in Egypt. I happened to have with me the dates of the attempts on the lives of British subjects in Egypt and these dates proved that the attempts had only been made when Zaghoul Pasha was either prevented from participating in politics or had been deported. One of the articles in the *Egyptian Gazette* further stated that even during the worst of the riots in Egypt, no Egyptian had ever attempted to insult a British woman. After nearly three-quarters of an hour's discussion of the Egyptian problem, when I pointed out to him that he did not know the true facts of the situation, he asked me whether I had prepared any material for *The Times* and I handed him the article I had written. After reading it he told me that he was going to arrange for its publication in one of the best positions in the edition of *The Times* appearing the next day, and, to prove his confidence in my moderation, the article would be published as it was without any alteration. He also gave me a letter of introduction to the Constitutional Club of which I was

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elected an honorary member, and introduced me to some important members of the Conservative Party. The article in *The Times* made a great sensation in the Egyptian Press when it was reproduced in Egypt, and a telegram of thanks was sent to me by Madame Zaghloul Pasha in the name of the Wafd. It was as follows :

### THE PROBLEM OF EGYPT

“ To the Editor of *The Times*.

“ Sir,—It often happens that the only road to the solution of a problem that has been in existence a long time is to ignore all the incidents, details, quarrels and side issues of the past, and to look solely at the immediate factors of the situation.

“ The real problem of Egypt has become obscured by its own duration. It seems to have grown more difficult than ever, chiefly because whoever wishes to understand and to attempt to solve it is faced with such an infinity of side issues and old controversies that he never reaches the present facts.

“ The main factors are three :

“ (1) The necessity for the British Empire to keep secure and open for itself the lines of communication between East and West.

“ (2) The determination of the Egyptian people to attain independence, not in name only but in fact, in regard to internal and external affairs. The English people believe that they have recognised Egypt's independence, but those who have followed events will understand why we cannot call it independence in reality.

“ (3) The fact that in making treaties and laws for

the realisation of this aim the Egyptian people will not trust the arrangements made unless they are made by their real representatives.

“ Now in regard to these three factors, the present position is as follows : The Egyptian people, and, in particular, Zaghloul Pasha and his colleagues, fully recognise the British interests in Egypt. At least three definite suggestions have been made by the Egyptian Delegation. One only has been made by the British representatives and that one, being in effect the military occupation of the whole of Egypt, is completely inconsistent with the realisation of the aims of the Egyptian people. What is required is precisely a discussion of this point : How to secure for the British Empire a free passage through the Suez Canal at all times and as against any possible enemies without prejudicing that Egyptian independence which has already been agreed to by the British Government.

“ The claim of the Egyptian people to independence has been admitted by Great Britain. It has even been passed by the vote of the House of Commons and proclaimed in Egypt. But the precise regime, with the Egyptian Ministry that is laying the foundations of that independence, in effect, appointed and controlled by a British military Commander-in-Chief, gives the Egyptian people very much more than a suspicion that the proclaimed independence is to be fictitious and not real. The least that is required here is the execution of Lord Allenby's promise to the Sultan to suspend the application of martial law in so far as it affects the free exercise of the political rights of Egyptians.

“ This brings me to the third factor. It is hardly necessary to point to the continuous failures of all those



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attempts to solve the problem which have ignored Zaghoul Pasha and his colleagues in the last four years. The only attempt which came within a measurable distance of success, and which, if the British Cabinet had supported Lord Milner, might have succeeded, was the Milner-Zaghoul negotiation of 1920. At this moment, success is more remote than it has ever been, despite the abolition of the Protectorate and the declaration of Egyptian independence, precisely because Zaghoul Pasha is a prisoner in Gibraltar, five of his colleagues are prisoners in the Seychelles, and seven more are, as the result of a trial by a British military court, prisoners in Cairo. None of these men is anti-British ; all of them are pro-Egyptian. There is being created in Egypt a strong anti-British feeling simply because of these imprisonments and banishments. Only the fulfilment of Lord Allenby's promise, the freeing of these men and the exercise of their influence can prevent that feeling from spreading.

“ Here are the factors and the lines of the solution of the problem. I am not one of Zaghoul Pasha's colleagues. As an Egyptian I sincerely desire, in the interests of my own people, a solution of the problem. I believe that such a solution is also in the interests of the British people. I make this contribution to the solution.

M. AMINE YOUSSEF.”

London, *Sept.* 16.

After that, so many papers offered space for the voicing of our case that some of the correspondents of the British papers in Egypt sent telegrams to their papers at home asserting that I had accepted a bribe of £40,000 to corrupt the British Press. So obvious a lie could only

aid my cause, for the British have always despised such methods and pride themselves on the incorruptibility of their Press. In less than three weeks the British Press in London and in the country was writing articles in support of Egypt. I was elected an honorary member of the National Liberal and the Constitutional Clubs and was invited as a distinguished foreign guest to the Authors' Club, where a dinner was given in my honour and where I made a speech on the situation in Egypt.

Today, seventeen years later, I look back on this whirlwind campaign of mine with some astonishment. Let me pause for a moment and review the facts.

For many years Egypt had been a constant preoccupation of the British Foreign Office and to some extent of the Cabinet. For about a year previous to my visit the office of the Wafd in London had brought my country and its problems to the attention of some private Members of Parliament and a certain number of journals and individuals outside Parliament. There had been formed an Egypt Parliamentary Committee and week by week questions were put to the Foreign Secretary from the point of view of our Nationalist Movement, which was to a considerable extent the point of view of the more liberal-minded and enlightened Englishman. This work, under the direction of Mr. Langdon-Davies and Dr. Hamed Mahmoud, was achieving slow success in an intensive manner. But the general public, the ordinary Englishman, was still unconscious of any Egyptian problem and, if he saw any reference to it, he was not interested. It is a curious fact about the English public that it is not generally interested in news concerning the Empire. Foreign European affairs are sometimes front-page news ; their repercussions may come close home.

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But India, Egypt, the Dominions even, leave the ordinary reader cold. It is all the more remarkable that the Press should have so immediately and so extensively taken me to its heart and my words to its columns.

One reason for this was that I believed so firmly in the great influence of the British Press, through public opinion, on British Governments. I was determined to mobilise that influence and I found that the journalists were ready to help me. This attitude of welcoming a foreigner, of helping him to accomplish his object, of smoothing away difficulties in his path was to me something of a revelation. The Englishman abroad and perhaps particularly in the Orient has the reputation of being cold and aloof. He does not usually seem to concern himself with any but his own affairs and those of his fellow-countrymen. Where his duties bring him into contact with foreigners, he is conscientious to the point of being sympathetic. But directly it is no longer a matter of duty, he is apt to retire into his shell. In his own country my experience is that he is a different being. From the policeman who directs one in the street to the Member of Parliament, he is ready with advice and help, goes out of his way to assist in what are no immediate concerns of his, is affable and genial as a friend. And it has to be remembered who I was. I came from a country which most Englishmen regarded, however incorrectly, as a disaffected portion of the British Empire. Anti-British riots were in progress, lives were being taken, the safety of the British community was jeopardised. I had come to plead the cause of those very leaders who were responsible or at all events had been deported and imprisoned on the ground that they were responsible for all these things. I make bold

to say that in almost any other country, so far from being welcomed and assisted, I should have been at best cold-shouldered and at worst arrested and deported. Yet, not only by the Press, but also in political and social circles, I was received as I have described. The British public is apparently always ready to hear the other side and I need not say how strongly I was fortified in my admiration of the British character by this discovery. Moreover, when it has listened to the arguments and finds that some of them at all events are good, it does not let the matter rest there. It immediately sets in motion all those subtle currents of opinion that in a democratic country do undoubtedly shape the policy of the Government. I had imagined that I should have to lay almost all the emphasis on my work in the co-operative movement in Egypt and only to let my plea for the leaders of the Wafd come in as a subsidiary matter. I found that, though the titles of the Press articles usually referred to my co-operative activities, what they really wanted me to do was to state the case for the Wafd. And I was only too glad to state it.

Unfortunately in my own country any very great success achieved by one person is almost certain to cause jealousy in others. The reason of this is that, where democratic systems are only beginning to emerge in more autocratic regimes and especially in a place where foreigners have for so long been in the ascendant, intrigue and self-seeking are common and genuine devotion to a cause is apt to be mistrusted. Thus it came about that my very success in bringing the cause of the Wafd before the British public aroused suspicion among certain of its members. Seizing the occasion of the misrepresentation of some of my views in the *Daily Express*,

they declared that I was lowering their cause in the eyes of the English and was not to be trusted to represent them. On the very day that this misrepresentation appeared I had telegraphed the article to Egypt together with a full account of my disagreement with it for publication in Egypt. My account was not published, the agitation against me was allowed to continue and I received a telegram from Madame Zaghloul asking me to return home. When my friends in London heard of this some of them—Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. J. A. Spender and Major Barnes for example—sent telegrams of appreciation of my work to Madame Zaghloul. In particular, Mr. Langdon-Davies, who it will be remembered was in a peculiarly responsible position in regard to the Wafd and had been in constant touch with Zaghloul Pasha while he was at liberty, telegraphed that I had been able to bring the matter of the release of Zaghloul Pasha and his colleagues to the sympathetic attention of the British public and that I had throughout correctly represented the ideas of Zaghloul Pasha and the Wafd as he understood them. Many others, amongst whom was Sir Valentine Chirol, wrote or spoke to me personally to the same effect. The essence of all these telegrams and letters was that the writers were convinced that, largely owing to my activities, Zaghloul Pasha would before long be released and that his party would be in power.

Such a consensus of opinion was bound to have its effect in Egypt and before long I received another telegram asking me to remain in England. But by this time I had come to the conclusion that I had accomplished in England all that I could do single-handed. I no longer felt confident of that support in Egypt which

### *Zaghloul at Gibraltar*

was essential if I was to continue the work in England. I had already seen Foreign Office officials and discussed the position with them and had now succeeded in obtaining an appointment to see Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, himself. But, when I sought permission from the Wafd to keep this appointment, they sent me an equivocal answer which left the responsibility entirely to me. This, of course, meant that anything I said or did could be disclaimed by the Wafd and I was not prepared to enter upon even informal negotiations on such terms. I decided to return to Egypt and face the music.

On my way back I was anxious to visit Zaghloul Pasha, who had now been transferred from the Seychelles to Gibraltar. I had a permit to do so from the Foreign Office, but unfortunately my name was on the black list and Gibraltar was under martial law. The Governor had gone on a trip to Seville and the military Commander refused to allow me to disembark. I stayed two days at Algeciras and took the train from there to Seville in the hope of reaching the Governor there. Unfortunately he had just left for Gibraltar again and it seemed impossible to reach him. I had, however, seen Madame Zaghloul, who was on her way to join her husband at Gibraltar, and had given her a full account of all my activities in England. I could therefore be sure that our leader would know the facts from my side and would be in a position to judge between me and any of my opponents who might attempt to prejudice me in his eyes.

Directly I landed in Egypt I went to see the members of the Wafd. I had made a complete dossier of all letters, documents and articles relating to my visit to England

## *My First Visit to England*

and I submitted this to the Wafd for examination. They then apologised for their treatment of me, but I realised that I had still some opposition to face when they accompanied their apology with a request not to publish anything in Egypt which might detract from their influence. What this meant was that, having to some extent supported the agitation against my activities they did not want an account of them published which would win the approval of the general public. I may add here that it was not until the real leaders were released that my relations with the Wafd again became cordial.

I was interviewed on my return by the newspaper *Nizam*, the organ of the Wafd party. In the course of this interview I foretold the fall of the Ministry of Sarwat Pasha, who had become Prime Minister the year before on making certain terms with the British authorities, and the release of Zaghloul Pasha and the other leaders of the Wafd. On this Mr. Kerr, the acting High Commissioner, asked me to go and see him. He started by saying that my prophecy would certainly not come true, that Sarwat Pasha would remain in power and that Zaghloul would never be released. I replied that, though he as the representative of the British Government was in a better position to know their present intentions than I could be, I still held to the opinion I had expressed. He asked whether I was prepared to bet on the subject. I replied that I should be delighted to back my opinion to the amount of £100. To this he raised the objection that whereas I, if I lost, would be able to go to the treasury of the Wafd for the £100, he would have to risk paying out of his own pocket. He suggested instead that, if he won, I should invite him, Sarwat Pasha, Sidky Pasha and the opponents of the



TEWFIK NESSIM PASHA





## *Resignation of Sarwat Pasha*

Wafd to dinner. I said that I would accept this if, in the event of my winning, he would in the same way invite the deportees and imprisoned leaders of the Wafd. Once again he changed the form of the bet so that finally, if I won, I was to entertain him and his British friends, while, if he won, he was to entertain me and my British friends. There was of course no very great importance in this bet, except in so far as his attitude showed a certain lack of confidence in the views he was expressing and a certain fear that I might after all be right.

My next step was to call on Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who had been Prime Minister at the time of the negotiations on the Milner Report. I showed him my dossier which he kept for some days and showed to King Fuad. It is not easy to estimate what influence this may have had behind the scenes, but at least it is clear what actually happened. When at the end of November Sarwat Pasha resigned, his successor was Tewfik Nessim Pasha and the Wafd and the public generally regarded this change as indicating the coming release of Zaghoul and the others. Relying on this the Wafd asked through me for permission to hold a meeting to mark the anniversary of the deportations in the Ezbekiah Theatre. They had not up to now been permitted to hold any public meeting since the arrest of Zaghoul, but Tewfik Nessim Pasha agreed. The meeting was a great popular success and after it I sent a telegram on my own responsibility to the deportees in the Seychelles and to Zaghoul Pasha in Gibraltar, in which I hinted that there were good hopes of an early release for them. Subsequent events showing that my judgment had been correct will be given in the next chapter.

THE RELEASE OF ZAGHLOUL AND HIS  
NATIONALIST MINISTRY

THE superficial observer of Egyptian affairs during these years is often misled by the impression that the politics consist of one long struggle between the Egyptians on the one hand and the British Government on the other. He will realise that this struggle ceased for the period of the war. He will also realise that its simplicity is from time to time broken into as a result of intrigues and personalities liable to occur anywhere and particularly so in Oriental countries. On the assumption of this simplicity of issue he will come to the conclusion that from the time of the British Occupation, 1882, to the date of the Treaty, 1936, the history is a steady series of attempts by the British to govern the country followed by retreats from the difficult positions so created. If he is an Englishman he will, according to his political viewpoint, ascribe these defeats to weakness on the part of Great Britain accompanied by ingratitude on the part of Egypt or to a very slow facing of the inevitable on the part of Great Britain, accompanied by a continuous and unvarying policy of resistance on the part of Egypt.

In point of fact the issue has not been nearly so simple as that. In view of the series of distinguished English-

men who have interpreted British policy, despite the fact that one of them at least, Lord Lloyd, continually expresses his puzzled surprise at its contradictions and inconsistencies, it is not for me to give any explanation. Any such views as I may give are attempts to show how that policy at any given moment looked to Egyptians, not how it may have been arrived at in England. What, perhaps, I can make clearer even than these distinguished authors are the complications and difficulties on the Egyptian side.

The first thing that must be understood is that ever since the war there have been three main factors in Egyptian politics, not two, and that the rapprochements and realignments of forces as between these three have been the cause of many of the difficulties in interpretation that have occurred. When in 1917 Sultan Hussein died and his son Kemal-al-Din renounced the succession, the British Government had to choose his brother, Prince Ahmed Fuad, to succeed him. In doing so they had chosen a man who was certainly not Anglophobe, but at the same time they had chosen a man who, though he had spent most of his life in Italy, was a very real Egyptian patriot. But King Fuad, who was an astute statesman, was not prepared to admit that the transfer of authority from the legitimate King to the leaders of the only party in the country was real democracy. This, in his view, was merely to establish one autocracy in place of another. So long as the Wafd was, or claimed to be, the only Egyptian party, the country was not a democracy and could only be governed by its King. That King Fuad held this view perfectly honestly and as a patriotic Egyptian there is no reason to doubt. But it can easily be seen that it brought him

### *Release of Zaghloul and his Nationalist Ministry*

at times into conflict with those leaders of Nationalism who with equal honesty believed that the immediate future of Egypt lay in having only a united nation represented by the Wafd and Parliamentary institutions supporting the policy of the Wafd to work for the complete independence of Egypt. In so far, then, as the Palace was also in favour of the independence of Egypt and its advance on the lines of purely social reform which emanated from Europe, it was at one with the Wafd. In so far as it constantly endeavoured to attract influential Egyptians away from the idea of democratic government, it was opposed to the Wafd. In this conflict sometimes the King and sometimes the Wafd gained the upper hand, but it naturally led to the weakening of Parliamentary institutions and to delays and difficulties in the solution of the problems of the new democracy. The British authorities may be said to have been in general opposed to the independence of Egypt, at all events for an indefinite period to come. On the other hand they were pledged to the introduction of democracy and to its adoption and smooth working as being the condition precedent of final independence. The Wafd were pledged to complete independence and to the immediate establishment of a democratic constitution.

It will be obvious to all that the Palace was always able to strengthen its own influence by exploiting the differences between the British and the Wafd. It was this triangular contest which made it essential for Zaghloul to keep his objects so simple as to command almost universal popular support and to postpone the advocacy of controversial policies of reform. It was this which, on the other hand, enabled Sarwat Pasha,



H.M. THE LATE KING FUAD



### *The Triangular Contest*

and others in conjunction with the Palace to retain power as against what they considered the dictatorship exercised under the disguise of democratic government by the Wafd, whose overwhelming majority in the country made the very existence of any other party impossible.

It was under the Prime Ministership of Sarwat, whose appointment had marked in reality a victory of the Palace policy, that a new Constitution was being prepared as a result of the negotiations that succeeded the report of the Milner Mission. This meant that Sarwat Pasha's Ministry could not be in accord with the policy of the Palace. But it was working in accord with the British Government, though at the same time, as far as its democratic policy was concerned, it was more in sympathy with the Wafd. Sarwat lost the confidence of the King and failed to obtain the support of the people. The British Government thought seriously of the release of Zaghloul and the King took advantage of this atmosphere to get rid of Sarwat Pasha and to appoint Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who was then head of the Royal Cabinet, to the Premiership. A renewal of riots with the new feature of bomb-throwing gave presumably the Palace and certainly the British to think that some decisive step must be taken. It was decided to release Zaghloul.

It appears that originally it was not the intention to permit his return to Egypt. His health was made the excuse for his release from Gibraltar. It was only logical that the other leaders of the Wafd should also be released and some of them were actually in Egypt. It was impossible any longer to justify the banishment of Zaghloul from his country.





TEWFIK NESSIM PASHA

## *Zaghloul's Return*

Meanwhile the English had insisted on the exclusion of the Sudan from the Constitution. Tewfik Nessim Pasha resigned and Yehia Pasha Ibrahim replaced him after accepting the point of view of the British. The Indemnity Law was promulgated and martial law was withdrawn. This was the situation when on September 17th, 1923, Zaghloul Pasha landed at Alexandria. He was received with the greatest enthusiasm by the people and all disorder at once ceased. The elections under the new Constitution were imminent and the Wafd, with its leader back in Egypt, entered upon the campaign.

My own fate in these elections was by no means happy. Zaghloul had on his return thanked me for what I had done in England towards obtaining his release. He allowed me to use in my election documents of importance commending my activities and ascribing the chief credit for his release to me. But I had chosen a difficult constituency. My opponent was an Omdeh who, having extorted large sums from his people, was able to spend an amount of money far in excess of anything I could have commanded, even if it had been my wish to win the election by these means. Moreover, he had the advantage in this contest that the electors were only too glad to get him out of the district by returning him to Parliament! I lost the seat by twelve votes and Zaghloul was good enough to say that he would rather ten Wafdist candidates had been defeated than that I should have failed. But the Wafd as a whole swept the country and in January, 1924, when the elections were concluded, Zaghloul found himself at the head of a united party of 190 out of a total of 214 members of the Chamber. In these circumstances there was nothing for it but to bow to the

### *Release of Zaghloul and his Nationalist Ministry*

inevitable and the King accepted the resignation of Yehia Pasha and invited Zaghloul to form a Ministry.

Thus at last ended the first round in the long fight with the British Government. The Protectorate and martial law were gone and Egypt was nominally independent.

The English who, incidentally, took some five hundred years to work out their own system of Parliamentary Government, are inclined sometimes to regard it as a weakness in us Egyptians, who had after all only recently emerged from a system of autocracy and who were working out the difficult balance of powers between the Throne and Parliament, that we did not succeed in ensuring the full working of our Constitution within a few months. It has to be remembered that so far our people only knew autocracy. There was not, as in England, a long history of grievances which culminated in direct quarrels between the King and Parliament. In Egypt it was the autocratic ruler to whom the people had looked for their blessings as well as for their sufferings. It was a question of a good or a bad ruler rather than a question of a King or a Parliamentary system. Still, even to expect such speed in the development of a new system of government may be taken to imply a compliment to our intelligence and political ability and I am prepared to leave it at that.

It is often pointed out that the Nationalist Government, when it came into power with such a decisive majority, was in a position to be far more effective in social reform than in fact it was. It is alleged, and with considerable truth, that not only did it fail to effect any important social reforms, but it did not even present to the electors a programme including them.

There was nothing constructive, we are told, about their policy ; they were bent only on destruction.

If such critics would pause for a moment and consider what the situation was, they may perhaps understand the reason for this. It was not that Zaghloul and his colleagues were not fully conscious of the need of reforms they would be only too glad to bring about. It was not that there were not many voices urging them on to reforms in respect of education, of sanitation, of local government and of a hundred other things. It was that there was always present to them one overmastering purpose, one everliving fear. They had spent their lives in the campaign for making Egypt into an independent nation, free from foreign control and in a position to shape her own policies, internal and external. Their immense majority was not due to their having succeeded in this, but to their pledge that they would in the future do so. Much had, it was true, been accomplished. But, after all, there remained the Residency, the British advisers, the British Army in Egypt, the British control of foreign policy and, last but not least, the Capitulations.<sup>1</sup> It was enough in all conscience to go on with and the very magnitude of the task made it unwise for them to risk frittering away their strength and, possibly, sowing seeds of disunion in the major policies by turning their attention to the minor matters.

It is a curious fact that Zaghloul's accession to power in Egypt practically coincided with the accession of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald at the head of the first Labour Government in Great Britain. There can be little

<sup>1</sup> Certain extra-territorial rights which the foreigners received from the Turkish Sultan.



SAAD ZAGHLOUL PASHA

### *Disadvantage of taking Office*

doubt that Zaghloul had high hopes of the Labour Government. He was a personal friend of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Labour Members had come to Egypt and actually assisted in the Nationalist campaigns. A large proportion of the Egypt Parliamentary Committee in England had been members of the Labour Party. A considerable section of the new British Cabinet were pledged almost as deeply as Zaghloul himself to the policy of the Wafd.

The first difficulty that faced Zaghloul was the formation of his Cabinet. In the first place some of the Wafd were very much opposed to his taking office at all. While he was not in the Government but had the country at his back, he had been able to effect much. By assuming office he, like Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, opened the way to criticism and opposition. To a certain extent the man who enters a Government, particularly as its chief Minister, identifies himself with the constitution and the situation as it is. Madame Zaghloul, Wacyf Ghali and I myself agreed with this view. On the other hand it was argued that there was no question of what his mandate was. He had kept his programme too simple and direct to leave any doubt about that. The Palace had invited him to take office on that assumption and the Residency had presumably agreed. He was to make a treaty with Great Britain which assured once and for all the independence of Egypt and he could, if he were Prime Minister, set about this not only as the popular representative of the country, but also as its official head. Moreover the chances of success with our friends in power at Westminster were far better than they had ever been. These arguments weighed with him and he accepted

### *Release of Zaghloul and his Nationalist Ministry*

office, but the opinion of some of his colleagues made the selection of the Cabinet very difficult. In Egypt, as in England, a Party which had never held office was in power. This means that practically all possible Ministers are untried and that, through services during the long years of opposition, there are a great many of them. In these circumstances it is only finally possible for a Prime Minister to decide himself, after consultation with those of his own circle who share his confidence, as he thinks right. Such decisions inevitably leave behind them disappointment and even resentment.

For example, there were two brothers, Fathallah Barakat Pasha and Atef Barakat Bey, of whom both could not be included, but for reasons of influence and ability, one must. Zaghloul proceeded first by consulting the Wafd. Now there was no question that Fathallah Barakat Pasha was the abler of the two. Unfortunately there was a certain amount of resentment among his colleagues due to his influence with Zaghloul and his popularity elsewhere and his very abilities caused this feeling to be the stronger. They decided by a large majority in favour of the Atef Barakat Bey.

The day before the formation of the Ministry Fathallah Barakat Pasha, my wife and my two sons and I were dining with Zaghloul Pasha. Fathallah had some private conversation with Zaghloul and at the end of the evening we all walked home together. On the way Fathallah quoted one of our proverbs "I went out from the fair without any peas." We knew at once what this meant and we made up our minds to do what we could to set the matter right. We went next day

### *Forming the Cabinet*

in good time to visit Zaghoul and my wife succeeded in causing him to ask why she seemed so depressed. She told him frankly that she thought his choice of Atef Barakat Bey was a mistake. Madame Zaghoul expressed her full agreement with my wife and, as a result, the decision was reversed.

In addition to such cases as this there were the wishes of the King to be considered. When Zaghoul went with his list to the Palace, there were on it the names of Morcos Hanna Bey, the Batonnier of the lawyers, and Ali el Shamsy Effendi. The King objected to both : to Ali el Shamsy on the ground that he had been a supporter of the Khedive and to Morcos Hanna on the ground that he was a Copt and that a Christian ought not to be Minister of Justice in a Mohammedan country. After various consultations it was decided by Zaghoul to omit Ali el Shamsi from the list and by the members of the Wafd, to whom Zaghoul left this decision, to substitute for Morcos Hanna, who became minister of public works, the name of Gharabli Effendi, a young lawyer who had yet to make a name for himself, and a member of the Wafd. He was proposed by Fathallah Barakat Pasha and was included by Zaghoul in the final list submitted to the Palace, approved and published.

For myself it was arranged by the good offices of Fathallah Barakat Pasha and Nessim Pasha that I should become a permanent official in the Senate, of which in March, 1924, I was made Assistant-Secretary-General. While I was glad to have my services recognised in this way and particularly gratified by Zaghoul's wish that I should accept this office in order that I should be closely associated with him in Parliament, it meant a serious financial loss to me, since the



### *Release of Zaghloul and his Nationalist Ministry*

salary of £900 a year was considerably less than what I had been earning as a lawyer when I was in Damietta.

My position at this time in close connection with the Ministry and even more in the confidence of Zaghloul Pasha, is of some importance because it enabled me to know what was going on behind the scenes and to a great extent the projects for the future that were in the mind of Zaghloul.

Nothing could have seemed more happy in auguries for the future than the messages received on the one hand from the British Prime Minister and on the other from King Fuad on the opening of Parliament. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald sent his best wishes to the "newest of Parliaments" and went on to say, "I believe that Egypt and Great Britain will be tied by a strong bond of friendship, our desire being to see this bond made stronger on a permanent basis. For this purpose the Government of His Majesty the King is ready now, and at any time, to negotiate with the Egyptian Government." King Fuad, in the course of his speech said: "You have before you one of the most grave and delicate tasks upon which the future of Egypt depends, the task of realising her complete independence in the true meaning of the word . . . my Government is ready to enter into negotiations, free of all restrictions, with the British Government, so as to realise our national aspirations with regard to Egypt and the Sudan."

In addition to this Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had, at the request of Zaghloul, given consent to the release of all prisoners convicted of crimes against foreigners during the troublous period now past.

Unfortunately there was soon to be an interruption of these cordial relations.

## *Trouble over Indemnities*

In the previous year a law had been enacted fixing very high indemnities for British officials displaced under the new regime. Into the general question of the justice of these indemnities I do not propose to enter except to say that, while compensation was without doubt due to many who had taken their positions on the assumption of their being permanent, it was hardly a guarantee given by Egypt and in any case not by Nationalist Egypt. Nor, perhaps, was it necessary to set the standard of this compensation so high that British officials were in many cases eager to take the cash and let the office go. It is certainly the duty of the head of a Government to see that there is no unnecessary extravagance, especially when such extravagance means taxing his own people for the benefit of foreigners. Zaghoul Pasha informed the British authorities that he proposed to modify this law.

I have found that there are many of his one-time supporters in Great Britain who hold that the accession to power did not improve the outlook of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. I would not claim to judge of that in the way in which British critics have claimed to judge of the outlook of Zaghoul in a similar position. But one thing I will say. It was unfortunate that Mr. MacDonald's first sign of disagreement with the policy of Zaghoul was over a question of money to be paid by Egypt to British officials put in their position by the British authorities and in many cases not welcomed by Egyptians at all, although some of them have served the best interests of the country.

On certain other points also the poison of prejudice seems to have entered Mr. MacDonald's mind at this period. One of them was the Sudan. The reference

## *Release of Zaghoul and his Nationalist Ministry*

to it in King Fuad's speech caused some anxiety in Great Britain. In fairness to Mr. MacDonald I am bound to admit that he had to some extent inherited a policy from his predecessors. Not only had he inherited the policy of the full compensation to officials, but he had also inherited that claim to the *ipso facto* British control of the Sudan which his opponents could always use against him if he seemed to make any concessions in that respect. His position was certainly not easy and this may well have been the reason why he became somewhat nervous as to the effect on popular feeling in his own country when the moment for negotiating the treaty with Zaghoul approached. He was anxious to obtain in advance an agreement that Zaghoul would not make claims in regard to the Sudan and that the defence of the Suez Canal should be in the hands of Great Britain. In the end, however, the invitation came without any preliminary undertakings on either side, and in the summer of 1924 Zaghoul for the second time went to London to negotiate terms.

But first he spent some time in Paris from where he had some preliminary correspondence with Mr. MacDonald. It was not until the end of September that the actual negotiations in London began. Zaghoul's claims were definite and were in accordance with the mandate he had received from Egypt at the elections. To make Egyptian independence a reality, the British Army must be withdrawn from Egypt altogether. As to the Suez Canal there was no objection to British troops protecting it from the Palestine side for a fixed period, but the Egyptian side would be perfectly safe under the protection of Egyptian troops. The Financial and Judicial Advisers were to go and the British Government was to



DR. AHMED MAHER PASHA




### *Difficulties of Negotiations*

withdraw any claim to protect foreigners or minorities, or otherwise to interfere in the internal government of the country.

Whether Mr. MacDonald was himself willing to proceed with the negotiations on this basis it is impossible to say. It has to be remembered that his own position was precarious and that there were powerful interests watching every step he took in the hope that it might give them an opportunity to get him out of office. In any case the negotiations broke down before they had got further than this preliminary statement of demands and Zaghloul returned to Egypt in October.

There was no doubt that this was a setback and I myself saw that there might even be dangers to the position of the Wafd in Egypt. Superficially it could be argued that when Zaghloul was not in power progress had been made, but that now that he was in power with a friendly government in England, nothing was being accomplished. This was precisely the situation which those of us who had been against the acceptance of office had feared. But mere resignation would not mend matters. I felt that the introduction of new blood and younger men into the Ministry might at least help to remedy the setback and I made a suggestion to Fathallah Barakat Pasha to this effect. He asked me to make a list of the appointments I would recommend and I submitted eight or nine names to him, including his son Baheideen Barakat Bey, Dr. Ahmed Maher and El Nokrashy Effendi. He asked me to add my own name to the list and to take it myself to Zaghloul on his return. I could not well take the list as it was with my own name upon it, but Barakat Pasha told me that I could delete my name and that he himself would suggest me afterwards to Zaghloul.



DR. AHMED MAHER PASHA

### *Zaghloul's Plan*

When I presented the list and explained my idea, Zaghloul Pasha made no comment, but when a few days later El Nokrashî met me at the House of the Nation after the interview of Zaghloul with the King in Alexandria and asked me to fetch Dr. Ahmed Maher for an interview with Zaghloul, I knew that my plan had borne fruit and I told Dr. Maher that he was to be appointed to the Ministry. He became Minister of Education, while Nokrashî was made Under-Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior and Baheideen Barakat Bey Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Justice. For myself, Fathallah Barakat Pasha forgot his promise and so no proposals were made. But the Ministry so strengthened would have been able to proceed to a vigorous programme of social reform without interfering with the main task in the hands of Zaghloul had it not been for the disaster which was responsible for its fall.

In view of the widely voiced view that the Wafd had no such programme in mind, perhaps I may here indicate from my intimate knowledge of the mind of Zaghloul the main lines on which it was intended to proceed.

As was to be expected from his earlier history in the time of Lord Cromer, Zaghloul was very greatly interested in education. He was anxious as a genuine advocate of democracy that this education should be popular and that a very important feature of it should be the study of citizenship. After all the new democratic institutions were not the slowly evolving product of aspirations in the minds of the common people, as they may be said to have been in European countries. The same generation that had been accustomed to the traditional forms of Oriental despotism was now endowed with a system of democracy. However much the *fella-*





BAHEIDEEN BARAKAT PASHA

*heen* may have disliked the tyrannies and exactions of the old days and however glad they may have been to be free of them, they were unaccustomed to decide public issues for themselves. Just as the reality of Egyptian independence was dependent on the details and spirit of its establishment, so the reality of the new democracy was dependent on the public will and ability to participate in self-government. And that was the task of education.

It was essential moreover that that education should be national. It was no longer a question of whether the influence of the French or of the English systems should prevail. Of the two the English system was gradually ousting the French in education for the professions and the higher branches of social life. But it was in the education of the majority of his fellow-countrymen that Zaghoul was interested, and they were the peasantry and the rural population in general. For them, an Egyptian form must be evolved since no foreign models were of very much use in their circumstances. The first thing was to educate them in their own work so as to keep them on the land and prevent that urge to the cities which had, for example, produced so many problems in England during the nineteenth century. At the same time there must be no hard and fast bar between the country and the town. So far, as has been pointed out, the peasant regarded the town as an escape which he could make if he became a landlord and could live on the labour of his former equals. What was wanted was to enlist for the professions and for administration the ablest minds from the country as well as from the towns. Through the system of rural education facilities for this must emerge.

The second main line of reform lay in the administra-

tion of justice. It cannot be denied that the courts of law were not yet strong enough to withstand what some might consider excusable influence, though by now it may be affirmed that they were free from that actual corruption against which, in his career as a lawyer and afterwards as Minister of Justice Zaghoul had set his face so sternly. The elimination of this could be assisted by the imposition of penalties, but in the last resort it was bound up in that education for citizenship of which mention has been made. High standards of professional honour, impeccability of judges, confidence of receiving impartial treatment on the part of the public, depend one upon another and are in the end all the product of a sense of social duty and service.

In the sphere of taxation the outstanding principle was that whatever was taken from the peasant should be spent on him and not diverted to projects in which he had no interest, unless they were vital to the prosperity of the country as a whole. As well as education there were housing, irrigation and sanitation to be considered and the peasant would thus be able to see what the money was taken for. At the same time the improvement in his lot would make him the better citizen and, incidentally, the better able to bear the taxation which the development of modern systems made necessary.

The precise measures that would have inaugurated these reforms cannot be guessed, since there was no time or opportunity for them to take definite shape. The Ministry had only been in power for eight months when there occurred the murder of Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, which led to its fall. That Zaghoul or any of his colleagues had the slightest responsibility for this crime

## *The Murder of Sir Lee Stack*

is incredible to any Egyptian. To argue, as some English writers do, that Zaghloul's campaign against the British in respect of Egyptian independence involves him in the responsibility for the assassination is inadmissible. It makes all political controversy impossible if the protagonists are to be accused of any crime which may be committed against a member of the opposite party. Moreover, there are certainly two very good reasons why the most remote complicity of Zaghloul, or indeed of his Ministers, is inconceivable. One is that throughout Zaghloul's career he had always been an influence against measures of violence. He and all who, as his Ministers, were associated with him knew well that violence was alien to his whole nature, that his entire life had been devoted to obtaining agreement to his policies by consent and to refusing either to be intimidated or to intimidate. The second was that a crime of such a nature was the greatest blow to the success of his policy that it could possibly sustain. So much is this the case that it is generally believed in Egypt that the crime was in fact committed directly or indirectly by a criminal group in order to damage his position.

In effect it did so far damage it that the Government fell from power. Lord Allenby, on behalf of the British Government, demanded from the Egyptian Government an apology, the punishment of the criminals, the payment of an indemnity of half a million pounds, the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and Egyptian units, the agreement to the irrigation of an unlimited increase of area under the Gezira scheme and the withdrawal of all opposition to the British plans regarding the future employment of British officials and to the protection of foreign interests.

## *Release of Zaghloul and his Nationalist Ministry*

In view of the effect of these demands it is, perhaps, worth while to examine them a little more carefully. To apologise for a crime means to accept some measure of responsibility for its commission, and this the Egyptian Government refused to do. They expressed, as indeed they felt, their horror at the crime, but could go no further. The mere suggestion that they were averse from bringing the criminals to justice was an insult. To demand an indemnity, again, for a crime which was not theirs and for which they had no responsibility was unreasonable. To withdraw Egyptian officers and units from the Sudan, when there was no suggestion that they in any case were responsible, was illogical and looked simply like taking advantage of the crime to strengthen the British as opposed to the Egyptian position in that country. Finally, there could be no doubt that the conditions concerning irrigation, the employment of British officials and the protection of foreign interests were completely irrelevant matters, and that the British authorities were simply seizing the opportunity to score points against the Egyptian Government.

But the British were determined to press home their advantage. They followed up the Egyptian reply by a series of threats, some of which they carried into effect. The Egyptian officers and units were withdrawn from the Sudan and the area to be irrigated at Gezira was increased. The tobacco customs were seized. It was further threatened that diplomatic relations would be broken off and that hostages would be taken in case of any further murders. This was either panic or a declaration of war. In any case it was clear that there was no possible chance of attaining the main object of the Wafd Government by their remaining in

## *Dangers of taking Office*

power. Zaghoul decided, wisely as I think since I had never approved of his taking office before the independence of Egypt was assured, to resign and retire for the time being from public life.

It would seem right to conclude this chapter with some sort of estimate of the effect of Zaghoul's brief tenure of office.

There is in my mind no doubt whatever that to take office without authority is a dangerous and possibly a disastrous policy. It was the policy of Ramsay MacDonald and the Labour Party in 1924 and it led to their defeat. It was in great measure responsible for their failure five years later and for their exclusion from any chance of power for ten years already, and for who knows how many years to come. The strength of an opposition which refuses to take office while it has the mass of opinion behind it, so long as office does not carry with it authority, is almost irresistible. Those supporters who fall away through not having the enjoyment of official positions and emoluments are better dispensed with. The argument that it is weak to criticise unless you are prepared to accept responsibility is soon countered by the fact that office without authority means responsibility for whatever may go wrong, accompanied by inability to prevent things going wrong. On the other hand, by insisting that authority must accompany office your opponents are put in the position of exercising their authority in the face of ever-growing popular opposition. Tempting as the offer may be, it is a surer and, indeed, a quicker road to success to refuse office in these circumstances than to accept it.

Zaghoul Pasha's tenure of office did not advance the cause of the independence of Egypt and did not increase

the strength of the Wafd. On the other hand it did not materially or for long diminish that strength. The demand for independence and Zaghloul's leadership in that moment were too deeply rooted in the Egyptian mind for a temporary setback to destroy them. Whatever intervening Governments might come and go, however averse the British Government might be from conceding to Zaghloul what Egypt again and again authorised him to demand, the main contest was still between the Wafd and Conservative opinion in Great Britain, and Egypt as a whole was aware of the fact.

In England that traditional conservatism which seems to dominate politics, whatever Party may be in power, had not yet rescinded its decree that Zaghloul was an irresponsible demagogue and that his demands must certainly not be conceded. The Labour Government, if a foreigner may be permitted to judge, may be credited with a courageous attempt to solve the Egyptian question, but its efforts were doomed so long as it had not an absolute majority. So far as I can judge of English political life, it has been very often the case that measures of a Liberal or even Radical complexion have, after long and bitter opposition, been adopted and carried by those very Conservatives who have opposed them. It always appeals to the British mind to be convinced by the logic of events and only by that logic. It is precisely this which makes them the despair of people who foresee the inevitable and accept it before it is forced upon them, and it is exactly this which constitutes in the end their strength. They make quite sure that a thing is inevitable before they admit it and to test its inevitability they oppose it with every force at their command. Once, however, the inevitability is recognised, they are

quite prepared to make a *volte face* and to advocate and carry through measures even more extreme than their opponents had ventured to advocate.

Zaghloul's tenure of office had not convinced the British people of the inevitability of acceding to the demands of Egypt. Another twelve years were to pass before the majority of those demands were satisfied. But the fact of his enormous majority in the country and, even more, the fact that that majority, though diminished, was not destroyed at the next elections marked one step in the slow process of conviction that was taking place in Great Britain.

I may perhaps mention here two incidents which came near to involving me in serious quarrels with the Government. During the Ministry of Ziwar Pasha in the year 1925 there appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* an interview in which it was asserted that a relative of Zaghloul Pasha had said that King Fuad was desirous of governing the country as despotically as had the Khedive Ismail. King Fuad was naturally extremely angry. Government papers mentioned that I had actually said this and the result was that the Council of Ministers decided to deprive me of my office of Assistant-Secretary-General to the Senate. One of the Ministers pointed out that my expulsion would undoubtedly be ascribed by the public to the fact that I was a relative of Zaghloul and that this would be an unpopular move. He suggested, therefore, that a Committee should be set up to consider economies in administration, that it should recommend the dismissal of a third of the staff of both Houses of Parliament and that I should merely be included in the list of dismissals. It happened, however, that Sir Reginald Paterson, the Financial Adviser, was a




### *Release of Zaghloul and his Nationalist Ministry*

friend of mine. Hearing of this proposal he asked me to call on him to explain the situation. He then discussed the matter with Yehia Pasha Ibrahim, who at the moment was acting Prime Minister, and whose account of the matter confirmed my own in every detail. As a result Yehia Pasha Ibrahim saw the King and submitted the view that the policy of dismissing a proportion of the officials in the interests of economy was very unwise as it would cause a feeling of insecurity among all Government officials. He urged that, if the number of Parliamentary officials was excessive, some of them should be delegated to other Government offices until positions were available for them. The King was not at all pleased at learning that the Government's reason for desiring my expulsion, which was at the back of this whole affair, had not remained a secret and asked Yehia Ibrahim to return to the Financial Adviser and to inform him that the King was in agreement with his plan and was opposed to the course suggested by the Council of Ministers. Not only I, but more than ninety other officials were in this way saved from expulsion, which would have been due to an entirely unfounded suspicion.

Zaghloul Pasha, who was ill in bed at this time, asked me to go and thank Sir Reginald Paterson on his behalf for his action in this matter and he also published in *Al Balagh*, the organ of the Wafd, a statement that it was due to Sir Reginald Paterson that all these officials had not been unjustly deprived of their offices.

The other incident occurred in 1926, when I was spending a holiday in Upper Egypt. The officers of the Egyptian Army at Aswan were good enough to give a reception to me as the leader in the Co-operative Movement in Egypt. At this time it was being said that the



SIR REGINALD PATERSON, K.B.E.



## *A Misrepresentation*

policy of the Wafd was being advocated in the Army and both the King and the British authorities objected to this. When the invitation was conveyed to me I asked the officers if they would be good enough to invite two other Egyptians who were there and who were not supporters of the Wafd. One of them was in fact the Editor of *Al Ittihad*, the supposed organ of the Palace. My speech dealt with two matters only : the co-operative movement and the friendly and democratic spirit indicated by the fact that officers and men played a game of football together on a footing of complete equality. It is true that the band on this occasion played the March of Zaghloul several times and that this was greeted with much applause, but I myself was in no way responsible for any political demonstration whatever.

Yet on my return to Cairo I found that the Editor of *Al Ittihad* had sent a telegram to his paper accusing me of having made a political speech and the officers of having applauded the name of Zaghloul Pasha. At this the King was very angry indeed and succeeded in getting, through General Spinks, a thorough investigation of the matter. Again there was an endeavour to get the Prime Minister, now Adli Yeken Pasha, to dismiss me from my office, but he refused to commit an injustice in order to please the friends of the Palace. General Spinks in his report exonerated me entirely and, though the officers were transferred to another station, that was all that occurred during the ministry of Adli Yeken Pasha.

SOME OBSERVATIONS AS TO THE POLICY OF  
THE ZAGHLOUL MINISTRY

THE limitations of party loyalty and party discipline are never easy to determine. Even in England, with its two centuries of party government, they are by no means clear. On the one hand a party is ineffective unless its leaders can rely on united support for a policy that has been adopted. So strongly did Zaghoul feel this that he was willing even to defend a policy with which he disagreed, if it had been adopted by the majority of his colleagues. For example, in the year 1913, the British authorities and the Khedive were anxious for a prolongation of the Suez Canal Agreement. Zaghoul was opposed to this policy, but was willing to bow to the opinion of his colleagues and actually to defend the policy before the Legislative Assembly, on condition, however, that the latter's decision would in this case be accepted as final. .

On the other hand any excess of discipline is apt to drive out of the party just those men of individuality and initiative who are likely to be valuable. The difficulties are of course far greater when, as in the case of the Wafd, a party has an overwhelming majority. It is a political commonplace in England that a small compact majority is far safer than an extremely large one.

## *Outside the Party*

Where there is a large surplus, an individual or a group can act in opposition to their leaders without endangering either their own seats or the position of the majority. It was all the more remarkable that Zaghoul was able, through all these years of opposition and even during the period of office, to preserve a generally unbroken front to his opponents.

I think I have said enough to show that I am not by nature a party man. I think and act as an individual and I think and act rapidly. I have tried, however, all my life to act in such a way as to bring only advantage to the causes which I am convinced are in the best interests of my country. I have never publicly voiced my opposition to any line of policy, once it has been adopted by my party. At the same time I have had to devote my energies to something and they have usually been sufficiently great to arouse jealousy and even hostility from the less generous of my friends.

During the Zaghoul administration I was not in the Ministry. Had I been offered and had I accepted office I cannot be sure how far my position might have influenced me and how far I might have influenced the actions of the government. As it was I had my duties as Assistant-Secretary-General of the Senate and there were one or two minor duties which I was able to perform. For example, while Zaghoul Pasha was away from Egypt, I was delegated to the Council of Ministers. I was also entrusted with a Press campaign to counter the accusations made against Zaghoul of fomenting trouble in the Sudan. But in general I was in the position of a critical, though loyal, supporter and was able to observe the course of events because I was not to any great extent responsible. These observations, fortified

### *The Policy of the Zaghoul Ministry*

by a good deal of experience and consideration in the intervening years, enable me today to give some interpretation of where the weakness of the Government lay and of how certain mistakes of policy at that time have left their effects on Egyptian political life to this day.

The very magnitude of his triumph was the cause of Zaghoul's making what I said then to him and what I still consider was a very serious mistake of policy. At the time of the election, 1924, there were no candidates who were opposed to the independence of Egypt. On that general issue it would have been impossible to appear before the electorate with any but one point of view. In addition to this we were at one on the matter of the Constitution. Although I am not prepared to agree with the supporters of the Milner Proposals, we were all determined to establish Parliamentary government in general on British lines and were prepared to defend that institution against encroachments by reactionary influences in Egypt on the one hand and control or interference from the British on the other. The difference between the Constitutional Liberals who, under the leadership of such men as Adli Pasha and Rushdi Pasha, opposed our candidates and ourselves, was one of degree or of tactics rather than one of fundamental principle. They saw in the proposals of the Milner Mission all that they believed it would be possible to get from Great Britain. We held that to accept a limited independence meant a sacrifice for all time of the complete independence for which we were fighting. They held that acceptance of what was already offered would strengthen us to obtain more. We held that it would weaken us. When our point of view triumphed

so decisively, it was of course not possible to include our opponents in the Ministry. But it was possible to recognise the fact that they were, like ourselves, Egyptian patriots and at the same time to present to our real political opponents, the British authorities, an unbroken front by inviting them to accept positions in the Senate. The fact that Zaghloul and his colleagues did not make this gesture left his former friends, who might have been willing now to be his allies, with feelings of humiliation and even of hostility. Upon these feelings it was not difficult on various occasions for the British and even for the friends of the Palace to work. I do not think it is too much to say that this mistake was responsible for most of the intrigues that followed in the intervening years. Zaghloul himself was certainly generous enough and I think wise enough in the ordinary way to appreciate the error of such exclusion. But under pressure of the claims of his actual supporters on all sides it was no doubt difficult to justify the exclusion of some of them for the benefit of those very men whom they had just defeated. But it should nevertheless, in my opinion, have been done.

A second mistake is one which those who recall the position and, in particular, the fall of the first Labour Government in England will appreciate. It is the omission to take cognisance of the fact that the permanent officials, the Executive, are not in general inclined to co-operate readily with a new and to them revolutionary government. If this proved a real difficulty in England, with its established conventions of the duties of the Civil Service to carry out loyally the wishes of whatever ministry is in power, can it be wondered at that in Egypt, where those traditions had had no time to become



### *The Policy of the Zaghloul Ministry*

established, it was a far greater difficulty? It would not have been difficult to introduce into these offices some of his own supporters who would loyally carry out his policy instead of leaving in charge, as Zaghloul did, those who in minor matters at least were often not in agreement with him. What in fact he did was to antagonise the Constitutional Liberals by leaving them out of Senatorial posts and to permit that antagonism to hamper him by leaving the old obstructive staff in control of the Civil Service. There would without doubt have been opposition to changes of this character, but in my opinion Zaghloul should have faced this opposition at any cost and insisted on the principal posts at least being filled by men of integrity upon whom he could place complete reliance.

A third mistake was in taking into the Government too many of those whose influence in their own districts was indispensable to the strength of the party. Again, it is difficult for a leader, when his supporters have been successful in organising public support, to deny them and himself the advantage of close collaboration at the centre of affairs. At the same time organisation up and down the country is bound to suffer in the absence of its local leaders and there is no doubt that this was the case.

Finally, the absence of an official Government newspaper was undoubtedly a weakness. While the Egyptian support of the principal aims of the Government was so universal that no Egyptian newspaper could oppose them, journalists are bound to express a point of view. That they should have the right to do so freely, even when a government profoundly disagrees with them, is of course unquestioned. That they will on occasions of

### *Weakness of Zaghoul's Government*

slight divergence of policy admit to their columns a point of view which differs from their own is also true. I, who have had the advantage of expressing in British journals of every political complexion views in direct opposition to the policy of the British Government, should be the last to deny to journalists this fair-minded attitude. But the Egyptian Press had not perhaps attained to the high standards of the British Press and, in any case, permission to express oneself in a possibly hostile environment is not the same thing as having a place where one has the right and the duty to state one's own case. There was no journal which the Egyptian as well as the Englishman could know was speaking the mind of the Government and this was apt to lead to constant misrepresentation and misinterpretation of its views.

I have written frankly of what I regard as the mistakes and weaknesses of Zaghoul's Government, not because I want to set myself up as superior in wisdom to him and his supporters, but because the British writers on Egypt have not, I think, penetrated to any of these real reasons for its lack of success. Zaghoul has been accused of petty jealousy and of spite ; his objects, most of which, by the bye, have in the end been attained, have been called wild and foolish ; our very real efforts at the establishment of democratic government have been derided. But our critics do not seem to have attempted, or at any rate to have attempted successfully, to put their fingers on our real errors and weaknesses and it is necessary for me to explain them. For it is only by the realisation of mistakes when they are made that we can learn to avoid them in the future.

After the resignation of Zaghoul the British Govern-

## *The Policy of the Zaghloul Ministry*

ment, influenced by precisely those erroneous views of the Egyptian situation to which I have referred and which appear in some of the books which Englishmen have devoted to the consideration of it, reverted to the policy of ignoring the Wafd and taking its stand firmly on the *status quo*.

Having driven Zaghloul from power by the humiliating terms they laid down in respect of the murder of Sir Lee Stack, they proceeded to modify those conditions, which were unfulfilled, very considerably in their demands on his successor Ahmed Ziwar Pasha. A Commission with an Egyptian representative as one of its members was to settle the Gezira question and the Customs were evacuated. The Egyptian officers and units had been, it is true, withdrawn from the Sudan, but the office of Sirdar was left unfilled. In return Ziwar Pasha agreed to retain the principal British advisers and to accept certain conditions more favourable to retiring British officials and to European pensioners and officials generally. To demand of the Egyptian Government the punishment of the murderers as if it knew who they were and could hand them over at will had always been absurd. (The seven murderers were arrested and were hanged in June, 1925.) The British authorities could not, however, disabuse themselves of the idea that the Wafd was at the back of the crime. At the end of 1924 they had arrested amongst others two of the Wafd party—Nokrashi Bey and Maitre Makram Ebeid—for alleged complicity. In the absence of evidence, however, they and a number of the others who had been arrested had been released. It will be seen shortly, however, that they were not willing to let the matter rest there.

Ziwar Pasha represented the influence of the Palace



ISMAIL SIDKI PASHA



and was anxious not to quarrel with the British authorities. But he was well aware that he could not succeed in retaining office for long unless he joined to himself someone who represented the more popular Egyptian views. From among the Constitutional Liberals he selected Sidki Pasha, so that when the elections came at the end of 1924 the leaders of the opposing forces were Sidki Pasha and Zaghloul Pasha. Pressure and illegal methods were employed in the elections, but in spite of that the result was a small majority on the side of Zaghloul, who was elected President of the Chamber as against the Government nominee Sarwat Pasha. On this the King on the advice of the Ministry dissolved Parliament. It was generally believed that, though the murder of the Sirdar and other circumstances had for the time being diminished their strength, the Wafd still commanded quite a large majority in the country. It was an opportunity which was not to be lost and, with a promise that the electoral law should be revised presumably against the interests of the Wafd, the establishment of a democratic system was again postponed. This, of course, was welcome to the British Government and on the relinquishment this year of his office by Lord Allenby, they sent out a man of a very different political complexion in Lord Lloyd.

Lord Lloyd has himself written the history of his tenure of office and he makes no concealment of the facts that he was from the outset opposed to the policy of the Wafd, as was not unnatural, that he believed that the influence of Zaghloul was waning and that Zaghloul himself was declining in physique and morale and that the future of Egypt could and should be based on the Milner Report and the Constitution of 1923, though for

his part he regretted that so much had then been conceded.

He treated Zaghoul with harshness and lack of courtesy and, in his book, speaks of him often in contemptuous terms. How far he was underestimating his opponent and the strength which was behind him, the facts of history have shown. But the only written history so far has been that of Lord Lloyd himself and the presentation of the facts is naturally somewhat prejudiced.

Let me, for example, here mention the concluding stages of the attempt to fasten upon the Wafd the responsibility for the murder of the Sirdar. In the year 1926, nearly two years after the commission of the crime and one year after the execution of the criminals, two members of the Wafd were put on their trial. These two were Ahmed Bey Maher, who had been Minister of Education under Zaghoul, and El Nokrashy Bey who had been Under-Secretary for the Interior. Now it may be remembered that they were two of the young men whom I myself had recommended for inclusion in the Ministry after Zaghoul came back from London on the breakdown of the negotiations with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. They were young men who were at the beginning of their political careers. Upon the continuance of Zaghoul in office depended their making their mark and reaching higher positions. I am not asking my readers to accept my word that these young men were incapable of plotting a murder. I am asking them to consider whether it was remotely probable that they would certainly risk the interruption and possibly the ruin of their political careers and in all probability risk their lives by so revolting and at the same time so



MAHMOUD EL NOKRASHI PASHA



foolish an action. The murder of the Sirdar could not possibly benefit them or their leader or the cause of Egyptian independence. They certainly had brains enough to appreciate that it was bound to injure all three.

But, said Judge Kershaw, who resigned his office on account of his disagreement with his Egyptian colleagues on the bench, there was the weight of the evidence. No doubt to Lord Lloyd, and certainly to his readers, that remark of Judge Kershaw, accompanied by his resignation, produced certainty that the Egyptian judges risked their own reputations and gave a false verdict. But they are thinking of the impartial evidence brought before an impartial jury in an English trial for murder. Whence came this evidence? It consisted in a number of allegations by the secret police in the employ of a Government anxious to discredit the Wafd for political reasons. One outstanding portion of the evidence was that one of the accused had in his office one of the men who were hanged for the murder and that he had been seen speaking to him. It does not require much subtlety to appreciate that if one is organizing a secret gang of cut-throats, one does not usually associate a member of it with oneself before all the world. Judge Kershaw need not be accused of wrong-headedness and certainly not of prejudice or dishonesty, if he took this evidence at its face value. An Egyptian judge, with every personal reason to desire to please those in power, is far more likely to be right in risking their displeasure and discounting the evidence of their employees.

I myself was so convinced of the innocence of these two men that I discussed the details of the case with Mr. Booth, the Judicial Adviser, and with Sir Reginald



SIR G. ARTHUR BOOTH, K.B.E.



Paterson. " It was asserted that Fakhri Abdel Nour Bey, a member of the Wafd, was in close contact with Ali Salem Bey, who was one of the judges, and Ali Salem Bey was forced to resign in consequence. I begged Mr. Booth to use his influence to replace him by a non-political judge of known integrity, and the result was the appointment of Ali Izzat Bey, who was in no way interested in politics.

To my mind there is no shadow of doubt that the Egyptian judges were right and that Judge Kershaw was wrong. Lord Lloyd was of a different opinion and sent a very grave warning to the Prime Minister in regard to the protection of the lives of foreigners. He also asserted that the British Government did not accept the decision of the two Egyptian judges, that they regarded themselves as more than ever responsible for the protection of foreigners and that they reserved for themselves complete liberty to take any steps necessary for the discharge of that duty. Whether it was necessary to make such an accusation against the judges or to adopt such a tone towards the poor Prime Minister I do not know. In any case that was the conclusion of the incident.

I left the political situation with Parliament dissolved and the Ministry of Ziwar and Sidki still in office. In November of this year (1925) Zaghloul announced that Parliament would assemble on the 21st in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, whether it were summoned by the King or not. The Government prohibited the meeting and on the date fixed used troops and the police to prevent approach to the Houses of Parliament. The members, to the number of 190 from both Houses, met at the Continental Hotel. They



ISMAIL SIDKI PASHA

## *The Wafd*

elected Zaghoul President of the Chamber and Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha and Abdul Hamid Said Bey Vice-President. By this bold step the Wafd for the first time associated with themselves the members of the other political parties.

From this time on there was a Coalition between the Constitutional Liberals and the Wafd, which should have given the clearest proof of Egypt's determination to attain her independence and her equal determination to establish her Parliamentary system. After some attempts on the part of the Ministry to promulgate a new electoral law obviously designed to hamper the parties opposed to it, it was announced that an election would be held under the old law. At this election the Wafd secured 144 seats out of 201 and its allies by arrangement with the Wafd a further 33. The remaining 24 seats were divided between Independents and Ittehadists, the supposed Palace Party. Even more decisively this time had the voice of the nation been heard. The British authorities were, however, undeterred. They had declared at the time of the Sirdar's murder that never again would they allow Zaghoul to be Prime Minister and, democracy or no democracy, they did not propose to allow it. In this they committed a great mistake. They deprived the undoubted leader of the majority of the people from forming a Ministry and they assisted the reactionary influences to weaken the establishment of the Parliamentary system in Egypt.

Zaghoul, in spite of his failing physical health, was at the height of his mental strength ; one proof of this and of his right to be considered a real statesman was his sacrifice of what were undoubtedly his constitutional rights in the interests of peace. He agreed to accept the

*Release of Zaghloul and his Nationalist Ministry*

Prime Ministership of Adli Yeken Pasha, though he could not refuse his own election to the Presidency of the Chamber. In political circles in Egypt and also in England it was well known that the attitude of the British Government in this matter was the result of the insistence of Lord Lloyd against the best judgment of the British Government.

EVENTS FOLLOWING ZAGHLOUL PASHA'S  
DEATH

THE government of Adli Pasha in 1926 cannot be described as having been very successful. Zaghloul alone in effect represented the popular will of Egypt. Thus Adli had even less power during his tenure of office than Zaghloul himself had had while he was Prime Minister. There were bound to occur disagreements between them and, even if Zaghloul did not choose to use his power, he could in fact at any time obtain a vote against the Prime Minister. They were, for example, in disagreement in regard to the appointment of the village Omdehs by direct election and again as to the right of the Chamber to instruct Ministers as to administrative measures. It has to be remembered that the whole question of local government, as well as that wider question of the relation between the legislature and the executive, were under examination at this time. In Great Britain how many centuries had been taken in solving these problems? How many Governments had fallen? How many revolutions pacific and otherwise had there been? It was not surprising that there were disagreements in the Egyptian Parliament.

Moreover behind Zaghloul was the Wafd with an enormous majority impatient of any concession to the



### *Events Following Zaghloul Pasha's Death*

Prime Minister and to the allies whom Zaghloul had persuaded them to accept. No doubt the failing health of Zaghloul contributed to the difficulties. So long as he was present the Wafdist members could be kept loyal to the compact which he had made with Adli. But, if he were absent only for a short time, their undoubted power made them restive under a Prime Minister who was not of their party. On both of the matters mentioned above, the direct election of the Omdahs and the control of Ministers by the Chamber, they had had to give way. In regard to the latter the Members of the Chamber were not willing to forego their claim without a struggle. Some of them insisted on their right to enter Government offices, to examine documents, to know what was being done in administration and to use that knowledge in the Chamber. When the Wafd had been in power before, I have already shown how one of their chief difficulties was that the administration was often opposed to the Government. Now they were not prepared to allow that difficulty to continue. If they could not obtain the constitutional control, they would at least make sure that there was nothing going on behind the scenes which endangered the authority of Parliament.

Finally, while Zaghloul was away ill, Adli came to the conclusion that he could not continue in office. He resigned with the approval of the Wafd members of the Cabinet and the question of his successor was difficult. Zaghloul was very displeased at Adli resigning without consultation with him. After all Adli was Prime Minister through Zaghloul's influence and, in spite of minor disagreements, Zaghloul had been loyal to his compact and had supported him in his actions. Now Adli had deserted him. When it came to the choice of



ADLI YEKEN PASHA



a successor both Adli and Madame Zaghoul were strongly in favour of Nahas Pasha, and it is probable that their view would have prevailed had not Nahas committed a serious mistake of tactics.

Zaghoul, in deference to the opinion of Adli and Madame Zaghoul, asked Nahas and certain other members of the Wafd to consult with him privately as to the most suitable men to be appointed members of the new Cabinet. Those members of the old Cabinet who had with Adli resigned without consulting him were to be excluded. Instead of approaching this delicate matter in confidence and weighing with Zaghoul the pros and cons of various appointments, Nahas asked the members present at Zaghoul's house to elect the new Cabinet. Again had the man, who was the undisputed leader of the party in the country, been disregarded in respect of who should form the Government which owed its very existence to his power. Zaghoul only knew of this move of Nahas when he saw the announcement next morning in the pages of *Al Ahram*. Ill as he might be, he still retained the reins of power and he decided to select his old opponent, Sarwat Pasha, as Prime Minister and to reappoint all the Zaghoulists who had held office under Adli.

It had been suggested some time before by the British Government that King Fuad should pay a ceremonial visit to England. It was decided that this was a good opportunity for the visit to take place. With him would go, not Zaghoul himself, for he was too ill to contemplate any such journey, but a Prime Minister selected by Zaghoul. Zaghoul Pasha agreed that Sarwat Pasha should go and should discuss with the British Government the political situation in Egypt. It was not

### *Events Following Zaghloul Pasha's Death*

intended by anyone that a treaty should be negotiated on this occasion. The Foreign Secretary of the British Government, Sir Austen Chamberlain, had made this abundantly clear. In Egypt it was not likely that any such negotiations would be successful unless they were approved by Zaghloul Pasha and it did not seem wise that they should be initiated by Sarwat Pasha. Still it would be an undoubted advantage to pave the way by a frank discussion of the situation.

To the surprise of all, the Foreign Office and Sarwat Pasha at once proceeded without reference to Egypt to negotiate and even to draft a detailed treaty. Whether at this time there could have been any final agreement will never be known. It does not seem very probable that there could, for the British Government do not seem to have suggested terms which would ensure the complete independence of Egypt and even Sarwat Pasha's draft did not insist on this. In any case, from what was to prove his deathbed Zaghloul Pasha voiced once again his refusal to accept any treaty not assuring that complete independence to which the Wafd, with the overwhelming support of the Egyptian people, was committed.

I myself at this time was not able to be active in politics since I was suffering from the effects of an accident. I had broken my arm and my leg and spent the summer months of 1927 between the hospital in Port Said and my home in Cairo. While I was in hospital I was visited by Madame Zaghloul, by Fathallah Barakat Pasha and by others of our leaders and I was kept in touch with events as they occurred. Dr. Stiven, who was head of the hospital—and an excellent hospital it was under his management—when Zaghloul telephoned

## *Death of Zaghloul Pasha*

and expressed his great anxiety about my accident, said, "Don't you worry, Pasha ; when Amine Youssef Bey had his fall, God was a Zaghloulist." Fortunately for me the broken arm and leg were not so serious as they might have been and it was to this fact that he was referring.

I never again saw my beloved leader alive, for on August 23rd he died. At the time of his death I could not move and I was carried in a chair to see him before he was buried.

Zaghloul Pasha was not fortunate enough to live to conclude a treaty with Great Britain. It would have saved both countries years of controversy if the British Government had not adopted the attitude they did at the conclusion of his tenure of office in 1924. From that time on they refused to recognise his leadership of the people and the inevitability of his policy being in the end adopted. The elections of 1925 made it impossible to disregard him entirely or to exclude him from office. But the events which followed showed that the refusal to allow him to be Prime Minister and to negotiate the treaty, meant that there would be no settlement of the Egyptian problem. It will be seen that something of this attitude survived his death, but another thing that survived it proved in the end stronger. He was a patriot and a man of the people ; he had consistently voiced the demands of the people ; he had refused to accept half measures or to be tempted into yielding one inch. It is easy and, I suggest, a little ungenerous to put this down to obstinacy, to personal vanity or ambition or to failing powers, as some of his British critics have done. I venture to submit that these are the lesser men's criticisms of a great man. Zaghloul was never obstinate,

### *Events Following Zaghloul Pasha's Death*

except where he represented the unbending will of his fellow-countrymen ; he never allowed his own position or prospects to affect his attitude ; had he been willing to do so, he might have proved accommodating and won the approval of those in Great Britain who never meant Egypt to attain her independence and of those in Egypt who never desired the establishment of democracy. But never for one moment did he palter with his conscience, nor was he ever in the smallest degree unfaithful to the trust imposed on him by the will of the people. Even his enemies could not hate such a man and the more generous of them have paid tribute to his great qualities.

On his death the first question that arose was the form to be taken by some permanent memorial to him. Ahmed Zaki Abou el Seoud Pasha, the Minister of Justice, came to me and asked for my suggestions. I advised that a tomb should be built for him in the House of the Nation. I also suggested that statues of him should be erected in the principal cities of Egypt. I also urged that a Government pension should be allowed to that most loyal colleague of his both in his private and public life, Madame Zaghloul. The Cabinet was in full agreement with my proposals and suggested further that the House should be taken over by the Government and converted into a Museum, and that his country house at Ibiana, where he was born, should be made into a hospital ; but, when these proposals were forwarded to the Prime Minister, Sarwat Pasha, who was then in Europe with King Fuad, they were vetoed. Although later, when Nahas was in office, the tomb was built near the House of the Nation and two statues were ordered to be set up in Cairo and Alexandria respec-

tively, at that time the only real memorial of him was in the hearts and minds of the people and I sometimes think that, after all, there is none that he himself would have preferred. But an even more serious question that arose was that of who was to take his place as leader of the Wafd.

I have already pointed out how and why I am by nature not constituted to be a regular party man. It may have been observed already by readers that there were liable at times to be currents of opinion within the Wafd which regarded me, if not as a danger, at all events as something of a nuisance. There were times when I was useful, as when someone was required to go to England and to plead the cause of the deported leaders. But the speed with which I acted and the fact that, when I was certain of my ground, I did not prejudice my chances of success by waiting for confirmation was always apt, as it did on that occasion, to arouse resentment amongst my colleagues. In 1926 there occurred an incident which, by the action of Zaghloul himself, established me for the time being at all events more firmly in the good opinion of the members of the Wafd than I had been before.

During the Prime Ministership of Adli Yeken Pasha, the Minister of Agriculture, Fathallah Barakat Pasha, proposed a measure for the establishment of the co-operative movement which removed the barriers to its development imposed by the existing laws. His proposal involved financial support to the extent of £1,000,000. The Finance Minister, Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, opposed this measure and was supported in his opposition by El Nokrashy, Dr. Maher and Dr. Hamed Mahmoud. As the leader of the co-operative movement I was deeply interested in the debate and I attended the



### *Events Following Zaghloul Pasha's Death*

House to listen to it. I used to sit with the Senators as Assistant-Secretary-General, as I had always done. The group opposed to the measure obviously disliked my close observation of the attitude taken by Members, fearing no doubt that I might report it unfavourably to Zaghloul and possibly use it against them outside the Chamber. They therefore requested an official of the Chamber to draw my attention to the fact that I had no right to be where I was. I felt very hurt and went home. Fathallah Barakat Pasha reported the incident to Zaghloul, who at once asked me to go and see him. He expressed his astonishment at the attitude of El Nokrashy and others of the group, and, in particular, at the way in which they had treated me. He at once sent for El Nokrashy and Dr. Maher and the former came to see him. On the next day I met El Nokrashy who greeted me with great affection and told me that Zaghloul had spoken to him with the greatest sternness and had told him of what I had done to ensure that he should have a fair trial when he was accused of complicity in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. He had pointed out that it was through my convincing the British officials, Sir Reginald Paterson and Judge Booth, of his innocence and of the prejudice the judges had against the Wafd and of how everything depended on whether the judges accepted the evidence of the secret police, that an impartial judge had been appointed and that there had been no influence exercised from outside on the decision. In fact, the whole attitude of these members of the Wafd towards me was changed by this incident.

Thus it came about that, when the selection of the new leader was being considered, the members came to me for advice. It was my opinion that the appointment of

any one man was inadvisable. No one man could inherit the influence of Zaghoul Pasha and the selection of one to hold his office was bound to cause jealousy and possibly disunion among the others. I gave it as my advice that Madame Zaghoul should be elected Honorary President, that Nahas Pasha should be Secretary and that three others should form a Committee to work with them as leaders. In point of fact Nahas Pasha became President and, as I had proposed him for membership of the Wafd in 1918, I had no personal objection to this. Nor did it prove a mistake. From 1927 to 1936 he led with very real success, though he could not be regarded as equal to Zaghoul Pasha in ability or intelligence. But he was recognised to be straightforward, honest and just, and from the very beginning of his office his success did away with all opposition to him.

At the moment Sarwat Pasha was Prime Minister with six members of the Wafd in his Cabinet. When his proposed treaty was rejected by the Government, as everyone knew it would be, he resigned and, now that Zaghoul was not there, the leader of the Wafd was permitted to assume the constitutional position of Prime Minister. The King at the time was favourably disposed towards Nahas and raised no objection to his assuming office. It was not long, however, before it became clear that Nahas was no puppet, but a very popular and powerful leader.

The Government at this time was pressing forward the passing of the Assemblies Bill. The British authorities saw in this measure what they regarded as a danger to the interests and liberties of foreigners. So long as the Executive could prevent the public expression of opinion at meetings and demonstrations, so long was



MOUSTAFA EL NAHAS PASHA

it difficult for the voice of the people, that is to say the policy of the Wafd, to assert itself. In the shifting play of forces the friends of the Palace and the British policies were brought together in opposition to what England had taught us was a fundamental principle of democracy.

At this stage the coalition between the Constitutional Liberals and the Wafd, cemented and held together as it had been by the influence of Zaghloul, broke down when that personal influence was gone. It may be remembered that, when the first cabinet of Nahas was about to be formed, Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha and some of his colleagues declared their intention of not co-operating with Nahas unless Fathallah Barakat Pasha and Osman Moharrem Pasha were excluded from the Cabinet. The Cabinet was formed in accordance with their wishes, but it became obvious that Mohammed Mahmoud was determined to break the power of Nahas and, with the non-Wafdist members of the Cabinet, he found an excuse for resignation on the publication of an agreement of the previous year between Nahas and two of his legal colleagues on the one hand and representatives of the mother of Prince Seif-ed-din on the other for her recovery of the Prince's estate which was under the influence of the Palace. The resignation of Mohammed Mahmoud was immediately followed by the dismissal of Nahas by the King.

Mohammed Mahmoud was invited by the King to form a Ministry which at once petitioned His Majesty to dissolve Parliament. This the King of course agreed to do and at the same time he postponed elections and nominations of Senators for three years. It was not difficult for Mohammed Mahmoud to make promises of social reform now that on the one hand the movement for

### *Events Following Zaghloul Pasha's Death*

independence was at a standstill, so far as the Government was concerned, and on the other the democratic constitution was in abeyance. Lord Lloyd somewhat naively remarks that now at length he as High Commissioner felt that he could take a holiday. There was no chance of the voice of the Egyptian people being heard for a while to come and he could leave things to take care of themselves. Public opinion was crushed and Egypt was once again under an autocracy.



MOHAMMED MAHMOUD BEY



UNOFFICIAL COMMERCIAL AMBASSADOR  
TO EUROPE

FOR the last six years, since my first visit to England in 1922, I had been occupied personally with two policies, neither of which had any particular connection with politics in Egypt. These two policies were the extension of the co-operative movement, of which I have already spoken, and a new movement which I was promoting single-handed and against very powerful interests for a closer link between the Egyptian producers and the British manufacturers involving the elimination of the middle-man in Egypt.

In the world of politics I was often regarded as having influence almost entirely as the nephew of Zaghloul Pasha. In that world there was some truth in this view for personal reasons of which I have already spoken. But outside that world in the day-by-day life of a people, politics and especially constitutional politics, though at moments they may seem to transcend every other interest, do not in reality occupy very much of the time and attention of the masses. It was, I think, something of a surprise to my political friends when I, who had not apparently been very much in the public eye, received a personal invitation from three European countries to visit them as the pioneer of the co-operative movement



in Egypt and to study commercial co-operation between them and Egypt. I had during these years written much in the Press and talked much with the representatives of foreign countries in Egypt on these matters. It was, not unnaturally, difficult to obtain much publicity for my views in Egypt. Practically every newspaper in a European language was controlled by the very men whose profits I was set on diverting. The profiteering middlemen who were living in palaces were doing so because they stood between the impoverished *fellah* and the hard-pressed manufacturer in Lancashire and in Europe generally. To me this was and still is a misfortune and, if I can directly or indirectly cure it in what remains of my life, I mean to do so. On the other side of my activities a similar class of wealthy and powerful traders were anxious to defeat any policy which might hinder them from reaping their iniquitous harvest. But such articles as appeared in that part of the Egyptian Press which was not so controlled and my conversation and speeches on these two subjects had gradually caused my reputation in this respect to spread beyond the boundaries of my native country.

Oddly enough it was not from England that my first invitation came. Though it was particularly in relation to the improvement of British trade with Egypt that I had spoken and written, that conservatism and insularity which undoubtedly permeates the British manufacturing and commercial world prevented the British from being the first to realise that here was something that might prove very much to their advantage. After the war British manufacturers and merchants tried to resume trade with foreign countries on the basis of pre-war methods. Their historic aloofness and mistrust of

## *Germany and Belgium*

foreign methods caused them to believe that once again they could sit down and wait for customers instead of going at least half-way to meet them.

So, though my articles had been mainly in English papers, it was from Germany that my first invitation came. My visit was made under the auspices of the German Federation of Industries and I am bound to say that I was very favourably impressed by what I saw in their country. I visited the electric works of Siemens, Borzig, and the A.E.G. Company. I lunched with the workmen. I went over one of the Federation farms where the workmen are sent for convalescence and I visited the clubs and recreation grounds. I found that the men were more hardworking and at the same time more inclined to co-operate with their employers than in most countries.

From Germany I was invited to Belgium where I was officially received by two Ministers and was the guest of the Government during the week I spent there studying their commercial arrangements and making suggestions for closer co-operation in regard to cotton and other commodities with Egypt.

I received also an invitation to go to Italy, but decided to go first to England since from my side at all events it was there that I most desired to seek co-operation.

The story of my visit to England is one of almost dramatic interest. The Press welcomed me even more warmly than in 1922 and literally hundreds of articles appeared in papers of every kind and description on the objects of my visit. The Board of Trade became interested and Sir Edward Crewe invited me to the Department of Overseas Trade. I shall never forget the friendly encouragement I received from him and from

his permanent staff and assistants. I deeply regret they are no longer there, for to me they represent the best type of British official, men with the highest interests of their country at heart and prepared to do everything in their power to work for them. Sir Edward Crewe and his colleagues arranged an extensive tour for me in the manufacturing districts, especially in Manchester and Liverpool. All this they did in the first three days of my visit and there seemed little doubt that my visit to England was going to be productive of great advantages for Anglo-Egyptian commerce.

To my immense surprise I received at this moment a telegram from Mohammed Mahmoud's Government cancelling my leave and requesting that I should return by the next boat. Two hours later Sir Edward Crewe telephoned to me asking me to come and see him. When I called at his office I could see that he was very angry indeed. He said that, as a Government official, I must have been intending to return all the time that he had been arranging for me the programme of my tour in the North. I replied that the best proof that this was not so was the fact that I had already replied by telegram to my Government that I would return at the earliest possible moment, *after* I had fulfilled the engagements made for me. He at once appreciated that I at least had been guilty of no breach of faith in the matter, but he expressed himself unable to understand the attitude of Mahmoud Pasha.

"How is it," he asked me, "that Mahmoud Pasha, who pretends to be a friend of this country, allows you to go to Germany and Belgium with proposals for the benefit of their trade with Egypt, but the moment you come to England he recalls you? Is that an example



MOHAMMED MAHMOUD PASHA

of his friendship for Great Britain?" I explained to him at once that Mahmoud Pasha was a political opponent of my own, but was undoubtedly friendly towards Great Britain.

"He is afraid," I said, "that I may utilise the publicity my visit has attained for the political advantage of the party to which I belong. He is not opposed to the English and I am quite sure that he is your friend."

When I had said this I received from Sir Edward Crewe one of the highest personal tributes it has ever been my good fortune to receive.

"Mr. Youssef," he said, "I have heard a great deal about you from many of the English in Egypt and now I know why they like and respect you. In defending your Prime Minister, who is opposed to you in politics and for that reason standing in your way, you have proved your integrity and loyalty to your country, and you may take it from me as representing the British Government that no harm shall come to you, on your return to Egypt, as a result of your propaganda and your efforts at promoting good relationship between Egypt and Great Britain."

It was then, at the risk of the loss of my post, that I went on the tour arranged for me by the Department of Overseas Trade. Coming under these auspices I was received everywhere with a warm welcome. Chambers of Commerce and economic and business organisations in London, Manchester and Liverpool gave receptions in my honour. The Manchester Ship Canal Company entertained me at a big public dinner where I made a speech on the direct commercial relations between our two countries, especially in regard to the cotton industry. Within the short space of three days seventy articles on

my views appeared in the Press and nowhere could I feel any disappointment at my reception. All that the Department of Overseas Trade could do, it had done. It remained for the British business man to do the rest.

It was here that the difficulty really began. The cardinal point of my scheme was the establishment of a central Board representative of both countries to organise the trade between them. The objects of this Board were to be the elimination of the middlemen and the establishment of direct relations between the growers and the manufacturers. I also urged that there ought to be a very great improvement in the type of men selected to represent British firms in Egypt. There is no doubt about the excellence of British manufactures. There is every doubt about the excellence of many of those employed to sell them. I have myself had the experience of going to the agency of a firm of British motor-car manufacturers and being advised by the Greek agent not to buy one of the cars of his employers but one of another firm. Sometimes it did not seem worth the while of British manufacturers even to be sure that their agents were honest. There is no doubt that Egypt is a rich country and that there are ties of interest and respect which unite it to Great Britain. Yet on this occasion and for the eleven years which have passed since I have been struggling in vain to persuade British manufacturers that they are not getting the advantages that are possible out of Egyptian trade. I have had every help from British Governments in my campaigns. Sir Edward Crewe and his colleagues on this occasion and the first and second Governments of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald are examples of this. I have had every help from the Press and have been treated with the

greatest kindness and hospitality by organisations and individuals in the business world. But I have not yet discovered how to galvanise the British business man into action on new lines. He suffers, not in silence but in passivity, when times are bad. He is apt to consider only the immediate and individual trade of his own firm instead of realising that the co-operation of different firms and even of widely different lines of business is essential for the promotion of international commerce. Worst of all, he is apt to ignore the proper approach to his customers and to wait haughtily, as perhaps a century ago he could, for the customer to approach him.

I could go on with this list of the shortcomings of my hospitable friends and refer to their general suspicion of any ideas which emanate from foreigners, to their refusal to mobilise the best brains of foreigners as well as Englishmen for the purposes of commerce and to many other things. But I shall have to come back to this subject in a later chapter and I need not labour the point here.

When I returned to Egypt I found that the publicity accorded to my visit to Europe, in spite of the fact that it was quite unofficial, had caused a great sensation. On the day of my arrival it was announced in *Al Ahram* that the Government had decided to make a thorough investigation into my economic activities abroad and into the methods by which I had obtained my letters of recommendation in the different countries of Europe. The announcement was so worded as to make it appear that I was likely to be dismissed from my post, as indeed the Government's telegram had hinted that I might be. But I knew that I had done nothing to merit such treatment. I saw Hafez Afifi Pasha, who was Foreign Minister at the time, and the interview left no doubt in

my mind as to the displeasure with which the Government regarded my actions. The Prime Minister was at the time in Upper Egypt, but I heard that the Foreign Minister, the President of the Royal Counsellors of the Government and the Secretary of the Senate were in frequent conclave as to the course to be adopted in regard to me.

After a few days I received a telephone message from the Hon. Cecil Campbell, Assistant Financial Adviser and Counsellor at the Residency, asking me to come and see him in regard to all the rumours that were going about. I told him that, if any serious step were taken, I should at once hand in my resignation. I had done nothing to justify any suspicion and I preferred to take the step myself. He asked me as a friend to take no step without consulting him first. Some days later I was sitting in the Hotel Continental talking with a friend, Helmi Issa Pasha. Suddenly some of the friends of the Prime Minister came in—Hamed el Alaili Bey and Mahmoud Shawkat Bey, who was also one of his party and an official in the Senate. Hamed el Alaili, who was well-known to be opposed to me, came up and talked to us. “Amine Youssef,” he said, “is the fifth reserve in the Declaration of Independence.” My friend asked him what he meant by that. His reply was that Mr. Campbell had gone to tea with Mahmoud Pasha and had told him that he considered that any action taken against me on account of my activities in England, which had been designed solely to promote friendly relations between the two countries, would be regarded as an unfriendly act on the part of the Egyptian Government towards the British people. On this Mahmoud Pasha assured him that his Government had never had any such intention ; he



### *Unofficial Commercial Ambassador to Europe*

was personally free from any ill feeling towards me and, indeed, was a great admirer of my work ; what the Government wanted to know was the cause of all the publicity I had been given. I may add, in conclusion of this incident, that I afterwards received a written request from the Secretary-General of the Senate for an account of my activities during the vacation. In reply I sent a report of my activities to which, however much they might have wished to do so, it was impossible for them to object. There the matter dropped as far as any direct results were concerned.

My personal position was however changed at this time, for I was informed by Ali Maher Pasha, who was at that time in Mohammed Mahmoud's Cabinet, but was not on the best of terms with the Prime Minister, that I was to be delegated to the Ministry of Justice. Khashaba Pasha, the Minister of Justice, did not seem to welcome this idea, but Ali Maher Pasha asked me to wait a few days until Khashaba Pasha went on leave. When this happened I went to see Ali Maher Pasha at the Ministry of Finance. He was for the moment Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice. He gave me a cordial welcome and in the presence of the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, Abdel Rahman Rida Pasha, expressed himself as full of sympathy for the work I had been doing and of admiration for the ability I had shown in doing it. To impress the Under-Secretary, he spoke too of his personal indebtedness to me for bringing him and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister, together at a luncheon I gave at El Haty's in 1922 for the purpose of bringing Mr. MacDonald and members of the Wafd together. He told me that I was to be entrusted with all important



ALI MAHER PASHA

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cases of pleas for the Royal Clemency and with any other legal cases that called for confidential investigation. I was to be associated only with him and the Under-Secretary in my work.

I cannot leave this period of my life without adding the reflection that, though in the end I was not actually penalised, yet it is strange that I should ever have been in danger of penalisation for what were universally admitted to be efforts to ameliorate conditions of trade between my country and Great Britain and Europe in general. It is true, as I have said, that I had provoked the resentment of powerful financial interests. But I do not think that this would have affected Mahmoud Pasha and his friends. There was something else and I have a shrewd idea what that something was. Those who have autocratic power do not like the credit for policies to go to others, even when they approve of the policies themselves. In this case I doubt whether those in power in Egypt really understood my aims. In any case they were not interested in them. Yet in Europe and, indeed, in Egypt they had been discussed and in general approved everywhere. The resentment aroused was therefore personal, not to me as an individual, but to me as a public man who, after the death of Zaghloul Pasha to whom they imagined any influence I had was due, had now proved more active and had received more public attention than ever before.

VISIT OF MEMBERS OF THE LABOUR  
GOVERNMENT IN 1929, AND ITS EFFECTS

**I**N 1929 Labour was not only in office but also in power in Great Britain. It was true that the Government in Egypt was not of a complexion that might be expected to appeal to them. Six years earlier, when Zaghloul was Prime Minister of the first Parliament under the new Constitution and Ramsay MacDonald was Prime Minister in the first Labour Government in England, hopes of a real settlement had been high. How those hopes were dashed I have already described and how after a short time the strength of the old regime defeated both Governments has also been told. Now there was a difference in both countries. In England Labour had learned something from its previous experience. But it was less, not more, bold at the outset, though probably better able to fulfil its intentions when they were formed. In other words there were likely to be fewer promises and more performance. In Egypt, on the other hand, though the demand for independence by the people had not diminished in strength, the people were no longer to the same extent articulate. The Friends of the Palace and the Cabinet of Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha were without doubt anxious for independence, but they wanted to obtain

## *Visit of Members of the Labour Government in 1929*

it themselves and not through the strength of the popular will. They had, therefore, to face a situation in which the British Government was likely to be against them in the form of government established, but at the same time likely to be more amenable than their predecessors to permitting Egypt to choose its institutions for itself.

Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha went to England to negotiate a treaty with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Adli had tried to do in 1921, in order to strengthen his position in Egypt against the Wafd ; but he failed. The Labour Government wisely believed that a treaty with Mahmoud's government, who were opposed by the Wafd, would surely be a failure. Makram Ebeid Pasha was the official emissary of the Wafd in London and was very successful in his propaganda for the cause of the Wafd ; but he did not succeed in persuading Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's government to inaugurate negotiations with it. I read in the papers that certain influential members of the Labour Government were to make a trip to Egypt during the summer. It was at once obvious to me that a trip to Egypt in the hot weather and on a small steamer was not a holiday excursion. There was a political significance in the visit and this was the moment for the Wafd to take steps to obtain once more a hearing. I saw Nahas Pasha and I told him that I proposed to introduce myself to these gentlemen on their arrival and to ascertain the real object of their visit. The Members were Mr. Short, Under-Secretary for the Home Office, Mr. Ben Smith and Mr. Hayes. All three held positions high enough to ensure that they were in the confidence of their Government, but not high enough to commit it irrevocably to

any particular policy. At first I found them very guarded in their attitude. They had come to look at things for themselves and had no mandate from the British Government. It soon, however, became clear to me that their chief anxiety was not so much the question of Egyptian independence, on which their Party had already made up its mind, as the question of the democratic constitution which was in abeyance. For, directly they learned of my friendship with their Premier, they unbent and treated me with much greater confidence.

I arranged a day's entertainment for them on one of Cook's Nile steamers to which I invited a number of my friends of various political views. The same evening I gave a dinner party to them and invited to meet them Makram Ebeid Pasha, Nahas Pasha's principal colleague. Gradually, as my friendship with them ripened, they began to tell me what other Egyptians had said and what views they were forming on the situation. For example, they told me how anxious Mahmoud Pasha and his friends were to convince them that they were supporters of the Labour cause and that Labour opinion in Egypt was on the side of the Government. They had been invited by some of the Government supporters to visit an alleged Labour club, which was supposed to provide evidence of the democratic sympathies of the Government. When, however, they were shown over the premises, it did not escape their notice that all the furniture was brand new and that the very writing-desks and pens had never been used. They carried away a strong suspicion that this Club was a show piece prepared to impress the visitors and not a reality at all.

Meanwhile their meetings with Makram Ebeid Pasha continued and gradually the possibility of actual steps to be taken came to be discussed. It was suggested that an official investigation should be promoted and that the parties to this should be the Residency, the British officials in the Egyptian Government and the leaders in the different parties in Egypt. Makram Ebeid was not in favour of this while the Wafd was not in power. He argued that the Egyptian people would not really be represented in such a conversation and that consequently any findings would be suspect from the start. I called on Nahas Pasha to join in the discussions and at the same time managed to arrange for the Hon. Cecil Campbell, acting Financial Adviser and Counsellor to the Residency, to meet Makram Ebeid and to discuss with him the possibilities of the Wafd coming into power. As a result of these conversations the King was advised by the British authorities to see Nahas Pasha. Unfortunately this interview was postponed and postponed right up to the time when the Labour Members were due to leave. Once more I had endeavoured to bring my friends in Egypt and those who could influence policy in England together ; once more I had succeeded in doing so ; and once more the efforts were crowned with success, as will be seen later.

Before they left I gave a farewell dinner party to the Labour Members to which I also invited Makram Ebeid Pasha, Maître Sabri Abou Alam, Hassan Sabri Bey (now Hassan Sabri Pasha) and a number of other friends. At this dinner Mr. Ben Smith proposed my health and in doing so called attention to the way in which I had made things easy for them during their stay in Egypt. He

said that they were deeply indebted to me for all my efforts to promote a friendly understanding between them and the Wafd which, without the intervention of an intermediary, would have been impossible.


He referred to my personal energy and in a rueful manner to the fact that I had even rung them up on one occasion at four o'clock in the morning. He could only describe me as "Insistent, persistent and consistent." To which my friend Sabri Abou Alam Bey added the words "and assistant." On the following Sunday I had arranged for them to visit Madame Zaghloul and the Tomb of Zaghloul Pasha. They had, first with myself as interpreter, and then with Madame Zaghloul's Secretary, Miss Farida, a conversation with her and the main points of this conversation were written down and signed by Madame Zaghloul, Miss Farida and myself. I have that record today. After again ascribing the success of their visit to me they told Madame Zaghloul that they had come to Egypt as Members of the English Government who were friends of her late husband, the great Zaghloul. After a few weeks, as a result of their first contact with me, they were leaving the country not only as friends of Zaghloul, but also as friends of Zaghloulism.

I was particularly glad to have had this opportunity of introducing these distinguished British representatives to Madame Zaghloul, because I have always felt very deeply how much the Nationalist Movement of Egypt owes to her. In all countries and perhaps especially in Eastern countries, the work of women in political movements is apt to be relegated to the background. Though some might criticise her attitude after her husband's death, and others might deplore her subsequent



## *Visit of Members of the Labour Government in 1929*

withdrawal from the political arena, it must be admitted by every fair-minded person that, during his life she proved his ideal collaborator and a source of true inspiration to the national movement. She not only rendered great services to the cause of her country but she also rendered the greatest possible service to the cause of feminism in Egypt and all over the world. How much she helped her husband with advice and co-operation can never be known outside the family circle. What is known, however, is that during his life on every occasion when he was removed from his position as leader—when he was sent to Malta, or to the Seychelles, when he was absent in Europe, when towards the end he was in failing health—it was Madame Zaghloul who became the inspiration, the counsellor and, in effect, the leader of the Nationalist Movement. She did not obtrude upon his colleagues her grief at his banishment, her loneliness during his absence, her anxieties in respect of his health. She came forward at once to take, in so far as it was possible for anyone to take, his place. Two things also must be remembered in this connection. First, that this is in an Oriental country, where women are only just emerging into public life and where even today their leadership in such spheres is regarded as almost incredible ; and secondly, that the very moments when she came forward were the most anxious, the most hazardous and the most difficult periods in the history of the movement. They were the moments when courage, decision, wisdom and efficiency were called for, and it was exactly those qualities that she displayed. No doubt in the East, as well as in the West, many women have exercised a great influence on politics. But the credit for what they have



MADAME SAAD ZAGHLOUL



done is in general given to those through whom their policies have been translated into action. It is always my desire that credit should be given where it is due and Madame Zaghloul deserves to stand, as again and again she did stand during his life, not behind her great husband, not only at his side, but as a leader of the people in his stead.

The Labour Members left, and there appeared in the English papers a number of articles and letters ascribing the success of their visit and their rapprochement with the Wafd to me. The effect of these on the Government I can well imagine, but what concerned me more was their effect on the leader of the Wafd.

As a result of the visit of the Labour Members and the efforts of Mr. Cecil Campbell the King decided to invite Nahas Pasha to form a government in place of Mahmoud Pasha, whose health was not very good at this time. Nahas Pasha did his best to take measures in anticipation of the difficulties created for the Wafd by its opponents at an earlier period when the life of Parliament was suspended in the time of Zaghloul and also when Nahas himself had before been Prime Minister in 1927.

I am bound to say that at this time I found it impossible to continue my activities with the leaders of the Wafd, deeply as I regret the fact. Nahas and Makram were unwilling to recognise in any way all that I had done to bring them and the Labour Members together. It was arranged that the lawyers in Egypt should give a dinner in honour of Makram Ebeid as the man who had established the contact and come to an agreement with the Labour Party in power. They even asked me to subscribe towards the expenses of this

dinner. This was adding insult to injury and I decided to have nothing to do with it. I decided then to have some written word from the Wafd in recognition of my services in this matter and I asked some of my personal friends among them whether they could obtain this for me. But Nahas and Makram refused to allow it, stating as their reasons that it was against my interests as a Government official and that, in addition to this, it would prejudice the interests of the Wafd in the country for someone who was not a member to have brought them and the British Government together.

Wacyf Ghali suggested that Dr. Maher or some other member of the Wafd might give a reception to me in recognition of my services, though Dr. Maher observed that this was really the duty of Wacyf Ghali himself, since he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Again Makram interposed his veto and, even when Madame Zaghloul tried to arrange a dinner party for me as having promoted the cause led by her late husband and as a member of his family, Nahas raised objections and persuaded her to postpone it.

It became obvious that the breach was irreparable, and in spite of the fact that my friends Nokrashy, Dr. Maher and Wacyf Ghali did their best to repair it, I decided to stand aside.

When they decided to go to London to negotiate a treaty, Dr. Maher proposed my name as a member of the delegation, but, as a result of the efforts of Makram, Nahas refused to include me. They went to London but unfortunately they did not succeed in the negotiations. On their return to Egypt Nahas tried to fortify his position, as Zaghloul had done in 1924 when the negotiations with the MacDonald Government failed, by

## *Fall of Nahas Pasha*

strengthening his Government with new blood and endeavouring to institute local reforms for the welfare of the people. But Nahas, who did not forget the way Mahmoud Pasha and his friends the Constitutional Liberals had acted towards him in 1927, when they suspended Parliament and seized power themselves, tried to promulgate a law punishing in future those who as Ministers tried to rob Parliament of its power. At the same time he changed most of the Mudirs and Governors of the Provinces whom he suspected of want of loyalty to him. The King refused to accept this law, though Nahas was under the impression that the English were on his side in his quarrel with the Palace. Although at the time I was standing aside from politics, I received information from a most reliable source that the British would not go so far as to support Nahas in his quarrel with the King with regard to this law and I thought it my duty, in spite of my being away from the inner circle, to tell Nahas Pasha when I saw him what I believed was the position of the English in this question. He disregarded my remarks, however, and expressed the opinion that my sources of information were not to be trusted. He tried to force the issue between Parliament and the King, which increased the gulf between them and led in the end to the King removing him from office and appointing Sidki Pasha in his place. Sidki Pasha dissolved Parliament and announced that a new election would be held. He meant to bring pressure to bear and to use every means to defeat the Wafd. But his efforts proved to a certain extent unnecessary, for Nahas Pasha adopted the extraordinary course of boycotting the election.

It is quite true that he was not in so strong a position

as Zaghloul had been in 1925. Sidki had at his back a number of groups and parties opposed to the Wafd although they were far less powerful than the opponents of Zaghloul had been. But the policy of Nahas apparently gave Sidki a great victory and certainly a very big majority, for the general comprehension of politics in Egypt is not yet sufficiently developed for them to appreciate the meaning of such a boycott. It is true that many of the voters, both in the cities and in the provinces, followed the lead of the Wafd and did not vote at all, but in general the policy simply led to the election of the only candidates who offered themselves, though it is generally believed that the numbers of voters were falsified by the election committees.

The Parliament so elected and the Government of Sidki Pasha remained in power for four years during which the Opposition of the Wafd was not very effective. There was no doubt of the abilities of Sidki as a financial expert and an able administrator and he was always ready to assist trade and to relieve the difficulties of labour, as will be seen from the events of which I have to tell in the next two chapters.

## MY THIRD VISIT TO ENGLAND

NEXT year I went to England again and this time on purely private affairs. But it was not very long before I was drawn once again into the arena of commerce and also of politics. My interest in trade relations between Great Britain and Egypt had never flagged and I could not resist the temptation to make a further attempt to improve them. Last time I had seen the official element and the private business men separately. The former had welcomed me and given me every assistance, but though the latter had shown me great hospitality and had appeared to be interested, they had done nothing. This time I would try to bring them together. The Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade at this time was Mr. Gillett and I invited him and a number of his colleagues in his Department and at the Board of Trade to dine with me at the Piccadilly Hotel. To this dinner I also invited a number of business men interested in Egyptian trade. The total number who sat down to dinner was nearly sixty. My proposals were the same as they had been before and I need not again go into them.

It has always seemed to me curious that it should be left to a foreigner to bring together in a matter of this kind the officials of the Government Departments



### *My Third Visit to England*

responsible for trade and the representatives of the firms actually conducting the trade. I suppose it is the individualism, which is so marked a feature of the British character, that makes it difficult for a Government Department to attempt to influence the private conduct of business. In any case, if they would not act in concert without me, here I was willing and anxious to bring them together. My dinner party was followed by a meeting arranged by Mr. Gillett in the House of Commons, which was attended by a number of Members and private individuals interested in the subject. Out of this arose my proposal that a Trade Mission should be sent to Egypt and this proposal was submitted to the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Before I deal with the appointment of this Mission and with the study of its visit to Egypt I must complete the account of my visit to England by giving some account of the political incidents that occurred.

It will be remembered that at this time Sidki Pasha had succeeded Nahas Pasha as Prime Minister in Egypt. The Wafd was not in office and a number of its members had come with other Egyptians to the International Parliamentary Congress which was meeting in London. Amongst them were Hamed el Bassil Pasha, Makram Ebeid, Dr. Maher, Wissa Wacyf, Sabri Abou Alam, Eliu el Sazzar Bey, and Mourad El-Cherei Bey. Makram Ebeid and others who were with him in the negotiations of the year before left their cards on Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. He, however, for political reasons of his own, did not acknowledge their call. Probably he was afraid that the Wafd would use any such exchange of courtesies for party purposes against Sidki and his

colleagués in Egypt. But in regard to Hamed el Bassil Pasha and myself his attitude was different. He left his card on Hamed el Bassil Pasha, who was a Member of the Wafd, a Member of Parliament and an official representative of Egypt at the Parliamentary International Congress. He also, as I myself, was acquainted socially with Mr. MacDonald. I received an invitation to 10 Downing Street. I was fortunate enough to see the Prime Minister for about twenty-five minutes, which all my friends assured me was exceptional in view of the pressure on his time and the number of people who at the time were trying to obtain interviews with him. He arranged for me to see Dr. Dalton, who was Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a few days later I spent an hour and a half with him discussing the Egyptian situation. The news of these interviews soon travelled to Egypt where it caused a considerable sensation.

Meanwhile in London Makram Ebeid was furious. He had asked me to refuse Mr. MacDonald's invitation on the ground that he had insulted the Wafd by not answering their call. I refused to do this on the ground that my invitation was not a political matter, but was the outcome of a long-standing personal acquaintance with no bearing on the Wafd or on the Government in power. This made him more angry still and he pretended that his request was an order from the Wafd, which I should have been bound to obey. I was astonished and persisted in my refusal and, when I told Dr. Maher afterwards of the incident, he expressed his approval of my attitude.

I was not content, however, with seeing only the head of the Government. I did not regard the Anglo-

### *My Third Visit to England*

Egyptian dispute as a British party question and I knew that Labour was not very likely to remain in power for long. I took steps to meet two other men of influence, Sir Herbert Samuel, the leader of the Liberals, who were at the time giving general support to the Labour Government, and Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Unionist ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs. Oddly enough all these appointments coincided on the same day and I saw Mr. MacDonald at 10 o'clock in the morning, I lunched with Sir Herbert Samuel and had tea with Sir Austen Chamberlain. It was a busy day for me and, as it turned out, an annoying one for some of my Egyptian friends. Makram Ebeid went so far as to threaten to resign from the Wafd if I continued my activities and, despite Dr. Maher's intervention on my behalf in London and Nokrashi's in Cairo, I received a telegram from Nahas Pasha ordering me to leave. I was by now becoming fairly well accustomed to being ordered to leave London because I was succeeding in bringing the Egyptian cause so prominently before the public or the men of influence. But this time I am bound to say that I was astonished. The order came, not from the Government, but from the President of the Wafd, who in any case was not in a position to dictate my movements. Not only this, but I had come to England on private business entirely at my own expense and had spent considerable sums on entertainment with a view to future benefits for the trade of Egypt. My friend Nokrashi, however, sent me a private telegram in which he suggested that I should go to Paris, where Madame Zaghloul was anxious to see me. I appreciated the force of Nokrashi's argument and agreed to go to Paris since Makram Ebeid was so

### *Orders from Egypt*

angry at what I was doing in London. But I did not want an opportunity I had been offered to continue my discussion with Dr. Dalton to be lost, and I arranged for Sabri Abou Alam Bey to see him in my place. But this also displeased Makram Ebeid and he ordered Sabri Abou Alam to leave London at once in order that he might not keep the appointment.

I suppose the fact that we had no real leader in London was the cause of the opportunities I had created being lost and the members of the Wafd returning to Egypt without having accomplished anything. The British Government refused to have anything to do with them, on the ground that they were not official representatives of the Egyptian Government, and they refused to allow me or Sabri Abou Alam to do anything in their place.

Before I left England I was delighted to hear that an official Trade Mission was to go to Egypt. Although the Mission was the result of my efforts in England, the Government of Sidki Pasha, to which of course it was officially sent, did all it could to prevent my coming into contact with it. I state this as a fact and I give below the evidence for it. No doubt Sidki Pasha had his reasons for excluding me ; the head of a Government has always to be careful of dynamic forces not easily controllable by authority. I am, as I have admitted, well aware that nature has not made me exactly a team worker and it is as a team that those in authority have to work. For myself I have always realised that I could be most effective when I was not hindered by the cautiousness induced by office. I have got on with the tasks to which I have set my hand irrespective of who was to get the credit if I succeeded. I am willing

### *My Third Visit to England*

to shoulder whatever responsibility I have for any failures. But I cannot accept the responsibility for failures due to the tasks being taken out of my hands. And I claim the right in such cases to state the facts and leave my readers to form their own conclusions. I have always succeeded in establishing my reputation for good faith and almost always for sound policy with the British. This may well be the reason why my fellow-countrymen have more than once put a stop or tried to put a stop to my participation in the results of those policies.

I was not invited to the receptions given by the Government to the members of the Trade Mission. As there were nearly fifty of these receptions it was obvious that I was purposely excluded. The members of the Mission themselves were astonished at this and, when the member who represented the British Co-operative Movement was making a speech to 2,000 Egyptians, he remarked on my absence to Colonel Elgood, who told him that I had not been invited. Considering my association with the Co-operative Movement and with the original idea of the Trade Mission, both of which were well-known in England, this was indeed surprising. The Mission gave evidence of this by inviting me to the dinner party they gave at the Hotel Semiramis in return for the hospitality they had received in Egypt. My seat was at one of the principal tables, that presided over by the Co-operative representative, who ranked third among the members of the Mission. It was not, of course, possible for the Mission to influence the Government as to who should or should not be invited to meet them. But in this way they made it clear enough that they at least knew what was due to me in this connection.

## *The Trade Mission*

I need hardly say that unofficially I was in touch with Sir Arthur Balfour, the President of the Mission, and his colleagues. I met them on several occasions at the house of Mr. Martin, the General Manager of the Shell Company and at this time also the President of the British Chamber of Commerce. He and my other English friends were disgusted at my exclusion from the official discussions and receptions and did their best to make up for it.

The report of the Trade Mission was very able, though there were many efforts on the part of foreign commercial interests, middlemen and other interested parties to mislead the Mission. Their recommendations are, however, of no great importance in this place because they do not touch on what I have already indicated to be the real evils of the present situation and the real remedies for them. To reach their customers there are required more and better publicity and salesmanship and closer contact with foreign points of view. I make no apology for insisting again and again on the necessity of a more active policy on the part of British business men in these respects. When I go to England and hear of the depressed areas, the unemployment, the situation in the cotton trade, I cannot help wondering when British industrialists are going to awake to some at least of the truths I and others have tried to impress upon them. And there is a wider issue involved.

We see everywhere the growth of armaments and the plans for defence ; we hear on all sides the rumours of war. There is no surer defence against war and, if war should come, no surer defence in it than close commercial relationships between the nations.

## I BECAME FOOD CONTROLLER

**I**N the winter of 1931 there was a sudden rise in the price of food in Egypt. There is little doubt that this was caused artificially and was the work of a group of profiteering merchants. The Government of Sidki Pasha was anxious to relieve the situation and, though Sidki Pasha had not shown himself disposed to be very friendly towards me, he turned to me rather than to any of his own supporters and offered me the position of Director Combating the High Cost of Living (Food Controller). My sole task was to reduce the prices of the necessities of life and, according to the official report of the Government issued afterwards, in less than three months I succeeded in doing so to the extent of from 20 per cent. to 40 per cent. on different items throughout the country. Moreover in my usual manner I did this without asking for any new laws or waiting for official action.

I found, for example, that the oil from the Egyptian oilfields was being sent to France and Germany. After all the expenses of transportation, refining and insurance, I found that it was being sold in those countries at a lower price than it could be obtained for in Egypt. It was obvious that the price in Egypt was being artificially kept up. I obtained the permission of the Prime Minister to go into the matter with the managers of the

## *The Oil Problem*

two principal oil companies in Egypt, the Shell Company of Egypt and the Socony Vacuum Oil Company. The Manager of the Shell Company was my friend Mr. Martin, but he showed himself unwilling to discuss the matter with me and opposed my researches, on the ground that confidential points were involved. On this I went to the Prime Minister and asked him for *carte blanche* to use every effort with the Companies to induce them to lower the prices and to warn them that, unless they did so, the Egyptian Government would feel bound to place its orders abroad. I had, meanwhile, with the assistance of Dr. Hassan Bey Sadek, Director of the Department of Mines, studied the position in regard to petrol in Egypt and abroad. I found that in 1899 an Agreement had been made between the Egyptian Government and the oilfields on the Red Sea by which the Egyptian Government had reserved the right to buy oil from this source at a price equal to the lowest at which it was sold abroad and which gave to the Government preferential rights over all foreign markets, if it chose to enforce them. On my communicating the result of my studies to Mr. Martin, he complained to the Residency that I was prejudicing British interests in Egypt. This, of course, alarmed the Government who did not want to come into conflict with the Residency. I reassured them and promised to take the matter up with friends at the Residency myself. I went and saw the Commercial Secretary and convinced him that there was no prejudice to British interests involved, but that on the contrary my policy was to defeat unreasonable prices due to a monopoly, which must redound to the advantage of British subjects in common with all other purchasers of oil. This assured me of the continued support of



Sidki Pasha to whom I promised to submit a detailed report with full figures. I asked him to promise his support to any proposals I put before the Shell and Socony Vacuum Companies for the reduction of prices by indicating to them that the Egyptian Government were serious in their warning. This, after reading my report, he did and, in addition, asked Mr. Craig, the Financial Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, to indicate this clearly to the Companies. When I saw Mr. Martin a few days later it was quite clear to me that all this had been done, since he was obviously nervous about the attitude adopted by the Egyptian Government. I was now able to take a strong line and I presented him with an ultimatum: if within ten days the price of oil was not reduced, we should begin buying from abroad. Mr. Martin refused categorically to discuss the matter further with me, but Mr. Stewart, on behalf of the Socony Vacuum Company, asked me to extend the ten days to three weeks since he was bound to communicate with his directors in America. Ten days later Mr. Martin telephoned to me saying that the price of benzine had been reduced by one piastre a gallon and the price of petrol by one piastre a tin. He wanted me to understand, he added, that this was not the result of my threat to the Companies but of general trade conditions throughout the world. I had no objection to his saving his face in this way and congratulated him on the fortunate turn of events. The Prime Minister was presiding over a session of the Council of Ministers, but I was able to give him the news at once. He was delighted, thanked me cordially and sent a communication to the press to the effect that this reduction in price would save the country something like half a million pounds in the year.



SIR PERCY LORAINÉ, G.C.M.G.



## *The Bread Problem*

Another and a most important example of the commodities, the price of which called for reduction, was, of course, bread. On investigating this I found that not only were the big bakers charging exorbitant prices, but they were further enhancing their profits by adulterating the flour with corn and chemical products. In tackling this problem I came up against Abdel Meguid Remali Bey, a very influential man, a Zaghoulolist member who was opposed to Sidki Pasha. He held the contracts with the Egyptian Government for the supply of bread to the hospitals and schools at fixed prices. He had managed to get control over most of the bakeries in Cairo by letting them have flour on long credit terms. Most of them could not in these difficult days meet their liabilities and were therefore unable to oppose him in any way.

All that I could do in this case was to try and open an old Government Bakery at Embabeh, and this, with the approval of Sidki Pasha, I did. This would have been effective and would have relieved the situation, but I am afraid that even this did not in the end break the control of Abdel Meguid Remali Bey, for his influence in the Government and the powerful commercial position he had attained were too strong even for Sidki Pasha.

I held this office for six months and was successful in the main in the objects for which I had been appointed. There were, of course, powerful forces opposed to me at every step and these forces penetrated far even into Administrative circles. But I found I could rely on the self-help movement of which I have spoken in Chapter II and also on the police and all those Government officials to whom the price of living was of importance. I should also like to put on record the support given to me by the



AMINE YOUSSEF BEY

## *National Government in England*

Prime Minister, though I was not a political supporter and though the credit for the reductions was given by the people to me and could not be used for his political advantage.

When the work was done as far as I could see my way to do it, I resigned my office and turned to consider my family affairs.

I was anxious to enter one of my twin sons at Sheffield University, which I had ascertained to have an excellent school of engineering, and I applied for leave to go to England in the summer of 1931 for this purpose. At this time the National Government had been formed under Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Great Britain had gone off the gold standard. I may at some future time have the opportunity of giving my views on the importance of this change in the constitutional system of Great Britain and on its relation to other new systems which have in recent years arisen in Europe, but here I will only speak of its effect on the policies in which I was interested. It seemed to me that the problem of Egypt was no longer one the solution of which depended on party policies. So long as, in effect, there was a Government in England that represented a fusion of parties we might look for continuity of policy and not find that a change of Government might mean the undoing of negotiations and agreements that had gone before. In addition to this I felt that the economic situation in Great Britain called for the more vigorous development of foreign trade and, probably, the more effective consideration of my proposals to that end.

I had always, as I have mentioned, received every consideration from the Department of Overseas Trade, first when Sir Edward Crewe and afterwards when Mr.

Gillett was in control of it. Mr. Gillett had now become Minister of Transport, but the Prime Minister and he arranged that I should see Major Lloyd George, the son of the former Prime Minister, who was at that time Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade. He was very much interested in the work I had recently been doing in Egypt since the Government feared that, as a result of going off the gold standard, prices might rise in England. To our conversations on these matters I of course added my old theme of the relationship of producer and manufacturer in the cotton trade.

How far I might have been able to carry these matters I do not know, for I received at this point a telegram from Egypt definitely cancelling my leave and requesting my return by the next boat. I was on the best of terms with Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha, our Minister in London, but I could not discover from him the reason for this telegram. I feared that it might be the result of some political intrigue, but I had not been playing any real part in politics recently and therefore I could not understand it. I had, however, no course but to return and I took with me a letter from Mr. Gillett in which, in the name of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, he asked me to give the benefit of my experience and advice to the officials of the Board of Trade, the Department of Overseas Trade and Food Control and, in particular, to discuss everything with Major Lloyd George.

When I reached Egypt and saw Sidki Pasha I learned that the reason for my recall was a Reuter telegram published in Egypt which stated that the British Government had invited me, while I was in London, to advise the Government Departments I have mentioned and to continue my efforts in regard to trade between Great

Britain and Egypt, particularly in relation to cotton. This telegram had, it appeared, caused so much comment in Egypt that it was generally said at the time that Reuter's telegrams devoted twelve lines to me for every nine they devoted to the Spanish Revolution.

Sidki Pasha, who of course had not been responsible for my visit to England or for what I had been doing, had been besieged with questions from his colleagues and others as to what this was all about. He received me quite courteously, but I could see that he was very angry. He asked me what was the meaning of all this propaganda of mine and of all the nonsense published about me, when I was supposed to be on leave for the purpose of entering my son at the University. Was the British Government in need, he enquired sarcastically, of an adviser like myself. I replied, "Excellency, Reuter's agency in London is not the correspondent of *Al Ahram* or *Al Mokattam*. It is not possible for such a company to publish news about the actions of the British Government on my unsupported authority. Your Excellency himself, though you are Prime Minister, could not make their representative in Cairo, Mr. Delaney, write anything about the Residency without the approval of the Residency itself. How could it, then, be possible for me to make their agency in London write that the British Government had invited me to advise them, if it were not a fact?" With this I handed him Mr. Gillett's letter. He took the letter, put on his glasses and studied it for five minutes. The effect was magical. The expression on his face, which had been one of great anger, changed like that of an actor on the stage, to one of great friendliness. It was a genial, smiling Prime Minister who spoke to me as



follows : “ Amine Bey, you know that I have always appreciated your efforts for the good of Egypt and its people. You remember how the fame you achieved as the pioneer of the co-operative movement in Egypt was enhanced by the letter I wrote you in 1922 as Minister of Finance, when I thanked you officially for all that you had done for Egypt through that movement and for the amelioration of the conditions of the poor in our country. It was you whom I chose last winter to combat the high cost of living in Egypt and I gave you the credit of succeeding in this, though you were a political opponent. But, my young friend, I do not want the young men of Egypt to be working for a foreign country. We need all their efforts for Egypt. That is why I do not want you to work as a free lance any longer and propose to transfer you to the Ministry of Finance where you can use your experience and ability for the good of your own country. England has plenty of men of ability of her own and Egypt needs every one of hers to concentrate their energies on her service.”

I expressed my thanks for his kindness and his high appreciation, but I was well aware that the change in his attitude was due to Mr. Gillett's letter and to his discovery that there was no justification for his displeasure. He asked me what Department of the Ministry of Finance I would prefer to work in and I replied that I left it entirely to him except that I should prefer that it should not be the Department of Commerce and Industry. My reason for this exception was that I had not been happy in this Department at the time when I was Director Combating the High Cost of Living in Egypt (Food Controller). For whatever reason, however, Sidki Pasha put me into that precise Department.

After I had received the telegram recalling me and before I left London I ventured so far to disobey orders as to stay a few days for what I regarded as a very important purpose. Gandhi and the Indian Nationalist leaders were in London and I was anxious for many reasons to establish contacts with them. I saw Gandhi and had a very interesting talk with him for two hours. He told me that he knew when he was in India of the Relief Co-operative work which I had accomplished in Egypt after the war. He praised me for my great achievement in helping the poorer classes. He spoke very highly of the late Zaghloul Pasha whom he considered the father of all Nationalist movements in the East, including India. I invited the Indian leader to a reception to which I also invited a number of Egyptian friends including Sidki Pasha's daughter and her husband and Dr. Hamed Mahmoud. Gandhi was represented by his son on this occasion and I had the opportunity of making a speech to a number of influential members of both the Indian and the Egyptian Nationalist Movements. I began by pointing out the strength of the movements in the Orient for the double objects of independence and democratic institutions. I laid special stress on the unity of these two objects and pointed out that, while sometimes they must come into conflict with the older policy of the British Empire, they owed much of their inspiration to the ideals which the British had inculcated. I urged that progress in these directions was sure to be and ought to be slow and steady, for the obstacles in the way were many and great. Sometimes it might seem that those obstacles were all placed in our way by the British Government. But this was not so. No doubt from time to time there

were points which we had to make clear to the British and in regard to which we found considerable opposition. But we must always remember that there were obstacles also within our own countries. New political philosophies were not adopted in a day, still less the systems which were their logical outcome. While we had to stand firm against the British when our convictions differed and to use every effort to make them understand and appreciate our aims, we had at the same time to educate our own peoples to value and make a proper use of that independence and democracy which we were struggling to gain for them. Above all we must understand the difficulties and the problems of those foreigners who were often in opposition to us, as we hoped that they would understand and sympathise with ours. In illustration of this last point I told my guests of a little ceremony I had had the privilege of conducting at the farewell dinner to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1922 on the conclusion of his visit to Egypt. I had predicted to him that before long he would come into power in England. I had pointed out that then he would himself be faced with the problem, amongst others, of the future of Egypt. I had presented him with an Oriental lamp and had expressed the hope that he would read the history of Egypt and of the East in general in the light of that lamp.

In that speech I outlined my conception of the relations of the East to Great Britain in the future history of the British Empire. I am as sure today as I was then that it is only by patient consideration of one another's points of view and special difficulties that we shall arrive at solutions of our common problems and at a more reliable basis for the future stability and well-being of the peoples of the world.

THE RAILWAYS, TOURISM AND  
INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP

**I** COME now to the year of my life, the record of which gives me, so far, the greatest satisfaction. For, though it started with a commercial purpose not dissimilar to my previous tasks in respect of food prices and the like, it led on to national and then to international schemes which seem to me of great value to the happiness and well-being of mankind.

The financial crisis which began in America in 1929 and was followed by periods of great depression all over the world had by 1931 almost destroyed the tourist season which means so much to the business world of Egypt. The Egyptian Railways in that year showed a loss of £1,200,000 owing to the decline in both goods and passenger service. The General Manager of the Railways, Sir Mahmoud Shaker Pasha (then Shaker Bey), was a man of very great ability and, I venture to think, that one of his abilities was that he knew when a fresh mind was needed for a problem and one of his many virtues was that he was generous enough to admit the fact.

He knew that I was not altogether satisfied with my work in the Department of Commerce and Industry and he came to me and asked whether I would be willing to

be delegated to the Railways in order to assist him in increasing their revenues. I had already heard that many of the big traders in both Alexandria and Cairo were dissatisfied with the Railway Administration in respect of the cost of transportation, and I had conceived certain plans which might solve both this and the problem of decreased passenger traffic. I told him that I should be willing to accept his offer on three conditions. The first was that in the execution of policy the methods and details should be left entirely to me and that I should not be interfered with in any way. The second was that publicity should also be in my hands alone and that the amount allocated for this purpose should be doubled. The third was that, if he heard anything against me or my plans, he would always come straight to me and talk the matter over.

He replied that, once we were agreed as to general policy, he would certainly accept my conditions as to its execution ; that publicity should certainly be left to me and that he would do his best to increase the allocation for the Press to the degree I desired ; and that, in respect of my third condition, we should be working as friends, not merely as fellow-officials, and he was delighted to agree. I may say at once that he was in all respects loyal to these terms and that never once during the months that I worked with him did he fail in friendly co-operation.

I began with the goods traffic. My first object was to gain the confidence of the British officials at the head of the Railway Department. Mr. R. E. Thomas, the Assistant Director-General of the Egyptian State Railways, was conservative in his outlook and in favour of keeping prices as they were. I succeeded, however, in

convincing the English head of the Goods Department of the underlying principle of all my work in connection with commercial matters, that it is better to lower your prices and sell your goods than to keep them up and have no sales. We went to Alexandria together and interviewed there most of the important traders, both Egyptian and foreign, who were concerned with the import and export of goods. We went carefully into their complaints and on our return we made new tariffs to remedy as many of their grievances as possible. It was obvious that, unless we did this, other methods of transport, by road and by water, were going to press very hardly, as indeed they had already begun to press, on the railways. This policy improved matters at once to some extent, but I regard its greatest importance as lying in the future, for it anticipated the establishment of organisations and vested interests in other methods of transport for goods.

Next I turned my attention to the matter of passenger traffic and here I soon saw that there was a far more complicated problem to be solved. In the first place it was useless to imagine that we could neutralise the effects of a world-wide depression merely by lowering the fares on our railways. The tourists from abroad would return when times were better and anything we did in the meantime to cheapen and facilitate travel would be to the good. We had to begin with our own people. Among them those who travelled for business purposes need not be seriously considered. They already had special facilities and in any case they were bound to travel. But there were many thousands of our people who would be only too glad to travel for recreation or for health, if only they could afford to do so. It would be an

undoubted benefit for them as well as for the railways if facilities were given them. But the actual cost of transit was a minor part of the expenses of travel for them. There was the cost of board and lodging at the hotels and restaurants when they reached their destinations. I went to Alexandria, to Port Said, to Ras el Bar and to other holiday and pleasure resorts and I found that the hotels and restaurants were as badly off as the railways. They were empty and the high prices they were charging the few people that were visiting them were tending towards making them emptier still. If we were to succeed, we must bring the hotels into our schemes.

I listed the hotels, pensions and restaurants according to their class and set about interviewing their managers individually. I suppose at this time I must have had long conversations with between one and two hundred of these gentlemen in order to convince them of my one simple proposition : it was better to have their rooms filled and their meals eaten at a low price than to have them wasted altogether. I was able to assure them that, if they would reduce their prices for these, the railways would help them by reducing their fares also. I did not propose to interfere with their regular customers or with what they chose to charge the people who came to them outside my scheme. What I did propose was that when they had rooms vacant for three, five or seven days, they should advise the railway authorities at Cairo by telephone of the number so available and that the railway should then issue combined rail and hotel accommodation tickets at prices which meant that their rooms would be let but the figure would be sometimes as low as one-fifth of the normal price. So also with certain restaurants

## *Holidays for £1*

I arranged a similar scale of prices for holders of these special tickets.

Of course the figures worked out very differently in the different classes of hotels but the following will serve as examples :

In Alexandria I arranged with the cheaper hotels and pensions that holders of these tickets should have bedroom accommodation for the periods mentioned at the rate of five piastres each a day in single rooms or four piastres each in double rooms, which amounts in English money to just over and just under one shilling a day respectively. The restaurants selected agreed to give them three meals a day—a good breakfast consisting of a European roll or two pieces of Egyptian bread, tea and milk, cheese and *foul midamis* (a favourite Egyptian dish of beans), a lunch consisting of half a pound of meat or fish, one vegetable, bread, cheese and fruit, and a dinner consisting of half a pound of meat or fish, rice or macaroni, bread, one vegetable and fruit—for seven piastres. Thus, travelling alone, the cost of board and lodging together came to twelve piastres, or about two shillings and fivepence, and travelling two together to two shillings and twopence each. The fare from Cairo to the coast (approximately 120 miles) on these tickets was reduced to six shillings return so that the people who had not been able to afford holidays could now get a week at the seaside for very little over £1 apiece.

In the better-class hotels I arranged similar reductions. Every hotel which adopted this plan could telephone twice a day free of charge and state exactly how many rooms were available on these special terms so that would-be travellers in Cairo could ascertain at the station exactly what accommodation they could have in



accordance with their means. No less than seventy hotels at Alexandria, Port Said and Ras el Bar came into this scheme and found that it worked out very much to their advantage.

As an example of various extensions of a special character I may mention an arrangement we made for the special Antiquities Train, which is still running. By this travellers from Cairo and Alexandria get the journey by night train to and from Luxor, which is thirteen hours each way, sleep for five nights on the train, have full board, guides, free entrance to the monuments, carriages, motor-cars, boats and tips, all included for £2. If the ordinary return fare of £3 for the railway alone is considered, it will be appreciated what a public advantage this was. Over this train I had a certain amount of difficulty with the Engineering Department as the trains were in effect to be used continuously as hotels. We managed however to arrange for each compartment to accommodate six persons and for attendants of their own sex to be provided in both the ladies' and the men's compartments. Of course, the larger and more exclusive hotels were at first disinclined to come into the scheme. But many of them soon appreciated its advantages. For example, the Casino San Stefano at Alexandria, belonging to the Egyptian Hotels, Ltd., which at first refused to join, afterwards accepted an arrangement by which a passenger from Cairo could take a first-class return ticket for seven days and stay at the hotel with full board, tips and transport to and from the station for six hundred piastres, or about £6, inclusive, which was about two-thirds of what it would have cost him under ordinary circumstances.

Meanwhile there was the question of publicity. It

was the first Lord Northcliffe who said that the thing to be remembered in regard to publicity was that nobody had ever heard of Pears' Soap. Above all is it essential to let the public at large know what you have to offer when it is the public at large and not an exclusive section of it to which your appeal is to be made. Armed with my powers from the General Manager I went to all the newspapers in which the Railways were in the habit of advertising. Here too the general depression made my welcome fairly certain and the very favourable offers I had to bring quite certain of acceptance. I promised them all double the amount they had been receiving for advertising provided they would devote space more or less equal to the corresponding advertising space in their editorial pages to the schemes we were inaugurating. To ensure still further friendly notice of this kind I made an arrangement with the hotels in the seaside resorts to reserve 2 per cent. of their rooms and free board for representatives of the principal newspapers. By means of this I was able to offer the staff of every local newspaper, both foreign and Egyptian, three months' summer holiday to be divided among them as guests of the Railway. To this I attached no obligation whatever, for I knew perfectly well that journalists enjoying a free summer holiday would inevitably write about it in their papers.

So successful were these plans for publicity that Sidki Pasha complained that there was more written in the Press about the Railways than about all the other departments of Government combined.

In actual figures the results of these plans was that in that year the Railways turned a deficit of £1,200,000 into a profit of £500,000. This was what I had been invited

## *The Railways, Tourism and International Friendship*

to do by the General Manager and what I had been released by the Government to attempt. But I want now to speak of the other aspects which my work with the Railways began to assume in my eyes.

In the first place not only the Railways but also the hotels, pensions and restaurants and the newspapers had been put upon their feet in a period of very serious depression. That was all to the good for many reasons. But the advantages to the public were in my opinion even greater. Tens of thousands of comparatively poor people had been enabled to enjoy the pleasures and advantages of the seaside and health resorts who could not otherwise have enjoyed them. I was able to feel that the increased health and happiness of all these people was due to my working out and persuading others to adopt one simple commercial principle—that it is better to get what you can for something which would otherwise be wasted.

When I had completed this task in Egypt I went on a holiday to Syria and the Lebanon. It was, as my holidays have usually been, what is, I believe, called in England a 'busman's holiday.' I met the popular leaders and I explained to them what I had been able to do in Egypt and suggested that they should do something of the same kind in their country. I am afraid they did not make much of a success of the plan there, but there were more far-reaching effects to come. On the conclusion of my work Mahmoud Shaker Bey, with that loyalty and sense of justice that distinguished him, wrote an official letter to the Ministry of Finance attributing to me most of the credit for the success of the schemes. This letter he caused to be published in all the local papers, both foreign and Egyptian. Hundreds of

articles appeared in the British and other European papers about the success of the schemes and, when I went to England next year, I found that I had been elevated to the title of "The Wizard Man."

It is a great grief to me that the country which I regard as my second home has not to this day made any concerted attempt to adopt any such plan of tourism for the advantage of the interests concerned and the public in general. In Germany, Italy and elsewhere, a great deal has been done on those lines and, I make bold to think, that the example which Mahmoud Shaker Bey and I set in Egypt has not been without its influence upon them. France was slower to follow in their footsteps and it was not until 1936 that those in authority there realised that they must adopt these methods if their lost tourist trade was to be recovered. But England seems incapable of realising that she has very much to offer to the world of travellers, sightseers and tourists generally, which they would readily visit her to enjoy, if publicity were given to it and facilities were provided.

In this world we all of us enjoy for a change the things which normally we have not got. To us in Egypt, for example, sunshine and hot weather are normal and we enjoy a gentler light and a cooler climate. We enjoy too the gardens of England and the countryside with its fresh green unscorched by the sun and unwithered by the sand. The English do not seem to be able to grasp that what is normal and commonplace to them in their country is novel and refreshing to many from elsewhere. I am certain that a wave of tourism could be directed to England by the adoption of such schemes as other countries have found successful. And there is something more to be said. Much of the suspicion, fear and hos-

tility in the world is due to the fact that the common people of the different countries are not familiar enough with one another. "Damn the fellow! How can I hate him if I know him?" In some such words Charles Lamb expressed the truth that familiarity, though it may breed contempt, makes enmity impossible. How obvious it is that Governments can only induce their peoples to accept war by representing the ordinary rank and file of the opposing countries as monsters of cruelty and iniquity. If the peoples of the world travel and learn to know one another they will refuse to believe such tales. And if the Governments of the world cannot rouse their peoples to hatred in this way they will hesitate to embark on policies leading to war.

I believe that tourism, apart from all its other advantages, may prove one of the strongest guarantees of peace between the nations and I know of no higher aim for the welfare of mankind than that.

## FALL OF THE SIDKI RÉGIME

**I**N 1934, Sidki Pasha had been Prime Minister for four years. The Nationalist boycott in the 1931 election gave him an apparently overwhelming majority in Parliament. But he was not popular with the masses. He made efforts to benefit economically now this class, now that ; but it was a case of trying to please every man, a policy which is never successful. A financial scandal, in which one of his Ministers was involved, did his Government considerable harm, and it was hardly to be expected that he could be in power for so long without falling out with the Palace from time to time.

All these circumstances led to his fall, and Abdel Fattah Yehia Pasha became Prime Minister. Sidki Pasha had been to a certain extent on good terms with the Residency, and his fall and the appointment of his successor meant a victory for the influence of the Palace as opposed to the British. The power behind the Government during Abdel Fattah Yehia's years of office was the head of the Palace household, Zaki El Ebrashi Pasha, who was the confidential adviser to King Fuad. Conflicts with the British authorities became serious, especially when the King's health was not good and, finally, the King, under pressure from the British, appointed Ziwar Pasha, an ex-Prime Minister, to be

### *Fall of the Sidki Régime*

head of his Cabinet, and Ebrashi Pasha was appointed Minister to Brussels.

Although Egyptians in general were dissatisfied with the state of affairs arising from too much interference from Ebrashi Pasha, some of the leading Egyptian politicians resented the methods adopted to get rid of him.

I was, it will be remembered, before the dismissal of Ebrashi Pasha, at this time Inspector-General in the Ministry of Finance. When the time came for my leave I decided to pay my fifth visit to England, to renew my interrupted campaign in regard to trade relations between the two countries and to see what I could do to help clear up the political situation.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, with whom I was on terms of friendship, was at that time practically adviser on foreign affairs to Mr. Baldwin, and in the absence of Mr. Baldwin, who was taking a holiday for reasons of health, was acting Prime Minister. Mr. MacDonald came and dined with me at the Hyde Park Hotel and we spent three hours discussing the situation in Egypt and Palestine. I also saw various Foreign Office officials. I was very glad of this opportunity, because political feeling in England was very much against King Fuad. Although I had had my own personal difficulties in regard to the King, and was well aware that he was not well disposed towards me, I knew that things were not very satisfactory in Egypt and I urged strongly against any false step being taken against the King which might cause public resentment in Egypt. I also saw various officials at the Board of Trade and the Department of Overseas Trade and discussed with them plans for the exchange of cotton, fruit and vegetables, and also manufactured goods.

I had not, however, very much time to carry these discussions further because the Egyptian Prime Minister, Yehia Pasha, on hearing of my economic activities, expressed strong disapproval. Although I was Inspector-General of the Ministry of Finance I visited England in a private capacity and he did not wish me to conduct what he considered important discussions in what might be regarded as an official capacity. Yehia Pasha endeavoured to get the Minister of Finance to cancel my leave, but the latter refused, declaring that he regarded my work as being so useful that he was thinking of applying for a grant to cover my expenses.

On this the Prime Minister sent a verbal note to the British Foreign Office in London disclaiming me as a representative of the Government and protesting against the contact of high British officials with me while I was on holiday. The reply from the British Government was to the effect that both officials and myself were acting in an entirely personal and unofficial capacity. The officials were merely exploring the possibilities of friendly co-operation and discussing them with an Egyptian friend who was very keen on the promotion of Anglo-Egyptian trade.

In the long run it became obvious that I should endanger my position if I prolonged my stay and I decided to return, although not before I had had a conversation with my old friend, Sir Edward Crewe, head of the Department of Overseas Trade.

When I reached Egypt I found that things had gone from bad to worse. The British were urging the King to dismiss Abdel Fattah Yehia Pasha and to appoint in his place Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who was a great friend of mine, and when preliminary discussions were held



with regard to the formation of the Ministry I was one of his very few friends whom he trusted and consulted. He was anxious that his Ministry should not be a party Ministry, but should be composed of independent ministers, and declared that he would follow any policy calculated to keep the balance between the Palace, the Residency and Wafd. He asked me to suggest the names of persons most suitable to be his colleagues and I gave him the names of those I thought would best serve the interests of the country. When the Ministry was formed, I found most of the names I had submitted were members of his Cabinet. The only two names which were new to me were Neguib Hilali Bey and Tewfik Abdallah Pasha. Sheikh El Maraghi was not accepted by the King and Mahmoud Hassan Bey was turned down by the Wafd.

I may mention that the first name I had suggested was that of Abdel Wahab Pasha, who quite definitely disliked me, as was well known. When Nessim Pasha heard this name he was very much surprised, but congratulated me on my integrity in choosing a man whom I regarded as suited to the position regardless of our personal relationship. After the Ministry was formed I used to see Nessim Pasha daily and have various talks with him. I have dealt fully with my relationship with Nessim Pasha at this time because it has a considerable bearing on events which occurred three years later, after I had been in America. For the same reason I must go on to deal with some of the groupings and currents of feeling which affected political life at this period.

King Fuad had at that time been seriously ill ; in fact, he never recovered. His personal influence naturally suffered in consequence and the Palace had no longer

even a nominal head to guide its policy. The British authorities had, through the acting High Commissioner, Mr. Peterson, insisted, as I have already said, on the dismissal of El Ebrashi Pasha. I myself worked in Egypt as in England to try and smooth matters over. I was as anxious as the British that outstanding questions at issue between them, the King and the Egyptian people, should be satisfactorily settled, but I did not want them settled in the wrong way. I, as a loyal subject, defended His Majesty and thereby earned for myself at the hands of some of the extremists the reputation of having become an adherent of the Palace. The King himself consulted me through some of his friends, as he realised that he had not looked upon me with any great favour for the previous ten years, and he expressed himself as deeply grateful for my loyalty. His thanks were conveyed to me and I took the occasion of a visit of Shawki Pasha, his private secretary, to advise the appointment of Ali Maher Pasha as Chief of the King's Cabinet in place of Ziwar Pasha, whose appointment was not in accordance with the real wishes of the King. I humbly submitted to the King, through Shawki Pasha, that I was sure His Majesty's desire, in the best interests of the country, was to remove misunderstandings with the British, and I said that if he approved of my suggestion with regard to Ali Maher Pasha I would do my best to pave the way for its fulfilment with my British friends.

I was at that time a great admirer of Ali Maher Pasha, and, though I knew that he was not on the best of terms with the King, I was convinced that he would be more successful in loyally serving His Majesty and Egypt than Ziwar Pasha. I received word from the King that he agreed to my suggestion and that I could proceed with his

approval to sound my British friends with regard to the appointment of Ali Maher Pasha. Here again I was risking the opposition of the Wafd and of Nessim Pasha, for neither the one nor the other liked Ali Maher Pasha ; but the possibility that he would prove a good link between the people, the King and the British impelled me to continue my efforts, which I did ; and after some difficulty I succeeded with my British friends, and also with Nessim Pasha, who never trusted Ali Maher Pasha. Ali Maher was then appointed.

At this time I was on the best of terms with the Government through my friendship with Nessim Pasha, and with the Palace through Ali Maher Pasha, while I had always been on good terms with the British authorities. How this caused me to incur the unfriendliness of all groups after the fall of Nessim Pasha will be apparent in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, a difficulty arose about my old opponent whom I had recommended for office—Abdel Wahab Pasha, Minister of Finance. He turned out to be an irreconcilable opponent of the British, even when their interests were not in opposition to our own, and was in conflict with them on questions of trade. The points of conflict were in connection with trade and industry, and should not really have been the business of the Minister of Finance. They belonged to the Department of Commerce and Industry, which many people had been urging should be made a Ministry ever since 1917. I suggested to Nessim Pasha that, instead of removing Abdel Wahab Pasha, as he intended, from the Ministry of Finance, where he was quite successful, a Ministry of Commerce should be set up under another Minister. This was done, and Neguib El Hilali Bey was appointed.



ALI MAHER PASHA



The formation of the Ministry of Trade was made with the approval of the King and Residency, and I had some small share in convincing them of the advisability of the change.

The Wafd were opposed to its formation. Nessim Pasha proposed to make me Under-Secretary of the new Ministry but Abdel Wahab Pasha threatened to resign from the Cabinet if I were appointed, and started to attack me in the Egyptian Press on the score that I was pro-English. Dr. Ahmed Maher, who was in the position of being a friend both of Abdel Wahab Pasha and myself, tried to get me to accept the post of Director-General of the Post Office, at that time held by Sharara Bey. I was to receive an extra £E 600 a year as member of the Boards of the State Railways and the Ramleh Electric Railway, but I refused, although the combined emoluments would have been more than those of an under-secretary. Dr. Maher used every argument to overcome my opposition and appealed to my patriotism on the grounds that my refusal and Nessim Pasha's insistence on his original proposal would lead to a further serious ministerial crisis. After due consideration I went to Nessim Pasha and begged him not to press my appointment as Under-Secretary of Commerce since I did not wish to be the cause of a ministerial crisis. He was very angry and told me it was no business of mine and that Abdel Wahab Pasha could resign if he did not like it ; he was bound either to accept the decision of the Council of Ministers or to leave the Government. I insisted, however, and said that I might even be driven to take the course of leaving the country. I implored him to consult King Fuad and to submit my desire on this subject. He did this, and the King, who was now inclined to regard me

with more friendliness, said that my attitude proved that I was a real patriot and that he desired Nessim Pasha to find a better position for me than that of Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce. Nessim Pasha talked the matter over with Neguib El Hilali Bey, the Minister of Commerce, and as a result my name was put forward as Minister to the United States. When it was submitted to the King he at once gave his approval, although he was at the time on bad terms with Nessim Pasha and was inclined to reject any proposals from him. It was Ali Maher Pasha actually who informed me by telephone of my nomination and congratulated me on behalf of His Majesty.

It was in these circumstances that I went to America for four years. The King I was never to see again. The Prime Minister I was to champion when he was attacked by his enemies. With the Nationalists I was often considered too moderate. With some of the officials of the Palace I was always supposed to be of Nationalist tendencies and at the same time, mistakenly, pro-British. Such are the dangers of preserving a sense of proportion and realising that every cause has something to be said for it. He who seeks the co-operation of others is apt to be crushed himself, but for the moment a new path of activity was opened to me and I entered on it with joy.

## DIPLOMACY

WHEN I was appointed Minister to the United States at the end of 1935 I had never expected to enter on the field of diplomacy. Nor, as will be seen, were my activities in America directly concerned with the international situation. But to enter the diplomatic world is to enter the world of international affairs and they have claimed a large share of my thoughts and interests ever since.

To this study I brought certain convictions which I have never seen any reason to reject. One is that what really matters is not the power of this or that country as represented by the arrangements its government can make. It is the fulfilment of the desires of the peoples as a whole which begin with their own well-being in the family circle and only concern themselves with treaties and national or international policies to the extent that these policies affect those personal interests. That they do affect them is only too obvious at the present time. But what is not so obvious to the minds of diplomats and politicians is that their general policies ought to be dictated by the personal interests of these millions of inarticulate people.

Europe, since the Treaty of Versailles, and with Europe to a great extent the world, has been in the



hands of politicians who, whatever lip-service they may render to the individual citizen, have not made his interests their main concern. In the East as well as in the West the Treaty of Versailles and the treaties which have succeeded it have aimed at the distribution of power rather than at the well-being of peoples.

And here let me enter a caveat. When I speak of interests I do not mean material interests alone. It is true that a sufficiency of food and other necessities is a fundamental desire of every human being. It is even more true that the continuance of life for those he loves and for himself is a desire even more fundamental than the desire for prosperity. But there are other desires, less material, less common to man and the lower orders of creation, which will sometimes transcend in importance even the necessary conditions of life at all. There are ideals of the good life, the life where the mind of man is freed from the shackles of ignorance and of oppression, the life of the adventure of the mind and the spirit, which leads to the conquest of nature and the comprehension of the meaning of life itself, the life in which fellowship takes the place of strife and men cease to conquer one another in order that together they may conquer the world in which they live.

These supreme interests seem to have been and still to be outside the vision of the politicians who have controlled our destinies. In their preoccupation with national power and national interests our rulers have forgotten the human beings who compose nations. They have arbitrarily determined from above who shall rule over this or that tract of land ; they have set up barriers of intercourse in culture and commerce between the peoples ; they have sown the seeds of fear and dis-

trust and hatred among the simple folk of the various countries. Of that sowing they are reaping the harvest. The fear, the distrust and the hatred have made it necessary for them to devote the energies and resources of the world to destruction instead of to construction. In its turn this misdirection of energy has intensified the fear, the distrust and the hatred. A man cannot devote his life to the making of poison gas or incendiary bombs without becoming convinced that someone deserves to be poisoned or destroyed. This destruction and the desire to destroy become the aims of the politicians' propaganda and the thoughts of all the world are steadily directed towards them.

In such a world there is no room for the altogether healthy play and interplay of political ideals. With the suppression of conflicting policies goes the elimination of the party system. One after another the different countries come under the control of autocrats or of autocratic groups. The trembling peoples turn to what they regard as the strong men and submit themselves unquestioningly to their dictation.

In 1935 I saw a world which was far advanced in this disease. Today I see it stricken and almost helpless.

What is it that I began then to see and what I am more than ever convinced today is needed, if humanity is to be saved from mutual destruction?

We in the Orient are to some extent detached from these issues. It is true that Japan has taken the same course as Europe and that China is being forced into it. But in Egypt, as in India, the conditions have been different. Whatever may have been our quarrels with Great Britain, we have been in close association with some of her finest minds from the time before this dis-

integration set in. It has been in conjunction with her that we have worked out those democratic conceptions, those ideals of justice and that sympathy for the common man which are our aim and our inspiration. We have found in Great Britain and in her great offspring America the exemplar which we have welcomed in our own politics and institutions. We are still ready, despite all differences, to stand by her side, if she is true to herself.

I have written in this way partly because I am writing this chapter in London in the dark days of August, 1939, and partly because it may serve to explain why, when I went to America in 1935, I devoted my attention to matters which affected the well-being of my own people and which, I fear, in the distortion of the sense of values which now prevails, may appear of minor importance. I went as a reformer and not as a politician and it is my conviction that the world will not recover its sanity until its leaders become reformers too. That is the only line of advance and it has to be determined by the peoples themselves. Either they will go on in their present course, submissive followers of leaders who openly confess they have lost their way, or they will call a halt and determine that they will follow only guides who know their way and can prove the fact. There still remains in Great Britain far more appreciation of this need than there is in the countries to which at the moment they seem to be opposed. We in the Orient will be found at her side in any war that may come, if she convinces our peoples that the power-politicians are not to direct their destinies, but reformers with the true interests of humanity at heart.

I can now turn to the immediate objects that were

### *My Aims as Minister to America*

in my mind when I went as Egyptian Minister to America.

They were, in fact, two. The first was the effective discharge of my regular duties as the representative of my country, by which I mean my people under its King and his Ministers. I was anxious to ensure the respect of the American People for us as an independent nation in line with the great democracies of the world, but with our own development of democratic institutions suited to the traditions of our country and to the stage we had reached. Though I was myself a Nationalist and more of a democrat than the present controllers of Egypt's destinies, I was their representative and I was determined to be loyal to my trust.

My second object was to obtain the removal of the barriers to the cotton trade which was the economic life-blood of my fellow-countrymen. In this I was pursuing not only the immediate aim of the economic advantage of Egypt, but that wider aim of the intercourse of peoples which was beginning to dominate my outlook.

I had, of course, other aims. I was anxious, for example, to attract American tourists to my country, for that too contributed both to the immediate and to the more far-reaching objects of my policy. But there could be no direct propaganda for this, since it might have produced an appearance of commercial aims inconsistent with the dignity of the official representative of a nation.

The first difficulty with which I was faced was the lack of efficiency in my own Legation. I found that the staff was very much more interested in the social side of diplomatic life than in any practical aims. I fully realise that that social life has its importance. But its

## *Diplomacy*

importance lies in its being contributory to the real work rather than being an end in itself. From the very day of my arrival I realised that the burden of the economic work was to be largely on my shoulders. My First Secretary was a very charming and consequently a socially popular man. This had a certain value, but it was not exactly the value I wanted. He came to the Legation at 11 or 12 o'clock in the morning, having spent two hours over electric massage treatment and other aids to his health and appearance which no doubt helped him in his social life. I used all the tact I could command to give him a different conception of the real duties of diplomatic service, but I failed, especially when, after the fall of Nessim Pasha, he felt fortified by the appointment of one of his relatives to the Egyptian Cabinet.

There was one official on whom I could really rely for help and that was Mr. Sirageddin, who looked after the finances of the Legation, but who gave me a great deal of help outside his regular duties. The remaining Attaché was good-hearted enough, but was slow and was also obsessed by his financial disability to keep up the position to which he considered himself entitled in Washington.

Changes were, it is true, made, but they did not improve matters very much. In one of the new appointments I had the experience of a man who was anxious to please me personally, but who, I could see, was not in the least interested in the work of the Legation. His health was not very good, though not so bad as to justify his continual belief that he was going to die, and he was in consequence idle. He was a good dancer and bridge player and unjustifiably extravagant, which

undoubtedly made him socially popular. I did my best with him because I was always anxious to help Egyptian officials to learn their work, for their own sakes apart from anything else. But neither he nor another new Attaché who was sent were ever of real assistance.

This was the atmosphere in which I had to work in America and, while it left me free to work at my own objects and to leave much of the social life to my colleagues, it imposed a very severe strain on my strength.

I was warmly received by President Roosevelt who said, "I welcome you not only as the representative of a nation friendly to us and to which I am particularly friendly and a nation with a glorious history, but as a reformer and co-operator like myself." While I was in America I had the advantage of the friendship of two Secretaries of State—Secretary Wallace, who is now Secretary of Agriculture, and Secretary Roper.

I found both of them fully appreciative of my economic aims and willing to render me any assistance they could. Secretary Roper was good enough to send, through an Egyptian journalist who happened to visit the United States at this time, a message from America to Egypt expressing the great debt which America and Europe owed to the civilisation of Ancient Egypt. He spoke also of the high hopes he entertained of the new Egypt which was renewing the memory of her great history and he was kind enough to add a warm appreciation of the understanding that the new Egyptian Minister to the United States had already shown in the short period he had been there and of the manner in which he was fulfilling his duty to his country. This is but one

example of the kindness and friendliness with which I was met everywhere in America and which I shall never forget.

In my mission regarding the abolition of the duties on Egyptian cotton I was not successful. At one time it seemed that I might be, but considerations of commercial treaties with other countries intervened to prevent it. It was held that, if such an agreement were made with us, it would prove to the advantage of other countries while there would be no reciprocal advantages for America. The fact that, for certain special purposes, our cotton being of a far better quality than their own—for fine cotton goods, for tyres, for aeroplanes and so on—it was to their advantage from the industrial point of view to remove the legal barriers, did not convince them of the advisability of doing so ; and, so far, these barriers remain.

Of the more ceremonial side of my work something must be said, for, though I am not a great man for receptions and social affairs, I do realise the importance of public ceremonies and the opportunities they give of publicity, especially in the United States. I can, of course, only mention here a few of these occasions, but they will suffice to indicate the interest in my country which I was able to arouse in the public mind.

On the occasion of the birthday of the King, for example, it had been the custom for the Egyptian Legation to give one reception, and that was all. During my stay no less than twenty-five separate receptions were given to celebrate the day. This was reported to King Fuad at the time when he was suffering from the illness of which a month later he died and I was informed that

he was deeply moved and expressed his very high appreciation.

Another of my objects was the formation of the Associations of the Friends of Egypt, of which over 120 were established in the course of my stay. Governors of States, Senators, Congressmen and other influential men were leaders in this movement and in some cities and States the Chambers of Commerce took an active interest in them. We received help too from Syrians and other Orientals in regard to these Associations and, in particular, from students in a number of the American universities.

In the winter of 1937 I paid a visit to California and spent three months on the trip studying the agricultural methods followed in their magnificent country. In this field there is nothing like it in the world. America has established agricultural experimental stations which, through the efficiency of their scientific researches, have contributed enormously to the improvement and perfecting of the cultivation of the soil. In the course of my trip out West six different States, including California, Texas and Florida, paid me and, through me, my country peculiar honour. They were the only six whose Legislatures happened to be in session at the time of my visit and in each a joint meeting of both Houses was held to celebrate the occasion. The Egyptian Flag was displayed and the portraits of King Farouk, who had now succeeded his father, of the President of the Regency, Prince Mohamed Ali, and of the Prime Minister, Moustafa el Nahas Pasha, decorated the walls. I was invited to address the assembled Congressmen and Senators on the position and problems of Egypt. On several occasions these meetings were broadcast all over



America and in California itself a film was made. I was told that this was the first time that the two Houses had met in honour of a foreign representative and, as it turned out, it seemed at one time likely to be the last. For, when the meeting was reported in Washington, the question was raised by some of the officials in the State Department as to whether such action was not an infringement of the Constitution. Telegrams had been sent direct from sixteen states to the King of Egypt, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Senate and the House of Representatives expressing good wishes for our King and country. It was unconstitutional for separate States to communicate direct with foreign countries on matters of foreign policy. But Secretary Hull, who was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at that time, a position which practically amounts to that of Prime Minister, refused to take any action and for nearly fifty days demonstrations of this kind continued.

I have laid some stress on these matters, though of course they could have no direct effect on the march of events, because they are the symbol of a very memorable period in my own career, because they are a remarkable proof of the enthusiasm with which an Egyptian Representative to America was received, and because I cannot say enough in thanks to the Americans for their generous interest in the cause of a small nation whose affairs were of no direct concern to them.

The time had now come when I was due for a vacation and I was anxious to return by the Egyptian steamer *Nile* because our young King Farouk was to be a passenger on her. I was presented to him in Marseilles just before the boat started.

I happened to have with me on board an album con-



H.M. KING FAROUK



taining a large number of the articles which had appeared in the Press dealing with Egypt and with my activities. There were also included in it official letters written to me by Governors of States stamped with the official seals, by Senators and Congressmen, by Chambers of Commerce and prominent business men asking me to express to His Majesty and to the people of Egypt their best wishes for their future welfare and happiness. The wife of an aide-de-camp of the King was told by her husband about this album which, however, I had shown to no one since I regarded it in the light of a document to be laid before the Foreign Office on my return. She persuaded me against my better judgment to lend her this for a little while. An hour later she came and told me that the King had seen her reading the album, had expressed great interest in it and had taken it to his private suite.

On Friday, after prayers, the King called me to him and, after apologising for taking the album without my leave, expressed his thanks to me for the great services I had rendered to my country. I replied that the album and anything of value to me that I possessed was at His Majesty's disposal. He told me that he would keep it for a few days before returning it and enquired how it came about that there were enough Egyptian flags in America for them to be displayed in all these different houses as an American newspaper had stated. He asked me how many flags I had taken with me on the trip. I replied that I had taken but one flag, one portrait of His Majesty, one of the President of the Regency and one of the Prime Minister. He replied that I had been quite right in providing that our flag should be honoured wherever I went.

In the afternoon of the same day Hassanein Pasha, His Majesty's First Chamberlain, came, as he said, with the bad news that His Majesty proposed to keep the album for his private library. I expressed myself as deeply sensible of the honour, but added that I ought to submit it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a record of my work. I was also anxious to make some extracts from it for myself and to prepare it in a more suitable form for presentation to His Majesty. On this he promised me that it should be returned to me on our arrival in Egypt.

Two incidents which occurred on the voyage I should like to mention as indicative of King Farouk's real affection and consideration for the common people and freedom from that *hauteur* which is often supposed to divide an Oriental monarch from his subjects.

The first occurred at a luncheon where I was sitting next to him when a special Egyptian dish called *Foul Midamis* was served. This consists, as I have already mentioned, of a preparation of beans and is the favourite breakfast dish in Egypt, particularly in the poorer classes. A special chef was on board who had a great reputation for the preparation of this dish which he himself was serving to His Majesty and the other Egyptians. While he was doing so a photographer came to take a picture of the King and his friends. The King turned to me and said, "Don't you think that, when this man has taken the trouble to come all the way to Europe to cook a dish for his King, he deserves to be included in the photograph, especially as the dish itself is the popular food of the poor in our country." I, of course, agreed, for I realised how popular such an action would be and in

what a kindly light it would show the new King. His Majesty on this had the chef stand behind his chair and a photograph taken, much to the delight of the man himself and to that of many people in Egypt when it was published.

Of the other incident the King told me himself, for I was not present when it occurred. He saw a stewardess cleaning the floor in the second-class cabins and fell into conversation with her without her knowing who he was. There was some Egyptian silk for sale in the hall and she asked him to buy some, but, on learning the price, he said that he could not possibly afford so much. She explained what excellent silk it was and told him that, as an Egyptian, he ought to patronise Egyptian goods. He then offered her a cigarette, which she accepted, but noticed that the paper was stamped with the Crown of Egypt. "How do you come to have this?" she asked. "I have been told by the other servants about these and they said that they were for the use of His Majesty alone." He replied that he had simply gone to the saloon and taken them. "I shall report you to the Purser," she then threatened. "It is strictly forbidden to take anything that belongs to His Majesty." He then begged for forgiveness and she agreed not to report him if he would promise not to do it again. They then chatted on various matters, including labour insurance, and he enquired whether the workers on Egyptian boats were insured against accidents. She even asked him his name, and when he said "I am called Farouk and my father was called Fuad," she told him not to be funny. The King said that it was one of the most interesting and entertaining conversations he had ever had, but when the girl learned that it was really

the King to whom she had been talking she was so overcome that she did not know what to do.

I conversed a great deal with the King at this luncheon and formed a high opinion of his intelligence, his store of knowledge and sense of humour. My stay in California caused him to ask me a number of questions, which I was able to answer, about film stars, whose names he knew far better than I did.

When we were back in Egypt I had the honour of meeting him again at the Ras el Tin Palace in Alexandria when he renewed his thanks for all that I had done for Egypt in America. To show his trust in me, he said that he would give me a piece of very confidential information which he would be pleased if I would keep to myself. He also said that in appreciation of my work he had asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to arrange for the representation of Egypt at the San Francisco as well as the New York Fair. He then told me that he had seen my photograph at his fiancée's house and, when I showed some astonishment, he explained that it was an old photograph belonging to her father Youssef Zulfikar Pasha and that it was taken when he and I were together in Ras el Bar. He had asked them to let him have the photograph, which I told him I regarded as a great honour.

I had the courage in the course of this interview to ask His Majesty's leave to speak quite frankly on a matter of great importance and, on being given full permission, I gave him my view on the subject and assured him of my admiration of his character and abilities, adding that he could at all times rely on my loyalty and affection above all, because he was so good a friend of the poor in Egypt, for whom I had worked all my life. I do not today regret

having said this, for it was my honest opinion and, as a patriotic Egyptian, I had every right to express it to my King. Whatever may have happened since, I have not changed that opinion.

I was just a little afraid that I might be encroaching on His Majesty's time with all this conversation, as there were a number of others waiting to see him, but, as he gave no indication of this, I was placed in a position of some difficulty. It was obviously impossible for me to be the first to suggest that the conversation should come to an end and that I should be given permission to withdraw, but I got out of the difficulty by asking His Majesty to give me permission to beg His Majesty to command me to withdraw, for I was afraid that in his kindness he had given me more time than I deserved. He laughed at my ingenuity, stood up and patted me on the shoulder and said that he would like to see a great deal more of me, but that, as I knew, etiquette stood in the way ; still, would I be sure to keep in touch with his First Chamberlain, Hassanein Pasha. It was on these terms that I parted from the King and my feeling that we were on the best of terms was confirmed a few days later when the American Minister to Egypt, Judge Fish, rang me up and asked to see me. He spoke of his great liking for, and admiration of, our King and told me that when he saw him for the purpose of obtaining permission to go for his holidays and had taken occasion to let the King know how highly the American authorities thought of me, the King had expressed his appreciation and said, " I consider him one of the most able Egyptians and I shall rely on him a great deal in the future."

It was, therefore, very much to my surprise that I



discovered four weeks later that something had happened at the Palace to rob me of the confidence that the King had placed in me. It was just at the moment when Nahas Pasha and the Nationalist Government had lost his confidence as a result of disagreement over the relative powers of the Throne and the Ministers under our Constitution. I had spent weeks in urging my friends in the Government to be more conciliatory towards the King and not to provoke a quarrel with him. I was very critical of their attitude and had been doing my best to persuade both them and my British friends to pave the way for an amicable understanding between the Government and the King. Unfortunately I was not successful and I can only suppose that some of those in the King's confidence misrepresented my efforts to him. For I was suddenly asked by the Government to postpone my return to America two days before I was due to start and I was given to understand that this was the result of a hint from His Majesty. This was the greatest disappointment to me, for I had, as I have said, the greatest admiration and affection for the King and I have never ceased to retain them to this day.

To explain this sudden change of attitude I must go back a little and deal with certain influences that had been at work while I was in America and that were at work on my return.

Tewfik Nessim Pasha was now an elderly man. He had been Prime Minister several times and was a man of great personal distinction. I have told in a previous chapter how he had, though himself a Palace supporter and a great friend of the British authorities, advised the appointment of Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd be it remembered, in 1935. Now in 1937 he became

engaged to be married to a young Austrian girl. There was nothing very unusual in this and one would have thought that it could not very much concern anyone else. But members of one political party were extremely hostile to him on account of various disagreements they had had with him when he was Prime Minister and because he had recommended the appointment of Nahas Pasha and his Nationalist friends, and this gave them their opportunity for revenge. Money would leave Egypt and go to Austria ; all kinds of private interests would be affected ; so, at least, they thought and said.

It was rumoured that it was through the influence of a very prominent member of this Party and other political opponents that an action was brought to show that he was not in full possession of his faculties and was unfit to manage his own affairs. When the case was to come on, it transpired that the Judge who was going to try it was a nephew of the prominent member, and the principal doctor who was to give expert evidence was his brother. I tried to persuade the Government to intervene on his behalf ; but, although Nahas Pasha owed much to Tewfik Nessim Pasha, he would make no move. I went to the British authorities, whose friend he had always been, and endeavoured to enlist their support. They could not, they said, interfere with the course of justice. Justice indeed ! Here was a great statesman, advanced in years it is true, but in full possession of his faculties. He proposed to do what many an elderly man does every day and in every country in the world—to marry a young woman. It was true that she was not an Egyptian, but what of that ? If every well-known man who married a foreigner were to suffer for it, there would be plenty of trouble not only in Egypt, but also in many

other countries. In his old age this distinguished man stood alone, faced by enemies whom his very honesty of purpose and real patriotism—for whether I always agreed with him or not, I knew that he was always a patriot—had raised up against him. There were influential political opponents hunting him down because he had in full honesty of purpose advised the calling to power of the Nationalist leader in his own place and had co-operated with the British. There was the Nationalist Government indifferent now to his fate. There were the British, unwilling to come up against the influence of the friends of the Palace.

When my efforts to induce the Government or the British to act proved abortive, I decided to act myself. I saw the head of *El Azhar*, Sheikh el Maraghi, a personal friend of the King, and Dr. Nimr, the proprietor of *Al Mokattam*, one of the most important newspapers in Egypt, and both had long interviews with Tewfik Nessim Pasha during which we all satisfied ourselves to the full that he was in complete possession of his faculties. With a medical friend of his I then advised him to see the most distinguished mental authorities in England and in France. Their verdict was in absolute agreement with ours and the proceedings lapsed.

I knew that my efforts would bring me unpopularity, and so it turned out, though I did not then imagine that it would go so far as it did. But to me it was disgraceful that a great Egyptian should be ruined by such an injustice.

The other incident arose out of a quarrel, not openly avowed it is true, with certain members of the Wafd.

In the course of the voyage on the *Nile* I had heard

## *The Question of a Crown*

from several reliable sources that King Farouk and the Government of Nahas Pasha were not on the best of terms.

One of my informants was at that time a great favourite of King Farouk. The quarrel centred round many small things, including the suggestion made to the King in Paris by Maitre el Tabei, that he should be presented with a crown on his coming to the throne. It was strongly supported by Fuad Bey Sultan, one of the governors of the Bank Misr, and I myself thought it an excellent idea. On my return to Cairo I tried to persuade my friends in the Government to support it. The young King was very popular indeed and his welcome on his return was really remarkable. There was a feeling amongst many that this might not be altogether a good thing, for it might lead to an increase of the power of the Throne as against Parliament. There was as a result a certain coolness on the part of some members of the Government about the welcome to the King. I did not share this view. Whatever disagreements there may have been between the Palace and Parliament in King Fuad's time, we had no reason to suppose that King Farouk would carry them on. He was young, patriotic, intelligent, democratic in his outlook and might well lead Egypt in her campaign for a satisfactory execution of the treaty with Great Britain and might even accept the full implications of a constitutional monarchy.

I used what influence I possessed with the Wafd to persuade them of this and I think many of the less influential members agreed with me. But others I could not convince. I reminded them that they had already put themselves in opposition to the King by

reducing the Palace staff and the salaries paid to those who remained. The King's own salary had been reduced by a third, at his own request it was true, but admittedly through their influence. The Palace staff had by this become smaller when Egypt was independent than when she had been a protectorate. Nor was this done from motives of economy, for their own salaries and those of many other high officials had not been reduced in the same way. The bad effects of this, I urged, could now be in large measure cured by offering a crown to His Majesty. Certain Members of the Wafd Government, however, wanted to make it a matter of bargaining with the King for advantages in return, which would have robbed the gift of all its graciousness and power to effect a reconciliation. When I realised that they were not really enthusiastic about the idea at all, I suggested that a special Committee should be formed with Prince Omar Toussoun at the head of it. For some reason Prince Omar Toussoun refused to act and even wrote an article which appeared in *Al Mokattam* stating that it was against the rules of the Mohammedan religion that the King should be crowned. This, of course, annoyed the King.

But this failure of mine did me no good with the King or the friends of the Palace, for the memory of efforts which fail always seem to outweigh in royal minds the efforts themselves. Nor did it help me with the leaders of the Nationalist Government.

Now it happened that, at the time when I was nearly due to return to America, a member of the Government had an audience of the King at Alexandria. For what actually happened at this interview I have only that member's authority. He informed me that the friends of



FUAD SULTAN BEY



the Palace did not wish me to go back to America and had given him to understand that it would be a good thing if the Government would relieve me of my office. That member himself, so he said, had defended me, but the friends of the Palace had said that they were informed that I had not been successful in America. He had then enquired in what respect I had failed and the reply appears to have been that I had provided champagne at an entertainment to students. When I was told about this and my informant added that he had urged that all the Government should do was to give me some other post and that the King had agreed to this, provided I did not go to America, I could hardly believe my ears. Was it likely that the King, who had only in the last few weeks treated me as I have described at some length, should now on such a trumpery excuse turn against me ?

I knew also that, when the question of who was to be Chief of the King's Cabinet was under discussion, on the suggestion of that same member of the Government my own name was the fourth suggested informally by Nahas Pasha through Maitre el Tabei (the proprietor of *Akher Saâ* and an unofficial intermediary between the Wafd and the Palace at the time). I realised that this must have had the effect, even if it was not the intention that it should, of leaving in the King's mind the impression that I was currying favour with him in order to attain this position. I knew also that in the minds of the Palace group it would appear to be an attempt to get a Wafdist who was pro-English into a position of influence at the Palace and that to the Nationalists it would appear that I was leaving them and joining the Palace. In point of fact this was done by that member without my knowledge at all, for my wife was undergoing a serious operation at the



time and I was by her bed in the hospital. I can hardly doubt that this proposal was, to say the least of it, not intended to help me, especially as we had always been opponents, and I was not very ready to accept his account of his interview with the King in regard to my return to America.

I may add that, when the British authorities heard of all this, they expressed their opinion strongly to the members of the Wafd concerned, saying that they could not understand this attitude in continually opposing the King in small matters and interfering in things that did not concern them and at the same time allowing without any reason such an official as the Minister to the United States to be discredited.

What grieved me most was not the loss of my official position, which I knew that I had used only for the honour and advantage of my King and my country, but the feeling that I had been maligned in his eyes, while in the eyes of my nationalist friends I had come to be regarded as an adherent of the Palace because I had criticised their attitude towards the King and urged them to use their best efforts to co-operate with him for the well-being of the country. I believe that the hope for Egypt and therefore for the true interests of Britain in Egypt in the future rests on co-operation between the three forces that are too often drawn into conflict with one another. Those forces may be expressed in three words : The People, the King and the British.

Thus ended, for as long as I can at present see, my diplomatic career.

If for a moment, however, before bringing this chapter to a conclusion, I may revert to the wider issues of which I spoke at its beginning, I should like to add a word on the

opinion I have deduced from my experiences in the United States, of the attitude of America towards Great Britain as a result of the last and in view of another war.

America has never forgotten that, while all the other Allies in 1918 derived from the settlement what they at all events regarded as advantages, she was left with her loans unrepaid. She will not easily again make sacrifices in the light of that experience. On the other hand America is at one with Great Britain and her allies in her loyalty to the ideals of democracy and in her belief that the hope of mankind rests upon them. If Great Britain remains true to those ideals—and her treatment of Egypt and the East is one of the surest indications of whether she does or not—America will throw her moral and, to whatever extent she can, her material influence on the side of Great Britain.

## THE TREATY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

I HAVE already spoken at some length on the triangle of forces in Egyptian politics. All through these years those forces had been operating. The position had at all times been complicated by a feature of Oriental political life which it is not easy for the Occidental mind to grasp. That feature is the predominant influence exercised by personalities and personal interests. It is often asserted that this is tantamount to saying that the Oriental is corrupt in his political life. I can only reply that corruption is not unheard of in the politics of the West, particularly in the far West, and that regrettable, even lamentable, as it undoubtedly is that men should seek their private interests under the guise of serving the public, this can only continue so long as the public remains uneducated and indifferent enough to permit it. But in Egypt particularly, this influence of the person, as distinct from the party or the cause, is not so often as elsewhere a matter of money. It is far more the desire for distinction, position and influence on the one hand and a readiness to follow and support a known personality rather than a nebulous policy on the other. This is one of the main reasons for that constant change of influences and of office-holders which has no doubt puzzled many of my readers.

## *The Changing Scene of Politics*

It is all the more remarkable that for so many years Zaghloul Pasha remained the single, undisputed leader of the Nationalist Movement and, in effect, of the Egyptian people. It is true that in 1920, when he refused to accept the Milner proposals, a section of his colleagues and their friends broke away under Adli Yeken Pasha and formed the group or party of the Constitutional Liberals. But this group never commanded a real following among the people and could only reach and hold office by a manipulation of the triangle of forces. It is an irony of fate that those who were regarded as the extremists of the Wafd party, and bitterly opposed both before and after the death of Zaghloul any coalition with the Constitutional Liberals, should today be working with them in opposition to Zaghloul's successor as leader of the Wafd, Moustafa el Nahas Pasha.

Ever since 1922 the British had thought of negotiating a treaty implementing the independence of Egypt on certain conditions. Those conditions were that the treaty should be made with representatives of all parties and groups in Egypt and that the institutions should have developed on sufficiently democratic lines to assure that this would command the general agreement of the public.

I need hardly say that I am in hearty sympathy with this policy. I have always been an opponent of the middleman both in commerce and in politics. I have always desired that the people should speak for themselves and that institutions should be so formed as to enable them to do so.

Each time that there had been an attempt at negotiation, it had proved a failure. I do not say that this was

### *The Treaty and its Consequences*

entirely due to Egyptian disunion, to personal aims and ambitions intervening to muffle the clearness of utterance of the Egyptian people. It took a very long time to convince the British that, when Egyptians spoke of independence, they meant it. It took a long time to get rid of a feeling of hostility towards the British among the Egyptian people, due to causes of which I have spoken and which the British naturally regarded as involving danger to themselves if it persisted after a treaty ensuring full independence. But it was the disunity due to the personal element and the triangle of forces which for so long delayed the completion of the policy of 1922.

When unity was achieved in 1936, as evidenced by the list of signatories to the treaty made in that year, it was not, I fear, due to the spontaneous conviction of the Egyptian leaders. It was due to two factors : the continued reiteration by the British of their refusal to make a treaty without such unity and the support given by the Egyptian students to the movement for achieving it. The students are a far more important element in Egyptian politics than is appreciated in other countries. It is probably because their youth and their education combine to free them from the obsession with personalities that they are so. In any case, the fact remains. The success of this movement coincided with a period of crisis in our part of the world for the British Empire. In view of the actions of Italy it was essential that Egypt should be, not under the thumb of Great Britain, not an unreliable and half-dominated adjunct of the British Empire, but a reliable ally appreciating and sharing its responsibilities and risks.

In 1936 it was noticeable that Mahmoud Pasha, who

### *Nahas Pasha and the King*

has always been regarded as moderate and well-disposed towards the British, should have been more extreme in his demands than was El Nahas Pasha. This was really due to the fact that he did not dare to be less extreme. His very moderation and friendliness opened him to attack at home the moment he compromised or gave way an inch. In a word it was due to the fact that he was an individual, a personal magnate and not the leader of a united people. I have no reason to doubt his sincerity, but I have every reason to doubt his power and, in the last analysis, his acceptability as a negotiator of a treaty to the British Government.

Nahas Pasha, on the other hand, the British saw had inherited from Zaghoul much of his popularity and much, if not all, of the support of the masses. He had, it is true, made mistakes. Within the Wafd he had used his personal popularity in 1932 to expel the majority of the executive over a difference as to a point of procedure. He had failed to appreciate the opportunity afforded by the coming of a young man to the throne of effecting a union between the Palace and the Nationalists. Relying on the friendship of the British, which at that time he possessed, and his general popularity in Egypt, the friends of the Palace say that he not only tried to increase the power of the Government at the expense of the authority of the King, but committed those mistakes which seemed to involve the King's personal humiliation. He would not listen to the advice of friends, who pointed out that the King could not be expected to support him after this treatment.

They say also that he did not in general understand the value of compromise, which is so essential in politics and diplomacy and so well appreciated by the British.

## *The Treaty and its Consequences*

But he was always straightforward and honest and he could more than anyone else be said to have Egypt at his back.

The treaty was signed on August 26th, 1936, and the signatories on behalf of Egypt indicate so remarkable a unity of forces that the list is worth setting out in full. They are, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Egypt :

Moustafa el Nahas Pasha, President of the Council of Ministers.

Dr. Ahmed Maher, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, former President of the Council of Ministers.

Ismail Sidki Pasha, former President of the Council of Ministers.

Abdel Fattah Yéhia Pasha, former President of the Council of Ministers.

Wacyf Boutros Ghali Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Osman Moharram Pasha, Minister of Public Works.

• Makram Ebeid Pasha, Minister of Finance.

• Mahmoud Fahmi el-Nokrashi Pasha, Minister of Communications.

Ahmed Hamdi Seif el Nasr Pasha, Minister of Agriculture.

Ali el Shamsi Pasha, former Minister.

Mohammed Hilmi Issa Pasha, former Minister.

Hafez Afifi Pasha, former Minister.

The terms of the treaty, stripped of all detail and official verbiage, were as follows :

1. Egypt was recognised as a sovereign independent State with the right to have Ambassadors in all

## *The Treaty of 1936*

countries, to a seat at the League of Nations and to all other recognised rights.

2. The military occupation of Egypt was at an end and the British troops and all other marks of it were to be removed with the exception of the provision for the Suez Canal area.
3. A defensive alliance was established binding both countries to contract no relationships with others inconsistent with it.
4. A limited British force should be stationed in a territory on the left bank of the Suez Canal with Egypt paying a considerable proportion of the cost. This arrangement was pending the handing over of the guardianship of the Canal to the Egyptian forces and was to be reconsidered in twenty years.

Thus, after seventeen years of bitter controversy were the terms accepted which, in effect, had been demanded by Zaghloul in the first instance. It is true that the Canal Zone, according to the British conception of it, is an extremely wide one. It covers an immense tract of country which extends to within not many miles of Cairo itself. It is true that no country can regard its independence as assured while a foreign army is on its territory and within some miles of its capital. The details as to payment of costs, making of roads, building of barracks and the like, which fill pages of annexes and protocols and were the subject of endless notes and correspondence are of very slight importance as compared with the fact of the British forces being there at all.

But, granted goodwill and genuine friendship, Egypt can prepare to take over this responsibility and will be



## *The Treaty and its Consequences*

ready and willing to do so when the time comes. But it is of the first importance that her people should be able to believe that Great Britain really means her to do so. On her reliance on good faith in that respect depends her willingness to build up the necessary strength to fulfil her obligation and her final acceptance of the treaty as a settlement of her claims.

But the terms of a treaty are not everything, as in this year of grace or disgrace 1939 can be easily recognised. There is not only the question of whether those terms can be relied upon, but there is also the question of how they are carried out. I am not sure that the execution of a treaty is not a more important matter than the actual terms it contains. Before it comes into existence the terms are all that matter. Afterwards, they are no longer in dispute and only the effects of them are considered. I am perfectly prepared to admit that those effects are determined by both parties. The Egyptians as well as the British are called upon to implement the spirit that underlies them. I want to make that point abundantly clear and therefore I am prepared to be as critical of my fellow-countrymen as I am of the British. But there are certain considerations which at the very start throw a greater responsibility for success or failure on them than on us.

In the first place they were, and to some extent still are, in our country, not we in theirs. Whatever benefits they may at different periods have conferred on us, they came not at our request and not by our desire.

In the second place there was the history of the Great War and the years which immediately succeeded it. Britain was responsible for the heritage of that in the minds of the Egyptian people.

## *After the Treaty*

In the third place there were the vacillations of British policy in Egypt due to the different Governments and different High Commissioners which had bred in the Egyptian mind an uncertainty as to the real mind of Great Britain.

For these things, if for no others, the Egyptians had very little responsibility.

For the fact that democratic institutions were not working so smoothly as they should, their own characters might be said to be responsible. It is true, as I have tried to show, that the presence of the British with power at their backs was very largely the reason for this. The principle laid down for the Roman Empire of 'Divide et impera' had not been absent from the policy of some of the British authorities. But it was weaknesses in the Egyptian character, as far as politics were concerned, which gave them the chance to 'disunite and govern.' Now that the power of the British was at all events removed to a greater distance, it was the task of the Egyptian leaders to be united in making their democracy effective.

This, on the conclusion of the Treaty and to a large extent up to the present day, they have not succeeded in doing. Nahas Pasha, after the Treaty, as Lloyd George after the war, thought that he had won a victory which would ensure him the support of the people whatever might happen. His colleagues contributed to this by their flattery of him.

Mr. Booth, the last Judicial Adviser in Egypt and a great Englishman, straightforward, fair and just, once made a remark to me which is very pertinent in this connection. At the time when I was occupied with the railways in 1932, pressure on my time compelled me to

refuse two invitations to parties at his house. When my plans were crowned with success and were a general subject of conversation and publicity he asked me to go and see him. After we had talked for forty minutes about what I had been doing he said, "Mr. Youssef, you know that I am your friend." I replied that I had no doubt at all of it, in fact that he was the best English friend I had in Egypt. "You know also," he continued, "that I am a friend of your country." I replied that I knew this also and I referred to the many difficult occasions on which he had helped us and, in particular, to his courageous stand for justice in the face of powerful opposition on all sides when El Nokrashy and Maher were accused of complicity in the murder of the Sirdar. "Well," he said, "as your friend and as Egypt's friend I have this to say to you. I wish you had only been a quarter as successful as you have been, for in Egypt and in other countries like Egypt, those who attain small successes are applauded, but those who seem likely to attain great successes incur hatred and opposition and, if they are completely victorious, are broken."

The Prime Minister, El Nahas Pasha, had, as I have pointed out already, aroused a good deal of personal feeling against him. There were old grudges existing in the minds of the circle at the Palace. There was resentment within the Wafd; there was still the opposition of the Constitutional Liberals. For the purpose of obtaining the treaty all these quarrels had been patched up. Returning to Egypt as "the man who won the Treaty" El Nahas fancied that his position was unassailable. But it was not. The old quarrel between the Palace and the Democrats blazed up anew and the

flames were the fiercer because of the removal of the third point of the triangle and because of disunity in the Wafdist camp. Before long the Constitutional Liberals and the Palace together displaced El Nahas and put Mohammed Mahmoud once again in power. Moreover he remained in power for more than two years and only in August 1939, has been forced to hand over his office to Ali Maher Pasha, an original member of the Wafd who of late years has thrown his influence on the side of the Palace. In criticism of the Egyptian political leaders, then, it cannot be said that they have yet succeeded in establishing democracy in the form of a Parliamentary system to a very satisfactory degree.

This and certain features in the British attitude, with which I shall be dealing in a moment, have caused the Treaty to decline steadily in its popularity with the masses.

To the man in the street the continued popularity of a broad national policy somewhat remote from his ordinary life depends on two things. The first is immediate. Does it at the first view remove the grievances he was assured that it would remove? Of those grievances probably the most outstanding to the ordinary citizen was the presence of the British soldier everywhere in his country, ready to dominate in the last resort the ordinary Egyptian and his leaders. While in words this control had been removed, in fact the British soldier was still there, in control of a large section of Egypt and in a position to take control at any moment of the rest. For this very doubtful privilege, as he saw it, he was expected to pay in taxation.

What might happen twenty years hence in regard to these forces, what was happening in regard to the

### *The Treaty and its Consequences*

removal of British control over administration, did not come within his view or affect his mind. In this respect the Treaty was not what he had been led to expect it would be.

The second cause of disappointment emerged more slowly. The ordinary man expects that such a success by his united leaders will increase his own well-being. The effects may be delayed a few months, but somehow he will soon become more prosperous. He knows little or nothing of the causes of fluctuations of trade. But he feels that now the foreigners no longer control his country, he and his fellow-countrymen will be better off. He expects, too, that every disability in respect of the administration of justice, the difficulty of education, the very conflict with Nature herself will at once be removed. He finds that they are not, and this further weakens the position of his leaders, for they cannot rely on his support. I shall endeavour to show in the next chapter what policies on the part of political leaders would ensure the loyal support of the people. All that I want to say here is that there have been no such policies operating in the eyes of the masses and that, until there are, the Treaty will continue to be regarded as unsatisfactory and democratic will not be forthcoming for the leaders.

On the side of the British the factors operating against the settling down of the two countries into friendly alliance are equally serious.

The first is the absence of a sympathetic understanding of Egyptian feelings. Two examples of this may be mentioned as symptomatic.

The first was in the case of Tewfik Nessim Pasha, which I have already mentioned. I said then that I



SIR MILES LAMPSON, G.C.M.G.



endeavoured to enlist British support in my battle for justice towards this very well-known and popular man. I could not obtain it. Now, however strong might be the desire of the British in 1937 not to interfere in the administration, it is a fact that they still could exercise and still were exercising a considerable influence when it suited them to do so. In any case it is fixed in the Egyptian mind that the British were responsible for what might have been a miscarriage of justice.

The second may seem a mere social "gaffe," but in Egypt it is taken as a very definite affront to the dignity of one of their leading families.

Last spring, that is to say in 1938, two daughters of Mustapha Fahmi Pasha died on the same day. Now, Mustapha Fahmi Pasha had been Prime Minister of Egypt for no less than eighteen years. He had been a loyal friend of Great Britain in the time of Lord Cromer, so much so that he had even been accused by the Khedive and the extreme Nationalists of disloyalty to the cause of Egypt. His third daughter is Madame Zaghloul and I have already indicated where she stands in the eyes of the Egyptian people. To the funeral neither the British Government nor the British Ambassador sent any representative. Lady Lampson did, it is true, send a personal letter of sympathy to Madame Zaghloul. But the Egyptian public saw in the absence of the usual courtesies on such an occasion a deliberate affront. I do not blame Sir Miles personally, for whom I have the greatest respect and admiration especially for his great success in the negotiation of the treaty, but I do blame some of his advisers who had been a long time in Egypt and no doubt understood Egyptian sensibilities.



## *The Treaty and its Consequences*

These are but two examples of a number which, taken together, make a considerable volume of ill feeling. It is essential that those who are sent to represent Great Britain in Egypt should be of the type that understands and respects the importance of such incidents. We still look to Great Britain for our ideals of justice and of democratic government. We are ready to show sympathy and courtesy in our dealings with her people. It is surely worth her while to show sympathy and courtesy in her dealings with ours.

Similarly in other spheres of life less closely connected with the actual Government in Great Britain. With one or two exceptions the great British journals are not sending to Egypt or to other Oriental countries, whose friendship means so much to Great Britain, the best type of representatives. The Press is largely responsible for the attitude of the people, on which friendship ultimately depends, and its representatives have a great responsibility. I would not suggest that the British Government should control these representatives, but I do say that it is worth its while to ensure that they should be men of broad and sympathetic outlook, men of culture and judgment and that a cheese-paring policy in regard to their appointment may be very unwise on the part of all concerned.

The same, of course, applies to the representatives of business concerns. These should, in the first place, be British and not members of other nationalities who may have a number of conflicting interests to consider and who may not and often do not possess the same standards of commercial honour as the British. And, in the second place, they too should be men whose horizons are not bounded by their ledgers and whose interest in the

### *The need for Courtesy*

people of their adopted country does not end with the conclusion of their business deals.

I hope that it is not too late to remedy many of these defects which in recent years have become very marked in the relations of Great Britain with Oriental peoples. It will not do to allow the Orient to think that the traditions of the age of Lord Cromer and similar men in other Eastern countries are gone from the British nation. Those are great traditions, extending from ideals of justice, democracy and humanity to courtesy, consideration and good manners in day-to-day life. They are remembered in the East, but sometimes it seems to us that they have been forgotten in the West. Much depends in the future on their being remembered, and not least the abiding friendship of the peoples of Great Britain and Egypt.

## THE POLICY FOR THE FUTURE

I AM drawing now towards the end of my task. As I sit here in London I hear the shouts of the newsboys as the editions of the papers come out with the latest bulletins of the European crisis. What the future holds for Great Britain, for Europe and for the world, no one knows. But we must assume that the world will go on and therefore we must work and plan how it shall go on. We must hope for the best while insuring against the worst. How far that insurance is involved in the adherence of the East to the great systems of the democratic countries I have already indicated. How far that adherence depends on the loyalty of Great Britain to her own ideals I have also shown.

I turn now to the consideration of the future in Egypt on the assumption that, for the time being at all events, the state of the world will remain broadly as it is today. I do so with the greater certainty of the utility of that consideration because, whether in War or in Peace, the general principles remain the same.

I have tried to combine the policies which I think at this moment our great leader Zaghoul would have followed, were he alive today, with those which my own experience during his life and after his death has added

## *The Future of Egypt*

to them. I see in every country the politicians working often for the interests of their own party and in any case for the interests of their own Government, without consideration for the real interests of the millions of human beings for whose lives they have accepted the responsibility. I am sure that this is wrong. I am sure that the true interests of mankind all over the world depend on harmony, on co-operation and not on the attainment of power by this or that party or by this or that State. I think that it is the duty of every one of us in every country who has any influence to turn his mind to the state of his own people and to work out such reforms as may enable them to contribute to the well-being of mankind. I turn to the future of my own country.

The future of Egypt is bound up with that of Great Britain. I have already sketched in outline what the leaders in each country must avoid and must do in order to make that alliance secure. I now propose to outline what I believe our great leader Zaghouel would have done had he been still alive and now Prime Minister of Egypt.

Having after 2,000 years of foreign domination attained the measure of independence that we have, I believe that he would have sacrificed everything to ensure its success. I believe that he would have devoted himself to overcoming those personal intrigues and destroying those personal ambitions which sacrifice the ideals, for which once Egyptians fought, to the idol of power. He would have rallied to the common cause those leaders of the Wafd who are today fighting one another for office. He would have made it his aim to



SIR AMIN OSMAN PASHA

## *The Pattern of Zaghloul*

create a strong army in order to ensure the independence of Egypt by the final withdrawal of foreign troops. At the same time he would have inaugurated a constructive programme of constitutional and social reform which would enable the Egyptian people to stand foursquare to the world as a strong and free nation. He would have realised that it is for this that the peasants, the industrial workers, the students and all the enduring sections of the Egyptian people are looking and longing. It is from what I knew of his far-reaching policies of construction and from what I have myself been able to add that I have been able to formulate what follows.

I should begin with the interests of the peasants, for they form the vast majority of the population. I should institute a geological analysis of agricultural land all over the country with a view to advising the cultivator as to the best means of using his land. At the same time I should invite cotton experts from Europe and America to Egypt in order to examine on the spot the methods followed in the production of cotton and to suggest any possible improvements. In order to enable the farmers and peasants to take advantage of these researches in the way of buying machinery or whatever might be needed and also with a view to freeing them from the extortion of the moneylender and the middleman, I should establish a state system of agricultural credit banks to lend them money at a reasonable rate of interest for approved expenditure. In order further to assist them financially I should take steps to relieve the farmer who remained at work on his farm at the expense of those who went to the towns and lived on the profits earned by their tenants. I should then turn my attention to the selling of the products, organising a central marketing

## *The Policy for the Future*

board for that purpose. It would be the duty of this department to make improvements in the sorting and packing of the goods, to study foreign markets, to organise co-operative sales in those markets, to free both buyer and seller from the extortionate toll levied by the middlemen in Alexandria. I should put a stop by law to the sale of crops at the wrong season and, through the credit banks, should see that the producer was not forced by lack of money to sell under cost price. Some of the new markets opened I should seek to use for the purchase of armaments and defence equipment which we are unable to produce for ourselves.

For the peasant and the working classes in the towns I should endeavour to reduce the cost of living by the encouragement of co-operative societies supported by the Government. Their first object would be to lower prices wherever the operations of middlemen and profiteers were keeping them high. For these classes, too, I should pursue vigorous policies of sanitation and housing and should establish the control of the Government over building with a view to the organisation of town planning on modern lines.

For the middle class I should promote the employment of native Egyptians by business men and companies by keeping an up-to-date census of unemployed men and women of education and placing them in vacant posts in the place of foreigners educated either in Egypt or abroad.

Next I should turn my attention to education. For the adult I should work through social clubs, the press, the stage and literature. My object would be the making of good citizens—by which I mean men and women informed as to their social duties and experienced

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in the performance of them. The history of their own villages, towns, cities, provinces and country with the public institutions of each would be an important feature of study both in the schools and through the idea of adult education. The principles of self-help and co-operation would underlie all this social training. By sending educational missions abroad and especially agricultural missions to the United States, I should give the opportunity for greater efficiency on the practical or productive side of labour and by stimulating the general study of world conditions of commerce and finance I should teach the Egyptian his real place in the world's economic system. The general curriculum of the schools I should change to a more practical form and should aim at making it more lucrative for the educated man to work outside than inside a government office.

The tourist trade in Egypt I should encourage on the general lines I adopted when I was assisting the railways and by other methods which various foreign countries have since added to them. Fixed prices at hotels and pensions, cheap excursion tickets, good advertisement and the organisation of all these things on a single plan would be my objective.

The tone of the public service I should seek to elevate by abolishing or greatly reducing the free private cars, official servants, telephones and other special privileges given to officials over and above their salaries and by a declared policy of promotion and increase of salary for meritorious service, incorruptibility and public spirit.

I should endeavour to demonstrate the evils of party intrigue and of personal self-seeking by a thorough investigation of injustices and breaches of the law committed by recent governments.



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Finally, I should use every effort on the one hand to ensure freedom to the Press and on the other to promote a tone of enlightened criticism of public policy and public men which is essential to the pure and free government of a country.

These policies, as I have briefly sketched them, would not be cheap. A great deal of money would have to be spent, if the people were to regard the Treaty as bringing an improvement in conditions instead of a financial burden. But money spent is by no means necessarily money lost and the psychological benefits obtained would lead to material benefits far in excess of what they had cost. Lord Cromer appreciated this fact when, at a period when Egypt was bankrupt, he began at once by spending large sums on reform and ended by setting her on the high road to prosperity. Egypt is not bankrupt today. She is able to spend vast sums on rearmament, which is unfortunately essential. She can well afford to invest a moderate amount in reforms on which her future depends.

I realise also that many of these reforms would provoke bitter antagonism from interested parties. I have experienced enough of the antagonism of vested interests both in commerce and in politics not to be oblivious of that fact. But the bold announcement of the whole of such a programme in advance would discount the effect of opposition from interested parties by enlisting the general support of the people. "De l'audace, toujours de l'audace," as Danton said. The policy of those who work in the dark behind the scenes is always best countered by bringing all that one proposes and all that one means to defeat into the light of day.

What, then, are the alternatives before us? Egypt,

as I see it, can continue in the course she is now pursuing. Her statesmen can be politicians aiming at personal or party power and postponing, because they are engrossed in the intrigues and manœuvres such policies engender, the social reforms which her people crave. Or she can embark on a plan of social reform which will itself lead to the establishment of real democracy and to the defeat of the aims of the middleman in every phase of national life. If she goes on as she is, she will not contribute to the establishment of her independence and to the success and final completion of the Treaty. If she adopts the other course, she should find British opinion ready to meet her half-way.

Great Britain for her part has a no less momentous decision to make. She too can pursue her present course, with an Egypt disillusioned and uneasy in her association. She can neglect the necessary goodwill and assurance of good faith that only enlightened intelligence in propaganda and in administration can assure. Or she can win back the confidence and respect she once had in Egypt. Those who have some political vision are well aware that in the Treaty, if its implications are observed, Egypt obtained much of what she sought. But she did not obtain it all. We are willing to accept that large instalment of what we regard as justice in confidence that full justice will follow—if she will help us.

And for the future of the British system, of its ideals of justice and of freedom, what does the choice in both countries involve?

It is not too much to say that the Egyptian situation is an epitome of the whole relationship of Great Britain to the Orient. This is not the place to refer to the special problems of India, of Afghanistan, of Iraq and

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of other Oriental countries. The enemies of Great Britain and her ideals are on the watch to sow the tares of discord between her and the Orient. There will be no harvest to that sowing, if the ground is already filled with the harvest of standing corn. Egypt is far advanced on the road to obtaining what the avowed object of Great Britain is that all Oriental countries, with whom she has been in contact, should obtain. Though she has never been technically a part of the British Empire, she has been so nearly in that position as to bring her into line with countries such as those I have mentioned. She has won her way to technical independence as an ally. It will mean much for her and for the world if that independence becomes more than technical and if that alliance is sealed with the respect, the affection and the loyalty of the two peoples.

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